One year after the launch of military operations on the orders of President Tshisekedi in Beni territory, his first operations as Head of State and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the result is clear : a fiasco ! Seven civilians killed with machetes in Kokola, Tuesday, November 17, 2020 ; 29 decomposing bodies found on Monday November 16 near Muhalika in the valley of the Semliki river ; 14 civilians killed in Kisima on November 8 ; 1,340 prisoners escaped on October 20 from Kangbayi prison in Beni, including criminals involved in the massacres,… In short, a year of horrors and chaos with a record number of civilians killed. An alarming report according to KST platform which emphasizes that with 2,124 civilians killed, including 640 in Beni, the first twenty months of the Tshisekedi presidency are by far more deadly than the last 20 months of the Kabila presidency (1,553 civilians killed). Yet, Felix Tshisekedi wanted to pacify this territory where he had a personal conscience. As a reminder, the population of Beni was improperly excluded from the 2018 presidential election which saw Tshisekedi being proclaimed “President of the Republic”. The new president wanted to win hearts in Beni. Failed !   

What went wrong with his strategy? Between incompetence of collaborators, double game of commanders assigned to operations, chaotic political coalition in Kinshasa and deadly alliances with cunning regional partners, here are the seven strategic errors of Félix Tshisekedi in the Beni crisis, which we will close with some proposals, not exhaustive. .

1. Ignorance of the enemy

Who are the enemies that Congo must fight in Beni?

Any president of a country facing an armed conflict has a set of precise information on his table at all times.

Who are the enemies (number of combatants, location, armament, networks of domestic and foreign complicity, supply channels, political objectives, combat capabilities, etc.)?

Who are the enemy military leaders (names, first names, nicknames, pseudonyms, nationality, family network, recent photos, last place of location, etc.)? The government even takes care to disseminate the photos and names of enemy leaders in the media in order to involve national opinion in efforts to fight for the neutralization of the enemy and to gather valuable additional information.

Who are the agents of the intelligence services who follow the movements of enemy military leaders? How reliable are they?

Based on this information and many others, the President of the Republic considers, with his military cabinet, the type of operation to be carried out : capture or elimination of localized targets ; drying up of funding and supply networks ; deployment of massive land forces to regain control of the enemy strongholds surrounded,…

Did President Tshisekedi know the enemies to fight in Beni before launching the operations? The answer lies in two of his statements.

The first, January 19, 2019 in front of the Congolese diaspora in London. He solemnly affirms: “The question of Beni is not a question of external aggression. It is a question of conspiracy of those who in particular traffic minerals and who profit from this situation ”[1]. So, an internal, Congolese-Congolese crisis. The second statement is that of April 4, 2019 during a trip to Washington, United States, where he claims that the eastern part of Congo is under constant threat from armed Islamist groups linked to DAESH. He even requested support of the United States to eradicate the presence of Islamist terrorists[2]. Two contradictory statements, the first excluding an external threat, the second evoking international Islamist terrorism.

Hard to have a precise idea on the identity of the killers of Beni by combining the two statements. It becomes evident that Tshisekedi had only a vague idea of ​​the enemies to fight in Beni before launching the operations, an unforgivable mistake, as the classical Chinese strategist Sun Tzu teaches us. Not having really knowledge of the enemy to fight, the question arises of the defense and security forces of the DRC. Felix Tshisekedi, did he know the army he was preparing to engage in these operations? Did he really know the FARDC?

2. Lack of knowledge of the FARDC and internal dynamics

“If you do not know your enemy or yourself, every battle will be a great danger,” Chinese strategist Sun Tzu teaches us.

The FARDC is an army born of a process of negotiations between enemy forces of the Second Congo War, of the Lusaka Agreement on the overall agreement and inclusive adopted in Sun City on 1^st April 2003, and materialized by setting in place on June 30, 2003 of the government said 1 + 4 (one president and four vice-presidents)[3]. It is an army by amalgamation of antagonistic forces, its main components being, at the outset, the loyalist forces loyal to the assassinated President Laurent-Désiré Kabila, the armed forces of the movements supported by Rwanda (RCD-Goma) and by Uganda (MLC, RCD-KML) and armed groups of various persuasions. So an army made up of odds and ends, without any real internal cohesion or esprit de corps.

