On December 9, 2019, the European Council decided to maintain the sanctions which, since December 2016 and May 2017, have targeted several Congolese personalities accused of serious human rights violations and of obstructing the electoral process. These sanctions target several relatives of Joseph Kabila, the former Congolese president. These “ individual restrictive measures ” – the freezing of assets and the ban on entry and stay in EU territory – concern twelve of them. The Council had lifted its sanctions against Lambert Mende, the former government spokesperson, and Roger Kibelisa, the former head of internal security within the ANR.
Several people sanctioned had contested the sanctioning procedure and the legality of these restrictive measures. Fifteen of them, except the Bakata-Katanga militia leader Gédéon Kyungu Mutanda, called on the services of Maître Thierry Bontinck to be heard by the Council of the EU “when there is a renewal of sanctions.”[1] An appeal procedure was initiated on February 13, 2020 at the European Union court. But the EU court rejected, in a decision of February 12, 2020, the appeals filed in March 2018 by the collaborators of the former president.[2]
This forum calls on the European Council to extend these individual restrictive measures in order to support the electoral process taken hostage by the Congolese parliament acquired by Joseph Kabila against the popular will and to support democratic reforms in the DRC.
An alternation of unusual and fragile cohabitation
Since January 2019, the DRC has been experimenting with an unprecedented political alternation in its contemporary history. President Félix Tshisekedi succeeds Joseph Kabila after elections whose results have been contested by several independent observers including the Congolese Catholic Church.[3] The originality of this alternation in power, which is not really in the proper sense of the term as it is understood in politics, is that President Félix Tshisekedi is forced to share power with the camp of his predecessor, Joseph Kabila, who retains control over almost all the institutions of the Republic.[4] It is an original situation that some qualify as an unusual cohabitation.[5] This situation generates the reality that Joseph Kabila continues to have an influence on the sovereign domains including the army, the police and the security services. African military political sociology informs that the control of the army by the president remains capital for the effective exercise of his ” imperial ” in the direction of the activities of the State.[6]
President Tshisekedi’s tenure began with signals deemed rather positive in terms of improving the human rights situation. However, for more than a year, the partners in power, the Common Front for the Congo (FCC), the platform led by Kabila, and the Cap for Change (CACH), the platform led by Tshisekedi, have maintained fairly tense marked by several political clashes and reciprocal acts of violence that make the political and security situation in the DRC very volatile. These acts provoke a serious political and institutional crisis on which is grafted an alarming security situation throughout the Congolese territory, causing serious violations of human rights. This presents the risk of plunging the DRC into deep chaos which will destroy all stabilization efforts undertaken by the international community – including the European Union, which has been particularly invested in the reform of the security services – for two decades.
As can be seen on the ground, the institutional balance of the new regime in the DRC still leans strongly in favor of Joseph Kabila, whose networks of political, economic and military control seem to have remained largely intact.[7] Despite Tshisekedi’s attempts to regain control of the army, the appointments made to the command post of the Republican Guard, the presidential protection and security unit, in April 2020[8] and the army in July 2020 instead consecrate the status quo favorable to Kabila in a subtle game of musical chairs.[9] Even if some people sanctioned no longer exercise visible functions, the parallel and informal system put in place by Kabila shows that they are still very active today, especially in human rights violations.[10]
Worrisome deterioration of the human rights situation
According to a statement from Human Rights Watch : In Lubumbashi, “ the macabre discovery of corpses thrown into the river a few days after a political demonstration constitutes a chilling warning about freedom of expression in DR Congo (…) In a context of lively political tensions , no lead should be overlooked and the authorities should pursue the search for justice, wherever the investigation takes them. ” [11]
On July 8, members of the People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) of former President Joseph Kabila and supporters of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) of Tshisekedi – both of whom part of the ruling coalition – clashed in the streets of Lubumbashi. On July 9, massive demonstrations took place in several cities, in protest against the hasty validation by the National Assembly of a new president at the head of the independent national electoral commission. Several sources confirmed that at least 16 people were arrested and detained in a concession in the 22nd military region following the protests in Lubumbashi. On July 12, the corpse of Dodo Ntumba, 49, was found floating in the Lubumbashi River. On the 13th, the bodies of Mardoché Matanda and Héritier Mpiana, both aged 18, were recovered from the river. On August 3, family members of Danny Kalambayi, 29, recognized his body in the morgue, almost a month after seeing him for the last time. Witnesses told Human Rights Watch that the four bodies showed signs of cuts and mutilations, which could have been the result of acts of torture. They were all members of Felix Tshisekedi’s party.[12]
The incursion of Katanga secessionist armed militiamen from the MIRA (Mouvement des Indépendantistes Révolutionnaires Africains), on September 26, 2020 in the mining town of Lubumbashi, the second largest city in the DRC, causing several deaths[13] , is an indication of the deterioration of the very worrying security situation in Katanga, the economic heart of the Congo.
