Luca Attanasio, the Italian Ambassador in Kinshasa was killed on Monday February 22, 2021 in Kibumba, north of Goma in the province of North Kivu, by bullets during an armed attack that targeted a convoy of the Program world food (WFP). He had been invited to visit food distribution centers managed by WFP. The ambassador and his convoy were targeted by unidentified armed men at around 10:15 am local time. The Congolese driver and the ambassador’s Italian bodyguard were also killed in the attack. The victims were in a convoy of two PAM vehicles, without the presence of MONUSCO or elements of the FARDC, the Congolese army.

This attack and the exponential increase in insecurity in eastern Congo illustrate the volatile and very unstable situation in which the DRC has found itself for two years. The attack bitterly reminds the international community of the low-intensity, skilfully maintained and often forgotten conflicts which have ravaged eastern DRC for 25 years.

Far from claiming to be conducting a judicial investigation into this tragic event, this analysis attempts to decipher the security situation in the area as well as the relevant diplomatic events. Our first objective, modest, is to gather as much factual information as possible to bring out the preliminary elements for understanding the context of the unfolding of this attack by placing them in a double internal conceptual framework and regional geopolitics. This constitutes for us the good matrix of work on which the investigators responsible for elucidating this crime must base their research in order to determine the real sponsors and perpetrators.

Contradictory versions concerning the perpetrators of this attack

The attack was unanimously condemned by national and international opinion. Unsurprisingly and without having carried out preliminary investigations, the Congolese authorities pointed out the responsibility of the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). In a message read by his spokesperson on national television, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi condemned ” with the greatest firmness this terrorist attack “. President Tshisekedi has called for an investigation so that the perpetrators of the attack are ” identified and brought to justice “. The Congolese Interior Ministry and North Kivu Governor Carly Nzanzu accused Rwandan Hutu rebels FDLR of being behind the deadly attack on the convoy.[1] The Secretary General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres , also called on the DRC to ” investigate diligently ” into this attack. According to the Kivu Security Barometer, the FDLR may be responsible for this attack. But, it is too early to confirm it, because this group is not the only group that operates in this area, at the foot of the Nyiragongo volcano.[2]

For their part, the FDLR reacted in a statement categorically denying their involvement in this attack. Colonel Placide Niyiturinda, their spokesperson, says their troops are too far from the area, which they say is controlled by the Congolese army. “ Our troops are very far from the tragedy. This despicable act took place between Goma and Kibumba where elements of the FARDC are installed, beyond the road that leads from Goma to Rutshuru. So the FDLR have nothing to do with this attack. An international investigation must be carried out for the truth to be established “.[3] It is all the same astounding for a state to be stared at by a foreign armed band which claims to control a portion of its territory and a part of its population.

In a video circulating on social networks, an ICCN eco-guard[4] complains about their situation on the ground. He denounces the daily attacks of which they are victims. He states that the ambassador’s convoy was attacked near the Kibumba market in an area known as the ” Trois antennes”[5] ”and not in the bush according to the official version of the Congolese authorities.

According to a source working with a European diplomatic mission in Goma, the attack took place about 100 meters from a checkpoint controlled by the FARDC. “ Moreover, I myself pass this section regularly and there are“ checkpoints ”every 1 km or so. How to explain that at this level there is no longer any protection? The road is classified “green” at this point. The convoy did not require an armed escort as there are several positions of FARDC and ICCN guards in the area ”.

What is the military situation in the attack zone?

To stem the insecurity that reigns in the province of North Kivu, large-scale operations have been launched since November 2019 in the two operational sectors, namely: Sokola 1 in the “Grand Nord” sector (including the territories of Beni and Lubero) and Sokola 2 in the “Petit Nord” sector (including the territories of Rutshuru, Nyiragongo, Masisi and Walikale).

According to military sources from the 34^th military region (corresponding to the administrative territory of North Kivu), the attack occurred in the Park area Virunga in the territory of Nyiragongo which runs the military operations Sokola 2 against the Rwandan rebels of the FDLR. The area is currently controlled by the 3408^th infantery regiment of the FARDC[6]. The 3408 ^th regiment is currently deployed in Virunga Park to Kibumba, near Goma. This unit is made up of a majority of elements from the CNDP rebellion, formerly supported by Rwanda.

