Two years after his accession to power, what can we learn from the governance of President Félix Tshisekedi when he is trying to set up a new heterogeneous political coalition to support his political action ?

On the political level: a political cacophony that incapacitates presidential action 

The day after he came to power in January 2019, after elections whose results were contested by several independent observers? including the Congolese Catholic Church[1], Félix Tshisekedi and Joseph Kabila allowed the DRC to experience an unprecedented political alternation in its contemporary history. The originality of this alternation in power, which is not really in the proper sense of the term as it is understood in politics, is that President Félix Tshisekedi was forced to share power with the coalition of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, who kept control over almost all the institutions of the Republic, notably in the government and in the two chambers of parliament. 

This original situation, that some define as an unusual cohabitation (Yamba, 2019) spawned the reality salt is that Joseph Kabila continues to have an influence on the main domains such as justice, the army, the pol ice and security services. The consequence of this was to deprive the Congolese president of the main levers that should allow him to have effective control of the management of the State. Since the start of 2020, the former partners in power, Front commun pour le Congo (FCC), the platform led by Kabila, and Cap pour le changement (CACH), the platform led by Tshisekedi, maintain rather tense relations marked by several political clashes.

This led to a blockage of executive action in the sense that there was a kind of two-headed government. On the one hand, that of the CACH which would receive its directives from the Palais de la Nation and on the other hand that of the FCC which swore only by the hierarchy of this mega political platform.[2] The two groups ended up mutually neutralizing each other to the point that in October 2020, President Tshisekedi, exasperated by insoluble internal conflicts and meetings, decided to consult the vital forces of the nation.

These consultations resulted in the breakdown of the FCC-CACH government coalition and the creation of a new composite political coalition called the Union Sacrée de la Nation (USN).[3]

The two years of the presidential mandate were also negatively impacted by the dysfunctions of a bloated, nepotistic and incompetent presidential cabin and agency, which became the new sanctuary for corruption and all kinds of unimaginable influence peddling.[4]

All-round energetic diplomatic activism with mixed results at the regional level

As soon as he came to power, President Tshisekedi multiplied trips and political contacts to attempt a political opening towards Congo’s external partners with a view to obtaining diplomatic and even security support. The United States of America is the first Western country to clearly demonstrate its desire to forge a strategic partnership with the DRC in support of the Congolese president, particularly in the field of defense in April 2019, during a visit by Tshisekedi to Washington.[5] Other countries have followed suit. In less than 15 months, the Congolese president has made no less than 30 visits abroad.

If these trips made it possible to open up the DRC diplomatically at the international level, at the regional level, President Tshisekedi is struggling to impress the diplomatic leadership of the DRC in the resolution of the recurring crises that plague the region. On the contrary, Rwanda’s influence on the internal political and regional and African diplomatic plan of the DRC has increased over the past two years. These private comments from a senior Rwandan security official say a lot: « In DRC, following the collapse of the political coalition between Kabila’s camp and Tshisekedi Camp. The  parliamentary majority has changed in favor of Tshisekedi camp. Today the coalition government has resigned, a new pro-Tshisekedi government will be put in place soon and a new speaker will be elected. As Rwanda we have a very close cooperation with Thisekedi administration. The ongoing changes can only be seen positively ».

The Congolese absence at the mini-summit of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) on the crisis in the CAR of January 29, 2021, is another example of the diplomatic lethargy of the Congolese presidency, a few days before the presidency Congolese of the AU. However, the DRC shares more than 1557 km of common border with the CAR and that thousands of Central African refugees have taken refuge in the DRC, pursued by rebels. At the same time, Rwanda and Angola, not having a common border with the CAR, have shown themselves to be very enterprising in the resolution of the Central African crisis.

On the judicial level: laudable attempts at the emancipation of justice 

One of the positive elements to be put to the credit of President Félix Tshisekedi is his desire to initiate justice reforms, with the fight against corruption as a priority. Congolese justice timidly regains its independence despite certain constraints that remain. A few reckless (Congolese) magistrates realize that the judicial institution they embody can fully play its role as the last bulwark against all kinds of abuses and anti-values. On land, however, the road still remains long to go especially as we still see in a kind of hushed instrumentalization of this court by the presidency to some political overtones records.