The report of the United Nations Joint Office for Human Rights (UNJHRO), published on August 5, 2020, indicates that between January and June 2020, the UNJHRO documented 4,113 human rights violations and abuses on the entire territory of the DRC, i.e. an increase of 17% compared to the previous semester (July-December 2019) and 35% compared to the same period last year (January-June 2019). The Joint Office reports a deterioration of the human rights situation in the provinces in conflict, in particular Ituri, South Kivu, Tanganyika and North Kivu, due to the activism of armed groups. In the field, the United Nations documented nearly 43% of violations attributable to state agents, responsible for the extrajudicial executions of at least 225 people, including 33 women and 18 children, across the country. This increasing trend can be explained in particular by a large number of arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions as well as violations of the right to freedom of expression. Including in the context of the implementation of measures related to the state of health emergency, by police and soldiers of the FARDC.[14] We are currently witnessing almost everywhere in the DRC an increase in acts of arbitrary arrests of politicians, press actors, human rights defenders, activists of citizens’ movements, etc.
If we invite the Council of the European Union to maintain the sanctions for the same group, it is among other things because, since these restrictive measures were taken by the European Union, no credible judicial or disciplinary action, dependent and in defense of the incriminated persons, has been brought against them. On the contrary, some of these people have been promoted to prominent political or military positions. Others, on the other hand, continue to pull the strings despite their apparent withdrawal from certain prominent political, military and security functions. Indeed, these people are moreover more active and uncontrollable in the shadows because they have their hands free to reactivate their informal security networks.
- Army General Gabriel Amisi Kumba “ Tango Four ” : Inspector General of the FARDC
Despite several grievances with which he is accused, in particular in the instrumentalisation of insecurity in the east in Ituri and in Beni, General Amisi Tango, an officer very loyal to Joseph Kabila, was promoted in July 2020 to the rank of general of army, the highest rank of the FARDC and at the same time appointed to the post of Inspector General of the FARDC. An administrative function whose stratagem would be to influence the future decision of the European Council while as a former number two in the army, he set up a network made up of rapid reaction forces, it is in particular 41th , 42th and 43th battalions Quick response Unit (URR), not responding to his command. As a result, General Gabriel Amisi Kumba remains the linchpin of the parallel security and repressive device of former President Joseph Kabila in the event of a political confrontation unfavorable to the latter. According to a Congolese military intelligence source, General Amisi has set up a parallel structure of military intelligence and special units that are beyond the control of the Chief of the General Staff. This structure sometimes conducts military operations without the knowledge of the official operational structures deployed in eastern DRC.
- Army General John Numbi Banze
Currently without official military function, Army General John Numbi has retreated to his ranch in Lubumbashi where he remains very active in the manipulation of armed groups close to the Bakata-Katanga. In fact, the Mai-Mai Bakata-Katanga are grouped together within two structures called CORAK and MIRA. According to our various military sources in North Katanga, these two organizations are under the control of General John Numbi, who is in a way their moral authority.
According to a Congolese military intelligence source, Kahimbi has set up a parallel structure of military intelligence and special units which is beyond the control of the Chief of General Staff and which reports directly to Kabila. This structure sometimes conducts military operations without the knowledge of the official operational structures deployed in eastern DRC.
