Major FARDC military offensive in eastern DRC turns to chaos
By Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu
The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) have been conducting major military offensives in North Kivu since October 31, 2019 to combat all the armed groups that are attacking the east of the country and destabilizing the Great Lakes region. General Army spokesman General Léon-Richard Kasonga told AFP: « The operations were launched from Nyaleke (Beni region) where the artillery shelled the rebel positions in the depths… » According to official FARDC sources, the start of operations was crowned with some success. The Congolese army took over some localities from local armed groups. This is particularly the case of Chochota camp, one of the major strongholds of the ADF rebels (Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), in the Beni territory (North Kivu), located about 12 kilometers north of the city of Oicha, in the « triangle of death » (the localities of Eringeti, Kamango and Mbau), according to an announcement of the army on November 17, 2019.
However, five days after the launch of these operations, the security situation in the operational zone quickly escalated. The information received by DESC from several military sources in North Kivu reports on a stalemates of the operation. The killings of civilians by « suspected ADF rebels » in the FARDC area of operation are sharply resumed. There are already about 100 killed in less a month of launching operations.
There is a great deal of confusion in the conduct of these operations, which highlight the disorganization of command and the inefficiency of actions on the ground. There is also a lack of clarity about the origins of some forces fighting on the ground. These include the presence of special units of the Rwandan army in these operations.
The present analysis will try to decipher the operational situation on this major offensive announced by the high political and military Congolese authorities.
The presidential statement of a major offensive in eastern Congo to put an end to armed groups
On 10 October 2019, after a three-day stay in Bukavu, South Kivu province, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Felix-Antoine Tshisekedi, made a statement to the people of Beni, a city ravaged by many years of attacks by the ADF terrorist movement, announcing a new major operation against terrorists. « We are about to launch the last attack against the ADF fighters in the coming days in order to exterminate them definitively, » he said, before adding: » I promise you that our brothers in the army are doing a good job and God willing, we will have the year-end celebrations in peace and security in Beni .« [1]
But the Congolese president will fail to inform the crowd that it was with foreign armies, those who sowed decades of desolation in eastern DRC that he promised to restore peace in the region.
On the same day, the Antonov 72 cargo plane carrying presidential logistics crashed after taking off from Goma. Its debris will be found a few days later in the territory of Kole, Sankuru province[2]. To date, the mystery remains unanswered about this accident whose authorities provide no credible information on the analysis of black boxes.
Plan of joint operations with regional armies, challenged by public opinion
A few days later, it was a five-page document emanating from a certain « Integrated General Staff » that raised an uproar on social networks. This document signed by the FARDC Chief of General Staff, Army General Célestin Mbala, authenticated by several military sources and military experts, mentioned the design of a joint military operations planning involving the DRC, the Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania against the many armed groups active in eastern DRC. These armies could, according to the document, provide special forces in the territory of the DRC, fire support units to combatant troops – with the collaboration of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and AFRICOM (the command of the American army for Africa) on certain aspects. The goal, according to the document, would be to conduct a major joint offensive against armed groups in both Kivu between November – in three phases, the first of which would begin as early as 15 and May 2020.[3]
But strong reactions against this document will lead some countries, including Uganda, and MONUSCO to disassociate themselves from this project. « From Uvira to Rutshuru, via the People’s Palace in Kinshasa, voices have been raised to protest against the prospect of an upcoming arrival of foreign armies in eastern DRC. « (…) In this document, it is also expected that the eastern neighbors will send special forces units. And this is what ruffles the civil society, still traumatized by the crimes committed by these armies during the two wars of Congo and these long years of occupation, wrote RFI[4].