The case of Beni will be revealing of these serious internal defects of this army since, in application of the agreement of March 23, 2009, between the Congolese government and the Tutsi militia of the CNDP, thousands of Rwandan soldiers and their Congolese auxiliaries were dumped in Kivu Ituri has since become the scene of endless massacres. As recalled in our work, « Les Massacres de Beni »^[4], these Rwandan forces and their auxiliaries were poured into the Congo following botched programs known as “brassage”, “mixing” and “regimentation”, and deployed throughout eastern Congo, with particular concentration in Beni. As an anecdote, the military leader of these Rwandan CNDP forces, General Bosco Ntaganda, even settled for months in Beni with hundreds of his followers. Beni became a territory under occupation, in fact, by a “hybrid” FARDC army with units that obeyed only their own chains of command and pursued their own strategic objectives. The tragedy was that these units, loyal to Rwanda, will take control of the military intelligence services (T2 in military jargon). Even the commander of the operational sector will only really exercise his authority over part of the troops.[5] In short, in Beni, Félix Tshisekedi was dealing with a politicized army, crossed by historical resentments, centrifugal allegiances, parallel recruitment channels, internal mistrust and loyalty to the Republic which left much to be desired.

A state does not launch military operations with an army that is so loose and unreliable. A sign that Felix Tshisekedi did not really know the FARDC, in addition to his ignorance of the elusive enemy to fight. The situation will thus quickly spiral out of control and give Beni the appearance of a Waterloo for the new supreme commander of the armed forces.

3. Lack of knowledge of geopolitical issues

On October 10, 2019, Félix Tshisekedi arrived in Beni where he held a meeting surrounded by local and provincial authorities. Three days earlier, he had just promised, in Bukavu, South Kivu, that he was ” ready to die ” so that peace in eastern Congo could become effective.[6] He seemed sure of himself, which sparked curiosity. He seemed to have found the magic formula to bring peace to this part of the Congo where even MONUSCO has struggled to restore peace for two decades. So what was the new president’s magic recipe ?

The answer will be revealed by DESC in October 2019, following the leak of a document signed by General Mbala Munsense , FARDC Chief of Staff announcing the imminent deployment of the armies of neighboring countries on Congolese soil to fight against armed groups. . So Tshisekedi was counting on the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to bring peace to eastern Congo , the same countries that sponsor armed groups that are sacking eastern Congo? The information sparked a wave of consternation forcing the army to withdraw, but without preventing the redeployment of the Rwandan army on Congolese soil, a visible redeployment in several territories in eastern Congo since June 2019, according to an investigation. by RFI[7], the Rwandan soldiers dissimilating themselves under FARDC uniforms.

As a reminder, military expert Jean-Jacques Wondo provided precise information on the presence of Rwandan forces in the territory of Rutshuru, in North Kivu, in the province of South Kivu torn apart by the Minembwe conflict and even in the Beni territory.[8] By letting Rwandan forces deploy on Congolese soil in general, in Beni territory in particular, President Félix Tshisekedi will have shown ignorance of geostrategic issues. Indeed, since 1996, Rwanda has been waging a war in the Congo – under cover of rebellions and armed groups – of plundering natural resources, destroying indigenous populations and balkanization in perspective. Take as a military partner a country like Rwanda, with ambitions so dangerous for the Congo[9] is proof of lack of knowledge of geopolitical issues and expansionist ambitions of this difficult neighbor.[10]

4. The appointment of catastrophic generals

On August 29, 2019, General Marcel Mbangu, commander of Operation Sukola 1, based in Beni, hands over to his successor. His name ? General Jacques Nduru Tchaligonza[11]. Tchaligonza[12]  a former right-hand man of the sinister warlord Bosco Ntaganda convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for his crimes against humanity in Ituri, neighboring province of Beni. The text of the judgment of the 6th Chamber of the ICC, of ​​July 9, 2019[13], condemning Bosco Ntaganda, sees the name “ Nduru Tchaligonza ” cited 30 times, an indication of the close proximity of the new Beni commander to the illustrious convict of the ICC during his macabre epics in Ituri.