Some members of the presidential cabinet continue to interfere in the conduct of justice. They give injunctions to the magistrates as to the decisions to be taken in certain cases, entrusts us a magistrate member of the Superior Council of the magistrature. We note, for example, a statement by President Tshisekedi who explained in September 2019 “that he did not intend to go snooping in the past and did not have time to bring the alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses to respond of their actions”. Tshisekedi said “I have too much work and no time to waste with settling scores“.[6] Amnesty International’s report cites concrete examples of political injunctions to magistrates to “suspend” arrest warrants against high executives of rebel movements or warlords who are clearly identified.[7]

In addition, out of all the Courts and tribunals in the country, only the jurisdictions of the Courts of Appeal of Kinshasa / Gombe and Matete were noted with a few arrests and detentions of certain big names, prosecuted for embezzlement of public funds then released without trial or any other form of sanction. Contrary to the changes naively applauded by public opinion in the judicial field, the news from the courthouses shows the return in force of the anti-values ​​decried under the previous regimes.

In terms of human rights

We can credit President Tshisekedi for efforts to humanize the intelligence services. Several underground cells of the ANR and the DGM were closed. Police officers and delinquent soldiers are increasingly punished at the disciplinary and judicial levels.

The human rights situation throughout the country remains very worrying. In 2020, the Joint United Nations Office for Human Rights (UNJHRO) documented 7,909 human rights violations and abuses. These figures are up around 21% compared to 2019. This increase is the result of the deterioration of the security situation in the provinces affected by the armed conflict, particularly in North Kivu, Ituri and South Kivu where the UNJHRO recorded the overwhelming majority (93%) of violations and abuses over the past year. At least 2,945 civilians were killed including 553 women and 286 children. Almost all of these violations are attributable to State agents, including 52% to PNC agents, 28% to FARDC soldiers, 6% to ANR agents and 12% to other state agents.[8]

Human Rights Watch points to worsening human rights violations. According to Thomas Fessy, senior researcher on DR Congo Human Rights: “The administration of President Félix Tshisekedi in the Democratic Republic of Congo has increasingly cracked down on the media and activist groups since taking office two years ago. Despite some initial measures aimed at advancing human rights, the authorities threatened, arbitrarily arrested, illegally detained and prosecuted dozens of journalists, activists and others deemed critical of the government ”.[9]

Defense and security in free fall

On the defense front, President Tshisekedi seems to be gradually counterbalancing the influence of his predecessor by making tribal regionalism prevail in the appointments to strategic positions in the army.[10] The restructuring that took place in the command of the Republican Guard, the presidential protection unit, in April 2020 and of the army in July 2020 seem to favor general officers from Kasai, his geographical origin area.[11]

With an estimated workforce of 176,000, despite the political alternation, the FARDC remains an operationally weak army with a vague, and almost non-existent battle order . There is a disorganization of the army due to unsuccessful reforms, the integration of militias and unruly rebellions. An army where contradictory hierarchical loyalty mechanisms coexist which complicate the effectiveness of troops engaged in combat, victims of internal complicity with local and foreign armed groups and rivalries between heads of units. There are recurring problems of indiscipline and cohesion (unity of command). The morale of the troops engaged in the fighting remains anemic due to the lack of financial means to properly maintain the military. Military balances remain low, bonuses are regularly diverted by the hierarchy. Nepotism and patronage continue to take hold in the army. In addition, the FARDC remains an army with inadequate and obsolete logistics to effectively support operational units deployed in combat zones, with incomplete staffing tables.

Army reform has stalled since 2013. No pragmatic DDR plan[12] has been initiated for more than two years to usefully reintegrate the demobilized rebels into society. On the contrary, government continues to integrate them massively into the army as a bonus to their lack of discipline. The skills of the military remain insufficient, the command is poorly trained and lacking and the basic training of officers is at a premium.[13] The absence of a military planning law hinders the modernization of the army. Presidential efforts, disorderly and not conceptualized in a comprehensive strategic plan for army reform, to relaunch bilateral military cooperation – never broken under Joseph Kabila – have not yet impacted the operational effectiveness of the FARDC.

Table: FARDC scale in April 2020

Sources : FARDC / DESC General Staff. US $ 1 = 1974  CF (as of 02/01/2021)

On the security front, the DRC continues to face several internal and external threats. The army is engaged in several unsuccessful military operations, notably in Beni, Ituri and South Kivu. The overall security situation in the DRC remains of great concern. The large-scale military operations announced by the President and carried out since November 2019 in Beni and Ituri are getting bogged down. 2,127 civilians killed, 1,450 kidnapped, the Kivu Security Tracker (KST) recorded a record number of deaths, kidnappings and kidnappings for ransom during the first twenty months of Felix Tshisekedi’s presidency . This record is even heavier than that of the last 20 months of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila (1,553 civilians killed).[14] Beni and Ituri remain the epicenter of insecurity and the odious massacres committed on the civilian populations in the face of the military powerlessness of the FARDC.