Indeed, after two days of round table[5], on October 24 and 25, 2019, in Goma, supposed to establish the creation of an « integrated staff » of the region’s armed forces (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania) in order to allow the troops of these countries to take part in military operations against armed groups in the eastern DRC, Uganda withdrew by refusing to sign the final declaration[6]. A refusal that provoked the fury of the Rwandan government[7], highlighting the persistent tensions between the two countries on the verge of an armed escalation against a backdrop of destabilization of the entire Great Lakes region[8], despite the signature in August 2019 of a memorandum of understanding in Luanda, supposedly to put an end to the crisis[9].
The reluctance of several Congolese soldiers, hostile to the foreign military presence in the DRC, some fearing their physical elimination, according to a source of Congolese military intelligence, also played in the flip-flop of the Congolese authorities. Rwanda had rebelled against the Ugandan withdrawal. According to sources close to the case, the refusal of the UPDF – ordered by Yoweri Museveni – was motivated by the fact that it would allow the Rwanda Defense Force (RDF) to operate outside the perimeters allocated to it[10].
On 25 October 2019, MONUSCO will, in a cautious manner, distance itself from the Congolese initiative, while remaining available to support only the FARDC. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in the DRC, Leila Zerrougui, will say to this effect: « The mandate of MONUSCO is to support the FARDC and not the foreign forces that come to the DRC« [11]. She will say later on November 16, 2019 that MONUSCO is not directly involved in FARDC operations. « We work with the FARDC. The Congolese government has decided to make an offensive decision. It is an open decision. It’s not a joint operation we’re doing there. Joint operations are carried out after preparation and a joint plan but the MONUSCO was not associated, you can not go blindly« . It will also specify : « We are also working with the government in this area, we are providing support to respect the security of areas that remain not to allow infiltration and revenge on the population. We bring medical support to the wounded. We have a mandate of protecting civilians, supporting the FARDC and we must reassure ourselves« [12].
These de-escalations will finally push the Congolese authorities to carry out almost alone the military operations, with the support of the Rwandan special units, concealed in FARDC outfits, according to several military sources participating in these operations. We will come back to this in an upcoming analysis.
Ex-CNDP units deployed in areas of operations
According to information obtained from military sources, shortly before the start of operations, under the supervision of General Gabriel Amisi Tango Four, the FARDC Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of Operations and Intelligence, the ex-CNDP Rwandan regiments, the 2103th came from Tshikapa as well as the 2101th and 2102th regiments from Mbuji-Mayi, were deployed to North Kivu where they operate under the command of generals Bob Ngoy Kilubi and Bonane suspected of colluding with Rwanda. But these units are negatively distinguished in the massacres in Kasai between 2016 and 2018, repressing disproportionately militiamen of Kamwina Nsapu. They were also moved to the center of the country during the war against M23 for their support of this rebel group created by Rwanda and supported by Uganda.
It is also worth remembering that before the launch of military operations, President Felix Tshisekedi had appointed Brigadier General Jacques CHALINGOZA NDURU, former rebel leader of the Bosco Ntaganda UPC, to the post of Commander of Military Operations Sokola 1 who have been tracking the rebels « ADF » since the beginning of 2014 in Beni. In a DESC article that painted the portrait of General Nduru, we put forward the hypothesis of the risk of increasing the escalation of massacres in Beni[13].
According to a senior military intelligence officer : « The day we changed the command of the Sokola 1 operational sector, I told you that it is a way of putting one’s leader in charge of the mission of betraying his nation. Chalingiza Nduru is first of all the result of the UPDF, the Ugandan army from Thomas Lubanga’s rebellion, before approaching Rwanda via Bosco Ntaganda. In addition, he is a Nilotic, one thing is that JKK can never venture to place any officer in this zone. Yet we have many able officers to whom we can give the task of helping their compatriots, despite we have exceeded the rate of treacherous officers who have agreed to obey an individual because of the money and promotion in rank instead of applying the military oath to serve Nation faithfully with loyalty. »
Before the launch of operations, in December 2018, General Gabriel Amisi Tango Four had crisscrossed the eastern part of the country to set up the current military apparatus and decide on the locations of Rwandan troops. A few weeks before the launch of these operations, General Gaston Ilunga Kampete, Commander of the Republican Guard (GR), had also visited the eastern part of the country to oversee the deployment of armored troops from Kinshasa to Kisangani by rail and other armored units transported from Lubumbashi and Kimbembe via Kindu. These different armored units are responsible for supporting the various operational areas planned for the widespread offensive against national and foreign armed groups. It should be recalled that before his appointment as head of the FARDC, General Gaston Ilunga Kampete was the commander of the integrated task force of the Republican Guard for several years. His units, along with the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade, had played an important role in the defeat of the M23. His presence in the area of operations, given his command of the field, involves coaching the new task force commander, Brigadier General Mike Mikombe. Unfortunately, it must also be recognized that the means used by these units are inappropriate and ineffective in the face of an adversary concealed between the offensive lines of the army and using asymmetric combat methods.