In his analysis of October 14, 2019, on the appointment of the new commander of operations in Beni, military expert Jean-Jacques Wondo announced that ” the return of General Nduru Tchaligonza to this part of the national territory should amplify the security crises in view of the past of this officer alongside Bosco Ntaganda during the years of the killings in the neighboring province of Ituri. In addition, General Nduru Tchaligonza’s affinities with Rwanda, which is eyeing Kivu, should rather have a response contrary to what the populations of North Kivu expect. That is to say, to intensify the massacres in this region” ^[14]. Two weeks after the publication of the analysis, Beni, in the hands of General Tchaligonza, sank into a new cycle of carnage. During the first week of the launch of operations, 16 people were killed including 10 soldiers, and this was only the beginning.^[15] The following days were repeated massacres which have lasted since.

Worse, at the height of the outbreak of massacres, Félix Tshisekedi decided to deploy a staff of 11 generals in Beni headed by the sinister General John Numbi, with a dark past and registered on the sanctions lists of the American government and the European Union. Operationally, the presence of 11 generals in the same contiguous sector quickly became a source of cacophony. Who decides on the field missions?

In the end, it turned out that the 11 generals spent most of their stay in Beni doing illicit business and absorbing the budget for the operation disbursed by the government. This is the observation that is noted by several Congolese military sources. They note the disorganization of the units by the operational command of the FARDC which is said to have inflated the troops in order to divert money from fictitious soldiers and fuel. Military leaders take advantage of these operations to gain financial health. According to a source from the FARDC General Staff, military operations in Beni will have an estimated cost of between 6 and 10 million US dollars in 2019.[16] Once the jackpot was siphoned off, the generals disappeared from the region, leaving the population at the mercy of machete killers.

In July 2020, President Tshisekedi appointed General Peter Chirimwami to head Operation Sukola 1, replacing General Nduru Tchaligonza. Problem: General Chirimwami’s name has been cited several times as one of the sponsors of the massacres, alongside General Mundos, of whom he was one of the right-hand men in Beni. In addition to being cited before the operational military court, three military intelligence sources who worked with him in North Kivu implicate him directly in the Beni massacres. In July 2020, Chirimwami, on Tshisekedi’s decision, therefore became commander of the troops in Beni, while his former superior, Mundos, registered on the European Union’s sanctions lists, in connection with the Beni massacres, was appointed Inspector Deputy General of the FARDC, in Kinshasa. In fact, for Tshisekedi, catastrophic appointments of military commanders to resolve the Beni crisis.

5. The search for easy political glory at the expense of effective victories over the enemy

The launch of operations in Beni was preceded by a deafening political-media hype. Dozens of new power collaborators landed in Beni with firm promises this time around is the end of the massacres.[17] That in three months, everything will have been finished. And that the population of Beni would celebrate Christmas 2019 in peace.

It quickly became obvious that what interested the new president and his partners was above all to obtain political glory in a territory where they had a lot to be forgiven, the population of Beni having been excluded from the elections which saw Tshisekedi being proclaimed “president”. Serious strategic error since this media noise allowed the enemy to organize themselves accordingly. It was even an amateur mistake revealing the inability to learn from the mistakes of the past.^[18] Indeed, each time the authorities announce in loud operations in Beni, there is an upsurge of civilians killings.[19]

The priorities of operations on the ground are also going to reveal something bizarre. Civil society points out that when the massacres are committed in the northern part of the territory, the army is mainly deployed in the south of the territory.^[20] Everything is done as if the army avoids the confrontation and wants to deploy on the ground after giving the enemy time to decamp. Chasing the enemy (instead of capturing or neutralizing them) means removing them only from a site, offering them the possibility of returning there as soon as the army is called upon to move for other missions in other territories. Basically, just performing military maneuvers on the ground, with cameras and photographers, to offer the new president the images of a fictitious military achievement and allow his supporters to shout ” Fatshi Béton ! ” .  