Indeed, John Numbi, discharged from his official duties as between 2010 and 2018, has currently resettled freely in Katanga, disobeying his military hierarchy who recalled him to Kinshasa. It was in Katanga that he had installed the security system in 2015 to neutralize the network of influence of the opponent Moïse Katumbi. It is there that he also continues to coordinate and quietly follow the clandestine operations of his parallel military forces (elements of the former Simba and Cobras battalions).[15] Numbi is more dangerous without a function than with an official function with limited skills where he can be monitored and controlled.[16]
- Ilunga Kampete : Commander of the Kitona base in Kongo-Central
Lieutenant-General Gaston-Hughes Ilunga Kampete is a Katangese who manifests a loyalty to Joseph Kabila to the point that he maintained unfriendly relations with President Félix Tshisekedi while he commanded the Republican Guard in charge of presidential security. He was appointed in July 2020 to the post of commander of the Kitona base, the largest military base in the west of the country near the capital and capable of acting there in the event of disturbances. Kampete continues to enjoy impunity as elements under his control violently repressed popular demonstrations against the Kabila regime organized in January 2015 and September 2016 in Kinshasa. During the events of September 19, 2016 in Kinshasa, we were able to speak by telephone with a senior Congolese police officer who requested anonymity. He told us that “ those who massacre the population for free in the streets of Kinshasa are not police officers. They are killers of the GR that come mainly from the 15 th commando regiment GR, predominantly Katanga. What a waste for the Republic ! “.[17]
- Kalev Mutondo : former Director General of the National Intelligence Agency (ANR)
The former director general of the National Intelligence Agency (ANR), the powerful state security service under Kabila, was for a long time considered to be Joseph Kabila’s trusted man and the country’s second strongman before the accession of Felix Tshisekedi to power. It is around him that all the strategies of repression of the protesters of Kabila were planned, executed and supervised. He is currently without function, but remains very active in the shadows thanks to a powerful network of intelligence agents that he has woven into the civil and military security services of the DRC. Kalev Mutondo was arrested on February 12, 2020 by DGM agents at Ndjili international airport while returning from a secret mission in Uganda where he made contact with rebels from the M23 wing refuged in Uganda and who tried in early 2019 to reorganize to carry out a few incursions into the DRC. He would also have contacted the emissaries of the dissident Rwandan general Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa who is leading a rebellion, RNC[18] against the Rwandan regime of Paul Kagame, from the plains of Ruzizi in South Kivu.[19] Kalev Mutondo remains unpunished in the Congolese judiciary and remains a destabilizing element of the fragile process of political normalization in the DRC.
- Brigadier General Eric Ruhorimbere : Commander of the North Equator operational sector
General Eric Ruhorimbere has taken an active part in the rebellions that have rocked eastern DRC since 1998. He played a leading role as chief of operations in the massacres committed in Kasai for ordering his troops to an excessive use of force and ordered summary executions committed by his militaries in Greater Kasai.[20] Ruhorimbere is not at all worried by the Congolese military justice to date. Ruhorimbere is currently the commander of the Nord-Ubangi operational sector (ex-Ecuador). An area considered to be the stronghold of the opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba. Since his arrival in the area, there has been an upsurge in acts of repression against local populations and human rights violations by elements of the army, particularly in Gemena.
- Commissioner Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo of the Congolese National Police (PNC)
Commissioner Ferdinand Ilunga Luyoyo is close to General John Numbi, both from the Malemba – Nkulu territory of Haut-Lomami province. Ilunga Luyoyo is a former commander of the formidable ex-Cobra Battalion of the PNC. He also commanded the 5 th Battalion of the National Legion of Congolese police intervention (LENI), quick response of the former Police became the special unit riot before becoming 14 July 2015 Commissioner senior superior of LENI between 2015 and 2017. His unit was heavily involved in the disproportionate repression of popular protests of January 2015 and September 2016 in Kinshasa. His troops were directly involved in the illegal, unjustified, excessive and disproportionate use of force, generally using lethal means such as heavy weapons (rocket launchers, grenades, etc.).[21] This is particularly the case during the repression of public demonstrations from January 2017 to January 2018, causing in particular the death of young activist Rossy Mukendi Tshimanga and Thérèse Deshade Kapangala, a young aspirant to religious life riddled with bullets while she was trying to save the life of a little girl victim of tear gas launched by the police.
In the hope of lifting the international sanctions taken against him and in order to show that he no longer heads the repressive operational units, Kabila has appointed Ilunga Luyoyo as Commander of the Unit for the protection of institutions and senior figures. But in December 2019, Ilunga Luyoyo was suspended from his duties for assaulting and injuring a lawyer in Lubumbashi. However, no domestic legal action has been taken against him in connection with acts of serious human rights violations and disproportionate repression committed by troops under his direct hierarchical and operational responsibility. In addition, Luyoyo continues to hold a highly politicized post as president of the Congolese Boxing Federation.
- Divisional Inspector Célestin Kanyama Cishiku, known as “Spirit of Death”: General Director of PNC training schools
Célestin Kanyama is a former provincial police commissioner in Kinshasa. R esponsible of much repression of peaceful demonstrations in Kinshasa between January 2015 and July 2017, he is currently Director of the Branch schools and training. Human Rights Watch had pointed out its direct responsibility in Operation Likofi, carried out against urban banditry in the capital, which took place from November 2013 to February 2014. During this operation, Kanyama had personally carried out actions and gave orders on the conduct of the operation, which resulted in numerous serious abuses. Participating police summarily executed at least 51 young men and adolescents and disappeared 33 others.[22]
It is not excluded that as commander of the police academies, Kanyama continues to design training modules there focused on the brutal and violent repression of demonstrations, following anti-urban guerrilla techniques that he used on the field in order to terrorize the population. In September 2018, six lifeless bodies of young people, bearing traces of bullets, were found in the Congo River.[23] Several corroborating sources accuse special police units of being responsible for these murders . We recommend the maintenance of restrictive measures by the EU against General Kanyama as long as he is not brought before the courts of the DRC.
