War against the Daech : The United States and Russia allies goals ?
A personal opinion of Francis Briquemont, retired Lieutenant General
On August 29th in “La Libre Belgique”, referring to some “passions” that trouble our world today, we cited the war against the Islamic State (EI) or Daech. This artificial state with no future could have easily be annihilated if the international community and especially the Arab and Muslim states that surround it had “really” declared war, which was not the case.
Recently, however, the situation has changed in the Middle East. Iran, having accepted the waiver agreement to nuclear weapons proposed by the “5 + 1”, finds an important role in the strategic game of power in this region. Russia decided to intervene militarily. The United States are reviewing their strategy and have just announced the end of their program to train and arm the Syrian rebels by replacing it with another, “less ambitious and focused” as written so beautifully “La Libre” 10 October. I wonder if the United States and Russia do not become gradually allies “objective” to try to resolve this political formula and incantation rather ambiguous: “Neither Daech nor Bashar al-Assad.”

In fact, today, two coalitions face. A Sunni coalition consists mainly Saudi Arabia and Turkey, with the main objective regional supremacy (which postulates the elimination of Syria Bashar al-Assad) and, incidentally (?), Neutralizing Daech, terrorist state and expression of the most extreme Sunni radicalism. The second coalition, Shiite, brings together Iran, Iraq, Syria’s Bashar Assad, Hezbollah of Lebanon. It fights against the territorial extension of Daech wants its disappearance and the maintenance at any cost of a Shiite arc from Iran to Lebanon via Syria Alawites.
Necessity of ground troops
Westerners (especially the US and France) have engaged in this quarrel between Muslims with an unclear political strategy (see above) and a military strategy doomed to failure because it never managed that is ie: to win a ground war with air power alone. Except perhaps some general American airmen who believed that it was once possible and including General Colin Powell laughed gently in his memoirs (1), I have never seen or read a general who does not affirmed with belief that a ground war could not be won with ground troops. It is even more obvious since most conflicts have become unbalanced and intrastate wars.
We will not rewrite history in recent years but Western politicians today (except in France perhaps) seem paralyzed at the idea of even commit ground troops for a very simple reason: just to compare the losses (killed and injured) land forces with air power and sea for twenty-five years to understand why politicians are reluctant to take such a decision, unpopular in public opinion of our democracies. It is in this context that we must place the actions of Vladimir Putin to the Middle East.
A reminder first: the strategy of a state is the result of an appreciation (the highest level) rational, without qualms even cynical interests of the state. The ethics or morality, international law, history often serve only to “gift wrap” to justify it. It is therefore necessary, and it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the real strategy followed by a state and the more or less dramatic speeches by its leaders in fora such as the UN, NATO, the EU or when press conferences.
Some speak of “gamble” of Vladimir Putin and disapprove his intervention in Syria. Did he not rather drawn logical conclusions from “his” movie? To destroy Daech and other terrorist groups, he thinks like … everyone!, It is necessary to have ground troops. Russia is not much more enthusiastic than Westerners for meaningful outside intervention in its operational ground units, Putin concluded that the only consistent units yet to face Daech and many small clans Syrian rebels are those of Bashar al-Assad. By supporting massively, it helps sanctuaries western Syria – the Alawites, the stronghold of Assad – which corresponds perfectly to the strategic interests of Russia (presence in the eastern Mediterranean naval base of Tartus, facilities of logistical support). So to Putin, it must first support that remains more or less coherent Syrian state (which does not mean keeping Assad in power at any cost) and then “liquidate” by supporting as Daech east Kurdish Peshmerga and the new (?) Iraqi army (predominantly Shiite), backed by Iran. The Russian strategy therefore seems logical enough: while defending its interests is involved in the fight against terrorism.
Participation by speeches
The strategy of the West and particularly the United States and France is more ambiguous. The slogan “Neither Daech nor Assad” does not mean much on the ground because, more or less short term, which replace the current Syrian president ? In reviewing their strategy for support to Syrian rebels multiple clans, Americans may wonder themselves where they can find new Syrian leadership … reliable. One can also ask many questions about the strength and cohesion of the international coalition led by the United States. In fact, in the latter, which supports “thoroughly” the fight against Daech? Which Arab or Muslim countries participate effectively in the elimination of Daech, other than by speeches and a minimum … actions on the ground ? From what country (ies) does Daech receive financial, material and logistics ?
Anyway, to defeat Daech and whatever air support from the Americans, Russians and others, will need to gain ground over the remains of the Syrian army, Hezbollah or some units Kurdish and Iraqi available. For now, Americans and Russians have therefore every reason to best coordinate their actions rather than bickering as in the days of the Cold War. Perhaps they already do. Within NATO and the EU, it would still be useful to seriously consider the exact role of Turkey in this “game” of power in the Middle East. But beyond the elimination of Daech and the necessary abandonment of power by Assad, would not we’ll see, gradually and long term, an inevitable readjustment of the Middle East with a Western Alawite Syria much more tolerant of all religious minorities ; a Kurdish state, whatever thinks Turkey ; an Iraqi state from the northwest predominantly Sunni Iraqi state and the southern Shiite majority? This would imply course is abandoned the principle of inviolability of borders about defined borders, in the early twentieth century by the leaders of French and British colonial empires based on their “own” interests.
(1) C. Powell : “Un enfant du Bronx” aux Editions Odile Jacob 1995. 9-6321-24934
Text originally Posted by Jean-Marie de CONDÉ
Lieutenant-Colonel – Comd2d CC Land (Centre de compétence terrestre)