Where are the enemy military leaders killed or captured? What networks of complicity and enemy supplies have been dismantled? Where are the judgments of criminal convictions of the war criminals of Beni?   

Zero, just “ Fatshi Béton !”

6. Low personal involvement in the field

The head of state of a country at war inevitably becomes a military leader. His presence alongside the soldiers in the operational zone is a permanent political duty to boost the morale of the troops and reassure national opinion.

Candidate Félix Tshisekedi had promised in Nairobi that once elected, he would settle in Beni with his Prime Minister until the massacres stopped. We later learned that he was planning to transfer the FARDC headquarters from Kinshasa to a city in eastern Congo. Promises not kept, but from which one could deduce that the new president wanted to pursue a policy of proximity between the theater of operations, although geographically far from the capital, and the top of the State. It will not be. In nearly two years of presidency, Félix Tshisekedi has only visited Beni twice: in April 2019 and in October 2019. The territory, the epicentre of genocidal-type massacres, will thus have only experienced two visits by the president of the Republic, in almost two years. No image of him, neither with the civilian victims, nor with the soldiers wounded in combat, nor even with the soldiers engaged on the front line in the operations. A “ policy of distancing ” which, added to the difficult social and salary conditions of the military, and to an absence of media coverage, of the press organs linked to the power, equates to an abandonment of Beni and its inhabitants by the State.

The crimes of Beni, whatever the scale of the killings, are not the subject of national mourning or national commemoration day. On the military side, the soldiers killed in combat are buried hastily, without any solemn tribute for their supreme sacrifice. This results in an almost generalized demotivation of the soldiers on the ground.

7. Impunity for crimes against humanity

On October 20, 2020, 1,340 detainees escaped from Kangbayi prison in Beni, including criminals involved in the massacres.^[21] In June 2017, the same prison was emptied of its detainees, including defendants in hearings before the operational military court of North Kivu sitting in Beni.[22] 955 inmates had escaped in a roughly comparable scenario. In September 2018, during the attack on the officers’ mess in Mupanda, a neighborhood in eastern Beni, several detainees were released and brought in by the attackers. ” This attack aimed to remove these detainees, whose identity could compromise the thesis of the ADF, from justice in order to remove the evidence ” , noted Jean-Jacques Wondo.^[23] These are all crimes against humanity that will go unpunished.

As civil society reminds us, Beni is not a secure enough territory to detain people suspected of involvement in serious crimes. For months, it has been asking, in vain, that these people be systematically transferred to prisons in far provinces. This request was relaunched under the chairmanship of Félix Tshisekedi, who did not react.

To this phenomenon of recurrent prison escapes is added a military justice which does not inspire confidence. Indeed, throughout the hearings of the operational military court of North Kivu, the territory of Beni was subject to repeated killings, which demonstrated that this jurisdiction, without deterrent effect, was not prosecuting the real sponsors of the massacres, who continued to operate freely. In June 2015, DESC launched a petition calling for investigations by the International Criminal Court into the crimes of Beni.^[24] To put an end to the massacres in Beni, it is imperative to mobilize the judicial component by involving international justice, which has greater means to identify, locate and arrest those who order the killings, often protected by their positions in the institutions of the State and in the countries of the region.

Conclusion and recommendations

Committing military resources is a sword in the water if, at the same time, the FARDC reform process is no longer reactivated, judicial inquiries and arrests are not carried out to neutralize sponsors lurking within the institutions, in the hierarchy of the army and in the countries of the region. The DRC being a party to the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, any sponsor of the Beni massacres, regardless of his country of residence, once located, should be arrested and transferred to The Hague, if Tshisekedi requests it to the Prosecutor of the ICC. President Félix Tshisekedi has never made such a request to the ICC. At the end of a botched year in relation to the Beni crisis – completely avoidable deaths – President Tshisekedi should take good resolutions which require a better understanding of the crisis, its apparent actors, its plenary actors, their motivations and type of shares to lead.[25]