DESC contacted a senior FARDC officer who commanded troops in the area for four years in Goma. This officer declares to have mastered the military topography of the area. He forcefully assures us that the place indicated is not far from the border with Rwanda, as shown in the image below. And to add, Rwanda has taken care to control a buffer zone beyond its borders in the DRC in order to avoid infiltration into its territory and the indicated zone is under the control of militias in the pay of Rwanda. Indeed, choosing unclear attack locations where it is difficult to identify who controls them by adding proximity to the border, is part of the modus operandi for an actor accustomed to carrying out terrorist activities of destabilization by blurring the lines that could bring it to the fore. And this choice is not trivial, in our opinion.

The so-called “three antennae” area is located in Kibumba. This city was formerly occupied by elements of the M23 who carried out massacres there in October 2013. At the time, two mass graves were discovered there filled with human corpses.[7] Since 2019, this area has been reinvested again by Rwandan military and paramilitary elements, deployed mainly in the Virunga, according to Congolese military sources. Several witnesses saw them in Ishasha , Masisi, Rutshuru, Kitshanga, Walikale and Rumangabo.[8] This information, once denied by the Congolese authorities, was confirmed in the latest report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, published on December 23, 2020. According to this document: “ soldiers of the Rwandan Defense Force ( FDR) are present in the DRC in the territories of Nyiragongo, Rutshuru and Masisi ”. ” Between late 2019 and early October 2020, members of the Rwandan Defense Forces were present in North Kivu, where they carried out operations in violation of the sanctions regime .”

Nyiragongo : a tourist paradise transformed into nests of armed groups 

The Virunga National Park, is a natural tourist site which is located in the territory of Nyiragongo. The attack took place in the south-eastern part of Virunga where the gorilla sector is located which is home to a third of the thousand remaining mountain gorillas in the world. This area has become the scene of conflicts between several Congolese and foreign armed groups who are vying for control of the wealth of the soil and the subsoil. According to the Kivu Barometer (KST), near the scene of the tragedy are the strongholds of several rebel groups including the Rwandan Hutu rebellion of the FDLR, Congolese militias Nyatura. Elements, mainly Tutsi, of the M23 rebellion are also located in the Zone.

According to two military intelligence sources from the 3^rd Defense Zone, contacted by DESC, the Kilimanyoka sector is occupied by several armed groups controlled by Rwanda, in particular by the FDLR / RUD faction (RUD-URUNANA). These military sources inform that the FDLR / RUD receive reinforcements in arms of the Rwandan army through a corridor that crosses the border Congo-Rwanda in the sector of Mikeno, located in the southeastern part of Virunga through Gikeri. This support also benefits the rebels of Nduma Defense of Congo-Rénové (NDC / R) led by militia leader Guidon Shimirayi.  

In North Kivu, there are two groups of FDLR : FDLR / FOCA and FDLR / RUD. The first, the Aba Cunguzi Combatant Forces (FOCA), came from the genocidaires Interhamwe. The second (RUD) are a dissident group of the FDLR, but which welcomed Tutsis who left Rwanda and especially Uganda, to settle in the DRC. These Rwandans trained by the Rwandan army (RDF) infiltrated the DRC to carry out destabilization, espionage and facilitation activities in the illegal mineral trafficking, according to Congolese military sources. According to John Nsengo, a former Assistant to the DDRRR process within MONUSCO: “Initially, the RUD was in a coalition called the National Democratic Congress (CND) with a group of Tutsi officers called Rassemblement pour le people rwandais (RPR – Inkeragubatara ). The FDLR / RUD already had an advanced position in the Virunga Park towards Bunagana while their headquarters was in Mashuta (border between the territories of Lubero and Walikale). But the group was infiltrated by former elements repatriated to Rwanda through the DDRRR process and who once arrived in Rwanda were trained to return to the DRC to carry out RDF plans. After the death of General Mousare, their military commander on the ground, the group was infiltrated on a large scale. It then broke apart. Part of this group has forged relations with other local armed groups and is currently working with the “ADF” who kill in Beni. Their location towards the Ugandan border was also motivated to facilitate the recruitment of new combatants in Uganda who were then to be transported to Beni Territory on behalf of the ADF. And this circuit would still work today ”. These FDLR / RUD are mostly of the Tutsi ethnic group. They loot, kill, wreak havoc and violent. They are rife mainly in the territories of Masisi, Rutshuru and in the Virunga Park. They benefit from the complicity in the Congolese army via rebels stirred up, mixed and integrated in the FARDC, but also in the Congolese police. They are working on behalf of Rwanda to maintain its hold over the DRC, our sources say.