Disorganization of command and pecuniary motives behind these operations
This is the finding that is noted by several Congolese military sources. They note the disorganization of the units by the FARDC military command which allegedly inflated the military to divert money from the fictitious and the fighters. Military leaders take advantage of these operations to gain financial health. According to a source from the FARDC General Staff, the current military operations would cost between US $ 6 million and US $ 10 million.
In fact, the troops deployed in North Kivu would be 21.000 men, according to a source of military information. This is the figure communicated to President Tshisekedi by the operational staff. In reality, there are several thousand fictitious people in these figures. I had already mentioned it in an article by François Misser of La Libre Belgique : « The strategy of the FARDC senior officers is to maintain a certain level of conflictuality that allows them to get their hands on the bonuses of the soldiers they manage as well as on additional operational budgets and to engage in fuel traffic »[14].
This cannibalization of operational military means renders the operations ineffective. This is what explains a company commander engaged on the front : « Regarding these operations, I too am engaged as a company commander. We operated on X [15]. The means at stake are not enough for the enemy’s asymmetrical combat methods. The fire support and the logistic support are ineffective, the armament of the troops on the ground is insufficient and not in conformity with the TD ».[16]
To my question as to whether the enemy is clearly identified by the intelligence units and the command of operations, my interlocutor replies: « Negative, because if he were well identified we would have eradicated him in a short time. Until then, we are only referring to the old positions of the enemy that we knew from the time of the operations led by the late Lucien Bahuma. And some of his positions were found deserted during the offensives. The level of our intelligence services is low: we do not manage to know the migratory movements of the enemy, and the population pays the price. Except that we must recognize that the enemy has lost many of these advanced positions but its exact location is a problem for now.«
Another unit commander will tell me that « on the ground we feel that the operations are not conducted to eradicate the ADF, but rather to cause confusion for the purpose of legitimizing the false thesis of ‘Islamic terrorism’. »
Radio Okapi reported the presence of at least ten FARDC generals deployed in Beni as part of the ADF operations. Two of the 3rd defense zone, two at the head of Sokola 1 operations, two others at the head of the 32nd Brigade of Rapid Reaction Units while one heads the 31st Brigade of commando units. Three generals, respectively of the logistics base, the military engineering corps and the naval force are also in the region[17]. And a military officer adds: « When appointing a brigadier general [Ed. Jacques Chalingoza Nduru] as commander of the operations and is surrounded by at least nine other brigade generals and a major general more senior than him, it is the imbroglio that one wants to create in the field of operations. This is what is happening on the various fronts. »
MONUSCO has made the following observation: » The Congolese army has structural weaknesses that make it unlikely a success without new resources, » assures a former cadre of the force of MONUSCO. « It lacks well-trained special forces and intelligence. Its deficit is even more acute with regard to aviation. It lost two of its three Mi24 attack helicopters in the Virunga Mountains in 2017 and therefore has no capacity in the matter. As for the MONUSCO air support, it is insufficient.« [18]
Towards an announced military stagnation, failing to draw lessons from the past ?