A fine analysis of the threat to properly identify the enemy, good preparation for operations and sensitization of the populations before and during operations, targeted legal actions and appropriate tactics using anti-guerrilla techniques and not conventional warfare techniques, can help the FARDC gradually eradicate insecurity in the region. The international community should also be actively involved, as in 2013 after the fall of Goma. As the United Nations Security Council prepares to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, the new strategic review must be able to strengthen MONUSCO’s mandate by providing for the creation of additional units to set up a second intervention brigade with SADC countries including Angola, which has not yet participated in operations in the east of the country. This new brigade should benefit from a specific mandate enabling it to conduct robust and targeted coercive operations against all armed groups in eastern Congo, unilaterally and not jointly with the FARDC.[26]

It is now common knowledge that the enemy in Beni operates within the framework of networks in the state apparatus, in the countries of the region, with partnerships well beyond the region, one of the challenges of the crisis being geoeconomic, Islam serving only as a mask. Using scientific investigation techniques, it is possible to identify with precision the little hands who leave their fingerprints at the scene of crime, their sponsors whom they call before killing and the “beneficiaries of the massacres” hidden in the mesh of the minerals, cocoa and other trafficking sectors; and proceed with their neutralization in the discretion, the media noise having been terribly harmful to the success of the operations on the ground.

 Notes

[1] https://www.7sur7.cd/2020/01/20/tshisekedi-londres-le-vrai-combattant-est-celui-qui-dit-la-verite-et-qui-se-bat-pour-la

[2] https://7sur7.cd/rdc-felix-tshisekedi-appelle-a-lappui-des-etats-unis-pour-eradiquer-la-menace-du-terrorisme-islamiste-a-lest-du-pays/

[3] Le long processus débuta par la signature, le 10 juillet 1999, de l’Accord de cessez-le-feu de Lusaka, en Zambie. Cet accord en vue d’arrêter les hostilités et de rétablir la paix invitait les belligérants congolais à s’engager notamment dans un processus d’instauration d’un nouvel ordre politique en RDC via l’organisation des négociations politiques inter-congolaises au terme desquelles sera mis en place un mécanisme de «formation d’une armée nationale, restructurée et intégrée ». (…) Ainsi, c’est conformément à l’esprit et à la lettre de l’Accord de Lusaka que le projet de réforme de l’armée congolaise sera d’abord rappelé en mai 2001 à Lusaka parmi les principes fondamentaux des négociations politiques inter-congolaises²puis réinscrit dans l’Accord global et inclusif signé à Pretoria le 17 décembre 2002. L’Accord global et inclusif sera adopté à Sun City le 1^er avril 2003, puis concrétisé par la mise en place le 30 juin 2003 du gouvernement de transition dirigé par un président de la république et quatre vice-présidents. Cette genèse de la formation de l’armée congolaise, remontant à partir de 1999, nous a semblé méthodologiquement importante pour replacer le processus de réforme de l’armée dans son tout premier cadre conceptuel initial. (…) Bien souvent, l’on se rend compte que les problèmes qui émergent lors de la mise en œuvre d’une réforme ne sont que l’actualisation concrète sur le terrain de conflits, d’antagonismes et de contradictions que le processus de réforme était censé avoir permis de dépasser lors de sa conceptualisation. Cf. JJ. Wondo, Les Forces armées de la RD Congo : Une armée irréformable ?, Bilan – Autopsie de la défaite du M23 – Prospective, Ed. www.afridesk.org., p. 1.

[4] B. MUSAVULI, LES MASSACRES DE BENI – Kabila, le Rwanda et les faux islamistes, amazon, juillet 2017, https://www.amazon.fr/MASSACRES-BENI-Kabila-Rwanda-islamistes/dp/152170399X, p. 114.