In addition, several armies and rebel groups from countries neighboring the DRC are reported on Congolese territory. These include Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Angola.^[15] Urban crime is also growing in Kinshasa and in the urban centers of Haut-Katanga, Lualaba , Kongo Central and North Kivu.^[16]

Presidential economic action unreadable and below the expectations of the population

The DRC’s economic environment has deteriorated considerably, largely due to the coronavirus crisis. Economic growth has continued to contract since President Tshisekedi came to power. In two years of presidency of Felix Tshisekedi, the Congolese government added only 20,000 CDF (10 US dollars) to the salaries of agents and civil servants of the State of the Democratic Republic of Congo. It was in October 2019 that this salary increase was made.[17] The Observatory of Public Expenditure (ODEP) notes a negative result in the infrastructure sector.[18] We are witnessing very little evolution of the major infrastructure projects launched by President Tshisekedi.[19]

Despite a higher mining export potential, the DRC remains seriously confronted with a dualist economy where the informal sector supports the majority of the population against the mining sector, which is very capital intensive but opaque and which employs little and whose revenues are low, evaporated in tax evasion, fraud, embezzlement of public funds as well as all forms of corruption.

Since coming to power, Félix Tshisekedi’s regime has been characterized by a frantic increase in non-productive or prestige public spending. In addition, the numerous scandals linked to corruption and embezzlement of public funds mean that the Congolese do not yet feel the effects of the changes at the top of the state on a daily basis. The purchasing power of the Congolese remains marginal enough to encourage the production of wealth. To this must be added the fall in economic growth, which is not inclusive, monetary inflation and the appalling surge in the prices of consumer goods. The depreciation of the Congolese franc against the dollar observed in 2020 has bled the salaries of civil servants and armed men.

According to the international monetary expert and former Minister of the Economy of Zaire, Raoul Donge , “ The DRC does not have a production capable of meeting Congolese consumption needs, most of the primary and secondary goods consumed come from outside. As the Congolese trade balance is in a permanent deficit, the foreign currency is highly sought after by economic agents to meet the ever-increasing import needs. This results in the continued depreciation of the national currency against the dollar. .. Even a devaluation under the current circumstances will not solve anything! “[20]

In addition, the government mobilized in 2020 only 3.7 billion USD in public revenue. The Treasury account shows an annual deficit of CDF 991.8 billion, which was offset both by advances from the Central Bank of Congo, between January and April 2020, and by budget support from the IMF and ADB. The initial 2020 budget of the central government was estimated at 11.2 billion USD before being reduced to 5.7 billion USD in the Amending Budget.[21]

Despite the presidential intention to fight corruption, poor economic governance and corruption are still anchored at all levels of power (Presidency, Parliament, Executive, Justice, public enterprises, etc.). The situation is hardly improving. Corruption is on the rise. The Corruption Perceptions Index of Transparancy International ranks the DRC to the 170^th out of 179 countries. The country fell two places compared to 2019 (168^th).

On the social level: checkmate!  

Of socio-democratic political obedience and with the slogan ” The People first “, it is on the social level that the Congolese expected from President Tshisekedi the first effects of the alternation in power. The prospective analysis made by Al Kitenge and Nick Elebe on the social impact of covid-19 suggests the following : “The social and economic situation of the country has clearly deteriorated to the point of making precariousness the norm. In a dollarized economy, highly extroverted, little creator of jobs, whose projections are dependent on its natural and mineral resources, negative market fluctuations, declining prices for natural resources, or any other factor likely to influence the market international, are felt directly and without a net on the common people, as on the government which loses its means ”.^[22]

Employment is a major issue for the Congolese state. So far, the government has failed to take measures or initiatives to reduce the unemployment rates of an impoverished, mostly young population. The government has not mobilized resources needed to support the jobs creation. The coronavirus crisis even negatively impacted the informal sector of the economy.