Although the start of large-scale operations has been relatively successful, it is clear that one week later, the security situation appears to be deteriorating considerably. Several foreign observers and military experts note a lack of army preparedness. To date, more than 100 civilians have been killed in the region.
On the operational level, the units are deployed in a strange way. The civil society (which counts the dead) points out that the operations are concentrated only around Beni city and do not cover the sectors where the attacks against the civilians are committed. The attackers can thus continue to kill the population while the army and the authorities speak of an offensive to eradicate an enemy who at the same time operates freely in the famous triangle of death[19] located between Mbau, Kamango and Eringeti. In a document entitled «la population de l’axe sacrifiée » (the population of the Mavivi-Kaima axis sacrificed) addressed to the commander of Sokola 1 operations, this citizen structure states that the population is exposed even in the places where the FARDC positions are. It pleads for the securing of the Mavivi-Kainama road and recommends the hunt for all Mayi-Mayi groups still active in Beni. Civil society also calls for investigations into the quality of military interventions during ADF attacks[20].
This is not the first time that the Congolese military authorities have launched military operations in the east of the DRC. Since the joint military operation with the Rwandan army, Umoja Wetu, in January 2009 through other military operations – Kimia 2 in May 2009 and Amani Leo in January 2010 – the results of all these operations remain ineffective and the insecurity persists in this part of the Congo. Ongoing operations and the massacres of civilians by the rebels are displacing the population. This has aggravated the humanitarian situation in a region still facing the Ebola epidemic.
An indolent and ineffective MONUSCO, on the verge of complicity
The conclusion that can be drawn from the continued presence of MONUC and MONUSCO in DRC, since 20 years, is that its action remains generally below the expected results. The DRC, especially in its eastern part, is far from stable and continues to face constant insecurity caused by both FARDC and PNC armed men and about 130 armed groups. Following the killings that took place on the night of 24 to 25 November 2019, the people of Beni, angry, went to burn MONUSCO barracks in the operational sector. The inhabitants of Beni denounce the « inaction » of the Congolese army and the Blue Helmets in the face of repeated killings attributed to the ADF in the region. The UN plays all its credibility in the current security crisis in the DRC.
Conclusion and recommendations : change strategic plan
Insecurity in the east of the country can not be solved with a minimalist military vision focused solely on the DRC, but it also requires political, diplomatic and judicial components. Indeed, military action must be part of a comprehensive strategy that incorporates a series of non-military measures aimed in particular at cutting off the sources of supply, support and funding for armed groups. It also requires networking intelligence services to properly identify the threat and the leaders of these groups. The leadership of these groups should be isolated from their bases by targeted actions against their leaders and by putting in place incentives to encourage defections and voluntary surrenders.
At the regional geopolitical level, the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement remains actually a framework and a global and multilateral basis of solution to the regional crisis which requires that solutions be taken in a regional geopolitical systemic framework, but also elsewhere, mainly in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. By signing this Agreement, the countries of the region undertake, inter alia, to:
Do not interfere in the internal affairs of other neighboring states;
Not condone or assist or support any armed groups;
Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring states.
Moreover, how can military success be envisaged when the Congolese military hierarchy remains in the hands of the same general officers who have been enthroned for several decades without being able to make the FARDC perform well ? With the political alternation, the President of the Republic could demonstrate some of his constitutional prerogatives as supreme commander of the armies to begin by a professionalization of the army and renewal of its hierarchy, accounting for the current dilapidation.
It is not with generals such as John Numbi, Gabriel Amisi Tango Four and Delphin Kahimbi, who are under international sanctions, that the Congolese army will regain its effectiveness. Their retention in the high command posts of the army and National Defense serves the efficiency of the army. Many units operating in eastern DRC are also beyond the control of operational commanders. Several units deployed to the east must be moved elsewhere.