Major Rwigema: one of the Tutsi officers who had joined the FDLR/RUD.

(Photo taken by John Nsengo, former DDRRR / MONUSCO program Assistant)

In addition, other local armed groups are also operating in the region and adjacent areas. These are mainly:

• Mai-Mai Manzembe-Kyaghanda which campaign for the defense of the Nande-Yira community .
• Nyatura : a Congolese Hutu militia which collaborated with the FDLR and the FARDC against the M23. The group claims to protect the interests of the Hutus against the former CNDP and M23 officers ”and the infiltration of the Rwandan army into the DRC.
• M23 : a rebellion supported by Rwanda which militates mainly for the Tutsi cause.
• NDC-R : this militia defends the Nyanga community against the Hutus of the FDLR and assimilated in the territories of Masisi and Walikale. The NDC-R had formerly allied itself with the rebellions of the CNDP and the M23 supported by Rwanda, which in turn supports it.

Is there a correlation between recent diplomatic activism between Rwanda and the DRC? 

The first military analyzes of the attack carried out by DESC experts put forward the hypothesis of a premeditated and well-planned attack. To succeed in such an attack with such dexterity, the attackers must have previously received precise information on the presence of the ambassador in the region and the route of his convoy. The day before the attack, Sunday February 21, he was in Bukavu at mass with the Xaverian fathers. According to a MONUSCO source: “ I am told that the ambassador arrived in Goma through the MONUSCO terminal. He left for the field immediately after the MONUSCO ‘clearance’ gave the convoy the green light, saying that there is no risk! “.  

This prompts us to analyze certain security and diplomatic aspects that have recently taken place in the region.

First, an imposing Rwandan delegation of ten officials made a working visit to Kinshasa on January 19, 2021. Led by Vincent Biruta, Rwandan Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Rwandan delegation was made up in particular of General Joseph Nzabamwita, Secretary General of the Intelligence Services, Mr. Vincent Karega , Ambassador of Rwanda in the DRC and Mr. Donald Kaberuka, the AU Special Envoy to mobilize international support for the African anti-Covid-19 response plan and former President of the African Development Bank (2005-2015). What did they talk about concretely?

A few days after this meeting, it was the turn of François Beya, President Tshisekedi’s Special Security Advisor, to go to Kigali with a Congolese delegation. In their talks, they raised the possibility of carrying out a joint military operation between the two armies in eastern Congo. At the end of his mission, François Beya declared: ” We are here to challenge the world, in particular the West, which does not want us to talk and work together “. What was his real intention through his words?

Indeed, it is an open secret that since the arrival of President Tshisekedi to power, the latter has strengthened his ties with Rwanda, arousing the discontent of Burundi and Uganda, two countries in conflict with Rwanda. Rwanda is trying by all means to convince Kinshasa to carry out joint military operations in eastern DRC to track down the rebel groups that are destabilizing the region. A first attempt at a major joint offensive by the armies of the region (Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania) against the rebellions in eastern DRC, between November 2019 and May 2020[9], aborted following refusals from Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. The DRC alone will sign the final declaration. These withdrawals will ultimately push the Congolese authorities to conduct military operations almost alone, with the support of special Rwandan units, according to several military sources who took part in these operations.[10]

At this stage, given recent diplomatic activities between the DRC and Rwanda, a source from DEMIAP, acronym of Congolese military intelligence, says it does not exclude any hypothesis. According to this senior officer : ” Wouldn’t this attack be a plan put together by Rwanda to show the world that the said operation must be carried out urgently ?”

And we are entitled to legitimately ask the question of who would strategically be the beneficiaries of this crime? What would the FDLR, already cornered from all sides, concretely gain in the commission of this forfeiture? And why the Congolese government, without having carried out preliminary investigations, instinctively pointed the responsibility of the FDLR?

An attack similar to that against Tanzanian peacekeepers in 2017

Indeed, on December 7, 2017, an extremely violent attack, with heavy weapons, against a barracks of Tanzanian peacekeepers resulted in fifteen killed on the Tanzanian side, 59 wounded and three missing in the ranks of the FARDC and peacekeepers. The attackers, professional soldiers with knowledge of the region, had targeted a MONUSCO base held by a Tanzanian contingent in Semliki.[11] According to UN sources, confirmed by Judi Rever, this report led by the Russian Dimitri Titov on the attack on the Tanzanian peacekeepers in Beni, indexes Rwanda and even risks embarrassing the governments of the region and ending the official narrative of the jihad behind the Beni massacres. This report would already be closed, but the UN would block its publication.