The DRC, despite its hydrographic potential and water resources, barely has an electrification rate of 15% and a drinking water supply rate of around 26%, the lowest in Africa. The country is ranked in the 177^th spot out of 190 countries according to the indicator on access to electricity Report Doing Business 2020 of the World Bank). No financial effort is made to consider lasting solutions to the difficulties in providing water and electricity services. However, the Electricity for All Program by 2030, drawn up by the UNDP, plans to invest up to 66 billion USD to succeed in connecting every Congolese to electric energy in the DRC. This project has never seen the start of implementation to date due to lack of political will.[23]

Education: free basic education deemed beneficial but insufficient

All observers praised President Tshisekedi’s decision to make basic education free. It was the biggest challenge for the current Congolese Head of State, Félix Tshisekedi, on his accession to the presidency of the Republic. To date, the effectiveness of free education still faces several problems and seems to be running out of steam. There is an absence of its conceptualization and upstream planning and the absence of an impact analysis in terms of the implementation of this measure. Factors which are aggravated by the fraud, the misappropriation of public funds and weaknesses in internal controls such as deplored by the General Inspectorate of Finance (IGF), which led the World Bank to suspend financing of 100 million dollars for the education sector.[24] In its report on the state of play of free basic education in the DRC, the National Episcopal Conference of Congo (CENCO) noted that free education suffers from a leadership deficit within the educational sector, characterized by short-term actions, the absence of long-term vision and planning and budgeting.[25]

The failing health sector continues

The Congolese health system remains precarious and is under tension amplified by the coronavirus crisis. Malnutrition, the lack of quality health infrastructure and the non-launch of the flagship presidential project for universal health coverage announced with a bang in February 2020 have a negative impact on the development of Congolese human capital. Funding for the health sector is declining and remains low compared to the size of the challenges and is declining despite the coronavirus crisis. Indeed, the 2020 health budget was 1.682,37 billion against CDF 1.453,48 billion CDF in 2021[26], ie a decrease of about 14 %.

In the DRC, as of January 28,2021, we officially note an accumulation of 22,455 cases of Covid-19 infections, including 665 deaths and 14,997 cured[27]. Although far from South Africa (1,430,648) or the countries of North Africa, the number of infected places the DRC to the 13^th position (out of 57) among the most infected countries Africa. The second wave of infections seems more devastating than the first which was observed in 2020. The authorities are urged to redouble their efforts to contain this pandemic and limit its spread. The DRC is one of the countries that combine the risk factors (high poverty rate, weak health system and overcrowded urban areas) and where the impact of the pandemic could be devastating.[28]

However, we must salute the effectiveness of the measures taken by President Tshisekedi, upon coming to power, to eradicate the Ebola epidemic.

Conclusion

Two years after his accession to power, the record of President Felix Tshisekedi remains rather bleak, apart from a few isolated improvements. We particularly welcome the release of several political detainees. The consequences of the electoral crisis handicapped the presidential action and the government in a double political and institutional crisis which sacrificed the socio-economic aspects. The political crisis comes at the same time with restriction of the democratic space, a slow drift towards authoritarianism and rising rights violations humans according to the UN. The macroeconomic indicators are all almost in the red. The lawyer Frédéric Bola indexes a regime that resorts to perfidy and legal imbroglio in its practices. Economic activity is slowing down and poverty is gaining ground across the country, exacerbated by increasing insecurity and the second wave of contaminations from the coronavirus crisis. The political deadlock between the FCC and CACH did not allow the implementation of structural and institutional reforms supposed to strengthen the rule of law, democracy, good governance and the fight against corruption and impunity. Pending the effective implementation of the Government from the Union sacrée new coalition, a kind of political potluck is taking place, while President Tshisekedi has only a little over two years to present the assessment of his “ People first ” program for which he will be the only accountant to the nation in 2023. After the beginnings and complacency in the choices of his collaborators, it is therefore time to really get to work. 

Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu / DESC exclusivity

Political analyst and expert on military and security issues

References

[1] Alain-Joseph Lomandja, « Présidentielle du 30 décembre 2018 en RDC : des résultats non conformes au vote du peuple ? » DESC, 13 janvier 2020. https://afridesk.org/presidentielle-du-30-decembre-2018-en-rdc-des-resultats-non-conformes-au-vote-du-peuple-aj-lomandja/.

[2] https://www.digitalcongo.net/article/5dc3e3451b628500042cd94a/.

[3] Christophe Rigaud : RDC : le Premier ministre destitué au forceps. Afrikarabia, 27 janvier 2021. http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/rdc-le-premier-ministre-destitue-au-forceps/.

[4] We can cite the Lobo case (or Lobogate : https://afridesk.org/lobogate-ou-le-scandale-qui-etale-les-tensions-et-les-insatisfances-du-cabinet- du-president-tshisekedi-jj-wondo / , The Trial of Kamerhe, Samih Jamal, etc.) ; The corruption case that splashed the brand new Agency for the prevention and fight against corruption, etc.