These poor performance of the army is an opportunity to change the doctrinal paradigm, if President Tshisekedi really wants to stand out from the failing security governance of his predecessor. Realistic and credible leads exist, but it is all about his real political will and his ability to really fulfill his duties as supreme commander of the armed forces. It will be, moreover, politically, the first beneficiary in the medium term. On the other hand, continuing to pursue the same strategy as Joseph Kabila may have a negative impact on his political future when he is already handicapped by the legitimacy of his power acquired following elections tainted by serious irregularities and in violation of the electoral law.
Good preparation of operations and sensitization of people before and during operations, judicial actions and appropriate tactics using anti-guerilla techniques and not conventional warfare techniques can help the FARDC to progressively eradicate insecurity in the region. .
The international community should also be actively involved as in 2013 after the fall of Goma. As the UN Security Council prepares to renew the mandate of MONUSCO, the new strategic review should strengthen MONUSCO’s mandate by providing for the creation of additional units to set up a second intervention brigade with SADC countries, including Angola, which has not yet participated in operations in the east of the country. This new brigade should have a special mandate to carry out robust and targeted coercive operations against all armed groups in eastern Congo, unilaterally and not jointly with the FARDC.
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu / DESC exclusivity
Notes
[1] https://www.politico.cd/news/la-une/2019/10/10/a-beni-felix-tshisekedi-announces-military-operation-of-the-dimension -the-terrorists.html .
[2] https://afridesk.org/the-crash-of-lantonov-72-affected-by-the-presidence-of-the-rdc-the-questions-of-desc/ .
[3] https://afrique.lalibre.be/42597/rdc-the-military-operations-in-the-with-the-armees-sides-divide/ .
[4] http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20191024-operations-conjointes-rdc-project-not-unanimity .
[5] This roundtable was attended by Congolese army chief of staff Celestin Mbala, Ugandan land forces chief Peter Elwelu, Rwandan military intelligence chief Vincent Nyakarundi and Monusco observers (led by French General Thierry Lion, Deputy Commander of the Force) as well as the command of the US Army in Africa (Africom).
[6] https://blog.kivusecurity.org/fr/enter-of-foreign-foreign-for-which-the-reunion-of- goma-to-fail / .
[7] https://www.softpower.ug/rwanda-furious-as-uganda-declines-to-sign-mou-on-joint-military-op erations-in-dr-congo / .
[8] La Lettre de l’Océan Indien, N°1508, 1er Novembre 2019.
[9] http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20191102-tensions-rwanda-ouganda-frontiere/ .
[10] La Lettre de l’Océan Indien, N°1508, 1er Novembre 2019.
[11] https://www.radiookapi.net/2019/10/25/news/security/leila-ze rrougui-the-mandate-of-monusco-is-to-support-the-fardc-and .
[12] ht tps: //www.politico.cd/continued/2019/11/16/last-offensive-of-fardc-on-the-adf-monusco-not-not-associated-by- what-can-not-go-to-laveuglette.html .
[13] https://afridesk.org/qui-est-lex-rebelle-upc-and-general-jacques-itshalingoza-nduru-the-new-commandant-of-sokola-1-a-beni-jj -wondo /.
[14] https://afrique.lalibre.be/41799/rdc-qui-arme-les-rebelles/.
[15] We do not mention the exact place to preserve the identity of the source.
[16] Staffing table of units in armament and ammunition.[17] https://www.radiookapi.net/2019/11/17/actualite/securite/nord-kivu-48-civils-tues-en-7-jours-dans-les-attaques-des-adf -beni .
[18] https://blog.kivusecurity.org/en/entree-of-foreign-foreign-groups-why-the-goma-summary-reunion/ .
[19] http://afridesk.org/crisis-de-beni-comprendre-the-deep-help-of-military-fiasco-and-the-promises-mensongeres- b-musavuli / [20] https://www.radiookapi.net/2019/11/17/actualite/securite/nord-kivu-48-civils-tues-en-7-jours-dans-le s attacks ADF-des Beni.