[5] Cas du général Marcel Mbangu, qui survécut le 18 octobre 2017 à une embuscade tendue par des unités incontrôlées des FARDC opérant sous masque ADF. Cf. JJ Wondo, « Les tueries à Beni : Le général Marcel Mbangu connaîtra-t-il le même sort que Mamadou Ndala et Lucien Bahuma ? », https://afridesk.org/les-tueries-a-beni-le-general-marcel-mbangu-connaitra-t-il-le-meme-sort-que-mamadou-ndala-lucien-bahuma/

[6] « Tshisekedi “prêt à mourir” pour la paix dans l’est de la RDC », https://www.voaafrique.com/a/tshisekedi-pr%C3%AAt-%C3%A0-mourir-pour-la-paix-dans-l-est-de-la-rdc/5114760.html

[7] « Militaires rwandais en RDC: quelles preuves? (2/2) », https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20200423-militaires-rwandais-en-rdc-quelles-preuves-22?ref=tw_i

[8] JJ Wondo, « L’armée rwandaise en cours de réoccupation de l’Est de la RDC ? », https://afridesk.org/larmee-rwandaise-en-cours-de-reoccupation-de-lest-de-la-rdc-jean-jacques-wondo/

[9] B. Musavuli, « La stratégie Kabila-Kagame de reconquête militaire du Kivu-Ituri par les RDF et de brouillage sémantique », https://afridesk.org/la-strategie-kabila-kagame-de-reconquete-militaire-du-kivu-ituri-par-les-rdf-et-de-brouillage-semantique-b-musavuli/

[10] The CODECO militia, which has been ravaging the neighboring province of Ituri since 2017, is a hidden hand of Rwanda through the Rwandan officers of the FARDC. CODECO is supported by elements of M23. See IRC report, https://www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/central-africa/democratic-republic-congo/292-republique-democratique-du-congo-en-finir-avec-la-violence- cyclic-in-ituri

[11] There are several spellings of the officer’s name. In the ICC judgment against Bosco Ntaganda (https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2019_03568.PDF), the spelling used is “ Tchaligonza ” (Nduru Tchaligonza). In a KST article, it is noted that his name is spelled Chaligonza or Ichaligonza. The ICC also noted that the officer called himself “Kyaligonza”, but that it is the same person. According to a DEMIAP officer, Nduru Tchaligonzais a Rwandan posing as a Hema from Ituri. After his adventure with Ntaganda, he would have stayed in Rwanda before being reinstated in the FARDC. After one year at the head of Operation Sukola 1, General Tchaligonza was appointed in July 2020 deputy commander in charge of operations and intelligence at the second defense zone covering the former regions of Kasai and Katanga. See JJ Wondo, « Remaniement du commandement des FARDC par Félix Tshisekedi : attentes et désillusions », https://afridesk.org/remaniement-du-commandement-des-fardc-par-felix-tshisekedi-attentes-et-desillusions-jj-wondo/

[12] The appointment of Tchaligonza has been dictated by the context of political coalition in Kinshasa where Tshisekedi had to deal with Joseph Kabila. In the government team, The Minister of Defense, Aimé Ngoy Mukena, is close to Joseph Kabila. But the Minister for Defense, Sylvain Mutombo Kabinga, is a staunch supporter of Tshisekedi, as is the Minister of the Interior, Gilbert Kankonde. See https://blog.kivusecurity.org/fr/author/jasonstearns/

[13] Jugement n° No. : ICC-01/04-02/06, Date: 8 July 2019.

[14] JJ Wondo, « Qui est le général ex-rebelle Jacques Itshalingoza Nduru, le nouveau commandant des opérations Sukola 1 à Béni ? », https://afridesk.org/qui-est-lex-rebelle-upc-et-general-jacques-itshalingoza-nduru-le-nouveau-commandant-de-sokola-1-a-beni-jj-wondo/

[15] Dix civils tués à Kokola le 5 novembre 2019  ; cinq à Kitchanga le 11 novembre  ; six membres d’une même famille tués à Oicha le 14 novembre  ; quinze tués à Mbau le 15 novembre , cinq au quartier Pakanza d’Oicha le 17 novembre, trois civils tués à Oicha/Mavete le 19 novembre,…

[16] JJ Wondo, L’offensive militaire bâclée, menée par les FARDC à l’est de la RDC, tourne au désastre, https://afridesk.org/loffensive-militaire-baclee-menee-par-les-fardc-a-lest-de-la-rdc-tourne-au-desastre-jj-wondo/.