- Evariste Boshab Mabudj-ma-Bilenge
Former Congolese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior and Security from December 7, 2014 to November 14, 2016, Evariste Boshab remains involved in the armed escalation that shook Kasai between 2016 and 2017. These incidents notably caused the he assassination of the two United Nations experts in March 2017, whose botched trial tends to clear the high political and security officials indexed in several independent investigations.
A report published on July 17, 2018 by the Study Group on Congo (GEC) of the University of New calls on the Congolese government to “ investigate the involvement of provincial and national authorities in supporting militias ” in the conflict which killed more than 3,000 between September 2016 and July 2017 in Kasai ” , in the center of the DRC. While the insurgency “was extremely brutal, the government’s narrow and disproportionate military response worsened the crisis, ” the report notes. According to the GEC, “ the conflict in Kasai has seen many politicians – including Evariste Boshab, Hubert Mbingho, Maker Mwangu and Alex Kande – maneuver for positions of intermediation between “ local ” conflicts and “ national ” political power . Mr. Boshab was Minister of the Interior when the conflict broke out. According to a careful investigation carried out jointly by RFI and Reuters on the basis of elements from the Congolese military justice investigation file, the result of cooperation with the UN, several Congolese state agents are involved in this double assassination. But to date, these pieces have never been mentioned either during the trial opened in the DRC, or in the report of an investigative committee set up by the United Nations.[24]
Several sources indicate that he continues to maintain local militias, especially among former young Congolese refugees in Angola repatriated to the DRC. These militiamen could be reactivated at any time in the event of a deterioration of the national political and security situation in Kasai to the detriment of his political camp. Hence the importance of extending the current sanctions against Boshab.
- Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary : Permanent Secretary of the PPRD, the party of Joseph Kabila
Unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2018, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary was Minister of the Interior during the Kasai massacres. His responsibility is also pointed out in the assassination of the two UN experts, Zaida Catalan and Michael Sharp, on March 12, 2017. The man is known to utter threats of violence towards the population and the protesters of his political camp. During the installation of the PPRD Women’s League committee in January 2020, Shadary declared that his party is ready to paralyze the country if misfortune befalls ” the boss of Gécamines, Albert Yuma, placed under judicial control in the case says of 200 million euros. Indeed, in a short video of one minute, in front of the president of the national assembly and some PPRD activists Emmanuel Shadari declares this in Lingala: ” They are doing everything to blame Albert Yuma finally for making him guilty but if today something bad happened to the PCA, I am going to give a slogan and we are going to paralyze this country ”.[25] This is indicative of the bellicose state of mind of Ramazani Shadary, who ignores the international sanctions taken against him.
- Alex Kande Mupompa
Alex Kande Mupompa is the former governor of Kasaï-Central during the Kasaï massacres. In his book “The massacres behind closed doors in the great Kasai”, Germain Joseph Muanza Kambulu quotes Alex Kande as being one of those responsible for the assassination of the customary chief Jean-Pierre Mpandi of the Kamuina Nsapu.[26] Elected provincial deputy in 2018, Alex Kande renounced his seat in the provincial assembly of Kasaï Central in October 2019. Holder of Belgian nationality, he would like to highlight this status to avoid the renewal of the sanctions decided against him while ‘No legal action has been taken against him in the Kasai massacres case.
- Jean-Claude Kazembe Musonda
Former governor of Haut-Katanga between 2015 and 2017, Jean-Claude Kazembe was sanctioned for his responsibility in security abuses and human rights violations in Haut-Katanga. Member of Kabila’s FCC, Kazembe is currently holding an insidious discourse with communitarian overtones in Katanga against supporters of Tshisekedi, mostly of Luba origin from Kasai.