[5] Zoom Eco. 2019 (12 avril). « RDC-USA : ce que prévoit le partenariat stratégique pour « la paix et la prospérité ». En ligne sur : https://zoom-eco.net/a-la-une/rdc-usa-ce-que-prevoit-le-partenariat-strategique-pour-la-paix-et-la-prosperite/

[6] https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/09/22/felix-tshisekedi-j-ai-trop-de-travail-et-pas-de-temps-a-perdre-avec-des-reglements-de-compte_6012599_3212.html.

[7] https://afrique.lalibre.be/45950/rdc-maigre-bilan-pour-lan-1-du-regne-tshisekedi/.

[8] https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/bcnudh_-_communique_de_presse_-_note_annuelle_2020.pdf.

[9] https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2021/01/28/rd-congo-la-repression-sintensifie.

[10] Rigaud, C. 2020 (18 juillet). « RDC : jeu de chaise musicales dans l’armée congolaise ». En ligne sur : http://afrikarabia.com/wordpress/rdc-jeu-de-chaises-musicales-dans-larmee-congolaise/.

Romain, G. & Bujakera, S. 2020 (19 juillet). Jeune Afrique. « RDC : sous pression des États-Unis, Félix Tshisekedi procède à un prudent remaniement dans l’armée ». En ligne sur : https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee/.

[11] Wondo, J-J. 2020 (27 avril). « Restructuration du commandement de la Garde républicaine : qui gagne, qui perd entre Tshisekedi et Kabila ? » En ligne sur : https://afridesk.org/restructuration-du-commandement-de-la-garde-republicaine-qui-gagne-qui-perd-entre-tshisekedi-et-kabila-jj-wondo-2/. Wondo, J-J. 2020 (31 juillet). Remaniement du commandement des FARDC par Félix Tshisekedi : attentes et désillusions – https://afridesk.org/remaniement-du-commandement-des-fardc-par-felix-tshisekedi-attentes-et-desillusions-jj-wondo/.

[12] Désarmement – démobilisation et réinsertion.

[13] JJ Wondo, La France, en perte de vitesse en Afrique, et sa nouvelle École de guerre à Kinshasa – DESC, 14 janvier 2021. https://afridesk.org/la-france-en-perte-de-vitesse-en-afrique-et-sa-nouvelle-ecole-de-guerre-a-kinshasa-jj-wondo/.

[14] https://blog.kivusecurity.org/divisions-between-tshisekedists-and-kabilists-paralyze-the-state-in-eastern-drc/.

[15] https://actualite.cd/2020/06/20/rdc-invasion-de-larmee-angolaise-signalee-au-kongo-central.

[16] https://legrandcongo.com/rdc-insecurite-et-montee-vertigineuse-du-banditisme-a-kinshasa-et-lubumbashi-gilbert-kankonde-calme-les-esprits-des-senateurs/.

[17] https://deskeco.com/2021/01/27/lan-2-de-felix-tshisekedi-seulement-20000-fc-ont-ete-ajoutes-au-salaire-des-agents-et.

[18] https://deskeco.com/2021/01/27/lan-2-de-tshisekedi-globalement-tous-les-aspects-lies-aux-infrastructures-sont-negatifs.

[19] https://deskeco.com/2021/01/27/lan-2-de-felix-tshisekedi-tous-les-grands-projets-dinfrastructures-au-point-mort.

[20] Interview with the author on August 3, 2020.

[21] https://deskeco.com/2021/01/23/rdc-le-gouvernement-na-mobilise-en-2020-que-37-milliards-usd-de-recettes-publiques.

[22] http://afridesk.org/covid-19-et-faim-deux-guerres-intrinsequement-liees-nick-elebe-et-al-kitenge/.

[23] https://deskeco.com/2020/11/10/rdc-face-aux-difficultes-de-desserte-en-eau-et-en-electricite-le-gouvernement-ilunkamba.

[24] https://zoom-eco.net/a-la-une/rdc-la-banque-mondiale-gele-100-millions-usd-dappui-au-systeme-educatif-et-exige-la-bonne-gouvernance/

[25] https://actualite.cd/2021/01/13/gratuite-de-lenseignement-de-base-en-rdc-parmi-ses-9-recommandations-la-cenco-propose-le.

[26] https://budget.gouv.cd/wp-content/uploads/budget2021/plf2021/doc5_analyse_explicative_depenses_2021.pdf.

[27] https://infosplus.org/covid-19-133-nouveaux-cas-enregistres-le-jeudi-28-janvier-2021/.

[28] Jonas Kibala Kuma, L’économie mondiale face à la pandémie de la covid-19 : Etat des lieux, analyses et perspectives.