DESC conclusion and recommendations

The fatal attack on the Italian ambassador’s convoy marks the failure of the large-scale military operations launched in November 2019 in the east of the country. At the same time, it illustrates the ineffectiveness of MONUSCO. This situation risks further deteriorating if nothing is done to find pragmatic and lasting political, diplomatic and security solutions adapted in particular to the specific context of the generalized crisis in the DRC.

However, beyond the internal issues of this crisis, as we often mention, one of the major aspects of the security crisis in the DRC finds its motivations in exogenous factors. Unfortunately, this approach seems often overlooked by many Western experts and their diplomats deployed in the region when they address the issue of the Congolese crisis of the past two decades. This crisis is mainly rooted in the wars imposed and suffered by the DRC by international, multinational and transnational actors and in the challenges of regional proxy actors. And there are serious indications that this attack is far from being an isolated fortuitous act or a purely Congolese affair.

To the Congolese authorities and the international community, DESC offers the following recommendations:

1. An independent and impartial international investigation must be carried out quickly enough to elucidate this triple murder. But this investigation should also be broadened to build on national and international responsibilities in maintaining insecurity in this part of the DRC.
2. Given that peace cannot be reestablished without justice, DESC recommends, as also recommended by Dr. Denis Mukwege, the establishment of a tribunal to try all the people cited in the United Nations Mapping Report , covering the period 1993-2003. However, this tribunal can also deal with all cases of crimes committed after 2003.[12]This project must be supported by the Congolese government using enterprising and proactive diplomacy. Unfortunately, we note a lack and a form of continuity in the way of handling this affair at the level of the Congolese political authorities due to the involvement in these tragedies of several current Congolese political actors still in activity. It is also common knowledge that the various rebellions that have grieved the Congo have been supported by governments of neighboring countries and beyond immediate borders, and on the ground by their respective armies. Moreover, Congolese politicians were recruited by the secret services of these countries and they acted as proxy actors according to timetables and wishes set by these states. Therefore, any pursuit would be equivalent to opening Pandora’s box.[13]
3. Reactivate DDR processes[14]and DDRRR[15]. The poor care of demobilized combatants and their almost systematic reintegration into the FARDC negatively impacts the effectiveness of the FARDC. Emphasis must be placed on improving the social reintegration component of these ex-combatants. This requires the pragmatic implementation of concrete projects designed on the basis of drastic criteria promoting a good retraining of combatants in civilian life and within their communities of origin. We should avoid reintegrating rebels into the army . The cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola or South Africa can serve as examples. The necessary resources should also be mobilized for the successful implementation of the DDRRR process. Also a better orientation, coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the DRR and DDRRR processes is necessary as suggested by the latest report of the UNJHRO.
4. Pursue and rectify the army reform plan. Indeed, the command of the troops remains weak. On the ground, there is also a juxtaposition of parallel command structures. The units operating in the area depend on the operatic map commander knew operational sector and administratively the commander of the 34^th Military Region, even the commander of the 3rd zone defense. Each structure has its own information managers (S2) who process information in a compartmentalized manner. In the field, there are often conflicts of competence between the various heads of the above-mentioned military structures. Most of them compete for the resources allocated to operations. This has a negative impact on the conduct of operations. The level of combativeness of the FARDC remains very low. It reveals the insufficiency of specialized units to carry out targeted operations in depth in hostile zones and a lack of military intelligence unable to correctly identify the enemy. The armament and the means of communication of the troops in operations leave much to be desired at the tactical level. It would also be necessary to optimize the operation of the logistics chain and fight against the cannibalization of military equipment. Increase the motivation of troops in combat by providing them with adequate combat resources, decent remuneration and substantial combat bonuses.
5. Carry out a new identification of soldiers and units deployed in the east of the country. Avoid appointing officers who have been part of rebel groups formerly supported by neighboring countries to operations command posts in the East. It would also be necessary to encourage the application of the policy of the assignment of non-originators in the zones of operation and to strictly apply the rules and principles relating to the relief of troops. Several soldiers total five years in the area without being relieved.
6. Strengthen military justice and severely punish unruly and unreliable military personnel.
7. Also carry out optimized reforms of other security services: ANR, DGM, etc.
8. Urge all states in the region to rigorously apply the Addis Ababa Framework Agreement and effectively operate the Addis Ababa peace accord monitoring mechanism, which has been ineffective to date. In this context, Congolese opinion must push the international community to impose an internal political dialogue between Rwandans. This country sits on a volcano, apart from the genocide there are issues related to the lockdown of political space and human rights violations, which one day will explode. Neither peace nor public order is maintained in a country by resorting to extreme violence.
9. As the United Nations Security Council prepares to renew MONUSCO’s mandate, the new strategic review should be able to strengthen MONUSCO’s mandate by providing for the creation of additional units to set up a second brigade of intervention with SADC countries, including Angola, which has not yet participated in operations in the east of the country. This new brigade should benefit from a specific mandate allowing it to carry out robust and targeted coercive operations against all armed groups in eastern Congo, unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC.
10. Raise awareness among notables, chiefdom and sector officials with a view to dissociating themselves from officials of local and foreign armed groups.