[17] Some delegates from Kinshasa even promised a reward of up to $ 50,000 to anyone who provided information to neutralize the ” ADF “.

[18] B. Musavuli, « Crise de Beni : Comprendre les raisons profondes du fiasco militaire et des promesses mensongères », https://afridesk.org/crise-de-beni-comprendre-les-raisons-profondes-du-fiasco-militaire-et-des-promesses-mensongeres-b-musavuli/

[19] This had already happened in 2018 after the announcement of an army offensive by General Marcel Mbangu, then commander of operations. As a reminder, in January 2018, General Mbangu assured Radio Okapi that ” this time, it is for us the last offensive to restore peace in Beni “. By loudly announcing a new offensive in August 2019, the FARDC gave the impression of an army that had not learned the lessons of its past failures.

[20] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20200201-rdc-violences-beni-nord-kivu-adf-fardc-felix-tchisekedi

[21] B. Musavuli, « RD Congo – Beni : L’évasion de la prison de Beni et les secrets inavouables », https://www.agoravox.fr/tribune-libre/article/rd-congo-beni-l-evasion-de-la-228121

[22] The operational military court of North Kivu sat in Beni from August 20, 2016 to January 22, 2018.

[23] JJ Wondo, « Les tueries à Beni : Le général Marcel Mbangu connaîtra-t-il le même sort que Mamadou Ndala et Lucien Bahuma ? », op. cit.

[24] https://secure.avaaz.org/fr/petition/Procureur_de_la_CPI_et_HautCommissariat_de_lONU_aux_droits_de_lhomme_Une_enquete_internationale_sur_les_massacres_de_Ben/?fKTCGkb&pv=73.

[25] Within the framework of the intelligence, we consider that it is imperative to: 1- Identify and interview all the FARDC officers who have been in operation in Beni since October 2014, starting with the four successive commanders of Operation Sukola 1: General Mundos, General Mbangu, General Tchaligonza, General Cirimwami. The framework of these hearings is to be defined: General Assembly of the army, parliamentary inquiries,…; 2- Identify all the killers (names, nationality, age, photos), their godfathers, their accomplices and constitute a DNA file from scientific investigations. 3- Identify all the victims and their families in the perspective of justice and reparation. 4- Formally request permanent cooperation from the International Criminal Court in the field investigations and the transfer to The Hague of the main sponsors of the massacres

[26] JJ Wondo, “L’offensive militaire bâclée, menée par les FARDC à l’est de la RDC, tourne au désastre”, https://afridesk.org/loffensive-militaire-baclee-menee-par-les-fardc-a-lest-de-la-rdc-tourne-au-desastre-jj-wondo/

[27] Using modern scientific investigation techniques, the Beni massacres can be brought to an end by creating scientific investigation teams and a “data bank” to put the names and faces of the killers on each massacre, precisely. 1 / In Beni, the killers speak to each other and pronounce their names in the presence of their victims; they eat, telephone before killing, attack women, during massacres. So they leave, in memory, their names, their faces, their saliva, their sperm and their blood at the scene of the massacres. A scientific team can identify them on the basis of DNA research, identification of names spoken and faces seen (robot portrait). 2 / In Beni, the killers call before they kill civilians. A team of scientific investigators, with the help of mobile phone operators, can trace calls and identify “callers” in the area where the massacre took place. 3 / In Beni, the killers take the personal property of their victims. So they walk, leaving scent imprints in their path. With the help of sniffer dogs, FARDC soldiers and the population can follow their trail to the location of the property stolen during the massacre. 4 / In Beni, the killers steal valuable goods, stocks of cocoa, goods,… So, people can hide inside telephones, valuable goods,… anti-theft devices in order to follow the movement of the stolen goods up to the final recipient.