The Congolese public must remain very vigilant and mobilize to counter any project of an official joint military operation between Rwanda and the DRC because the Congo is not to be balkanized! This joint operation makes no sense and will not bring any added military or security value, like previous operations. Rwanda occupied and controlled, militarily, for more than 15 years the east of the DRC, why did Kagame not put an end to the activities of the FDLR? In addition, since 1996, this country has not stopped carrying out military operations in eastern Congo either with its own armed forces or through its support for the various rebellions that it finances and trains. Imagining that he would end the insecurity is like believing that a fire is being put out, using gasoline.

Jérôme Ziambi Kengawe & Jean-Jacques Wondo / DESC exclusivity 

Jerome Ziambi Kengawe graduated from the 129^th Promotion All Weapons at the Royal Military Academy (RMA-Belgium). He also holds a degree in criminology from the University of Liège. Ziambi holds a special license in insurance law from the Université Libre de Bruxelles.  

Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu graduated from the 129^th Promotion All Weapons from the Royal Military Academy (Belgium). He is a patent holder of the 11th promotion 2015-2016 of the 4° Cycle of Hautes Etudes de Sécurité et de Défense HESD of the Royal Higher Institute of Defense ((IRSD – Ex Belgian War School). Wondo also holds a bachelor’s degree in criminology from the University of Liège and a master’s degree in political science from the Université Libre de Bruxelles.

References

[1] “They were attacked by an armed group of six people. Unfortunately these people wanted to take them to the parks to ransom them. The Congolese army and the wardens of the nearby ICCN park were not far away. They came to the rescue. In the exchanges, the attackers shot the ambassador’s bodyguard and the Congolese WFP driver. Four other people were rescued. According to the survivors, the six attackers spoke Kinyarwanda. And, generally, the armed groups that are in this region are the FDLR. Maybe a few nyatura groups too. But according to initial information and estimates, we believe that they are FDLR located in this region of Kibumba”.

[2] https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20210222-mort-de-l-ambassadeur-d-italie-en-rdc-kinshasa-accuse-les-fdlr-qui-d%C3%A9mentent.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Institut congolais de conservation de la nature

[5] To design three telephone communications antennas installed in this perimeter.

[6] Formerly 809th brigade which formerly operated in Oïcha (Beni).

[7] https://www.radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/10/28/rdc-les-fardc-ont-decouvert-deux-fosses-communes-kibumba-selon-julien-paluku.

[8] https://afridesk.org/larmee-rwandaise-en-cours-de-reoccupation-de-lest-de-la-rdc-jean-jacques-wondo/.

[9] https://blog.kivusecurity.org/fr/faut-il-inviter-les-armees-des-pays-voisins-dans-lest-de-la-rd-congo/.

[10] https://afridesk.org/loffensive-militaire-baclee-menee-par-les-fardc-a-lest-de-la-rdc-tourne-au-desastre-jj-wondo/.

[11] https://afridesk.org/lattaque-des-casques-bleus-a-beni-la-revanche-rwandaise-sur-les-troupes-tanzaniennes/.

[12] Indeed, the cases of human rights violations in Congo after this date are abundantly documented. Several NGOs as well as the Joint United Nations Office for Human Rights have been publishing regular reports for years on all human rights violations committed on Congolese territory.

[13] Unfortunately, all these disturbing reports, stored in drawers, multiply the number of coffins, if the victims are at least lucky enough to have one for their eternal rest.

[14] Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operation for ex-combatants.

[15] Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement operation of foreign armed groups in their countries of origin.