Conclusion
The general political and security situation in the country remains very uncertain, as no legal action is taken against these people. Despite some positive signals currently emitted by the Congolese justice, particularly in the fight against corruption, the Congolese judiciary still remains heavily dependent on the political power and several political and security officials under the presidency of Joseph Kabila involved in serious human rights violations. The political camp of Joseph Kabila blocking initiatives for electoral reforms to consolidate the democratic process by developing conservation strategies for control of power. This is what the electoral expert Alain-Joseph Lomandja notes. “ It suffices to note for the moment the difficulty of such fundamental reforms in an institutional framework locked by the former power . In fact, all the necessary reforms (CENI, electoral law, etc.) depend on the Parliament, currently mainly acquired by the camp of the former President, responsible for the taking hostage of the last electoral process. In addition, the current Constitutional Court is also under the control of the partisans of the old Power. And, if we stick to the provisions of article 10 of the organic law on the organization and functioning of the Independent National Electoral Commission, the future CENI will also be controlled by supporters of Joseph Kabila who hold a de facto majority in The national assembly. Thus, without a Republican start, no major reform will be able to pass”.[27] And to note that the FCC is repeating the same strategy as in 2018. [28]
Finally, it should be remembered that the complete electoral cycle is not yet completed (there are still municipal and municipal authorities), logic would dictate that EU sanctions are maintained throughout the entire cycle, knowing that the risk of rigging, sabotage or sine die postponement of these elections remains high. To date, no concrete act taken by the new regime demonstrates its determination to want to organize fair, transparent and legal elections, without corruption or violations of human rights, with an apolitical CENI and reorganized so as to avoid serious irregularities and new crises of legitimacy of the authorities in the future[29] .
On the internal Congolese judicial level, with the exception of the trial – still ongoing – of the murder of the two UN experts in Kasai, the Congolese state has not undertaken any investigation into all these massacres and the Congolese justice system has not opened any investigation into these serious allegations of human rights violations. Victims therefore see no domestic legal proceedings against their torturers who are active in the ins Public tutions (National Assembly, Senate, public companies, etc.). What is more, the Congolese public treasury pays monthly fees for lawyers who defend individuals in their desire to obtain the lifting of sanctions.[30]
Thus, lifting the sanctions that weigh on the people mentioned above would be a negative signal for the EU perceived by the Congolese as a bonus to impunity in the DRC. We do not find any new element in their defense which would currently plead in their favor. Therefore, DESC encourages the European Union to maintain the pressure on the DRC, by extending the current regime of sanctions against the persons mentioned above for their harmful role in serious human rights violations and for obstructing the good conduct of an electoral process to ensure future peaceful, free and credible elections in order to allow the effective normalization of the political situation in the DRC. These people remain harmful and maintaining these sanctions also aims to change their dangerous behavior, to improve themselves to become actors in the consolidation of peace, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu
Political analyst and expert on defense and security issues
DESC exclusivity
Notes
[1] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/535542/politique/rdc-15-proches-de-kabila-sanctionnes-demandent-a-etre-entendus-devant-le-conseil-de-lue/ .[2] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/896111/societe/rdc-le-tribunal-de-lue-rejette-les-recours-des-proches-de-kabila-sous-sanctions/ .
[3] Lomandja, AJ. 2020 (January 13). “Presidential election of December 30, 2018 in the DRC: results not in accordance with the people’s vote? »Online at : http://afridesk.org/presidentielle-du-30-decembre-2018-en-rdc-des-resultats-non-conformes-au-vote-du-peuple-aj-lomandja/ .
[4] Félix Tshisekedi was proclaimed President of the Republic while the other polls marked a clear victory for the FCC of ex-President Kabila. According to the CENI, the FCC obtained 330 of the 500 seats in the national assembly, 836 provincial deputies and more than 80 of the 108 seats in the Senate. The FCC controls the national government (made up of 66 members of which 42 are from the FCC and 23 from the CACH) and provincial governments.
[5] Bandeja Yamba, 2019 (8 novembre). « RDC : Comment traiter des criminels du passé dans un contexte de coalition, voire de cohabitation gouvernementale ? » En ligne sur http://afridesk.org/rdc-comment-traiter-des-criminels-du-passe-dans-un-contexte-de-coalition-voire-de-cohabitation-gouvernementale-bandeja-yamba/.
[6] Wondo, J-J. 2019. L’essentiel de la sociologie politique militaire africaine : des indépendances à nos jours, Amazon, 458p. Disponible en vente sur Amazon : https://www.amazon.fr/Lessentiel-sociologie-politique-militaire-africaine/dp/1080881778.
[7] Nyenyezi, A., Vlassenroot, K. & Hoebeke, H. 2020. « The limits of President Tshisekedi’s Security Strategy in the Democratic Republic of Congo ». En ligne sur : https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/crp/2020/04/28/the-limits-of-president-tshisekedis-security-strategy-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/.
[8] Wondo, J-J. (27 avril) 2020. « Restructuration du commandement de la Garde républicaine : qui gagne, qui perd entre Tshisekedi et Kabila ? » En ligne sur : https://afridesk.org/restructuration-du-commandement-de-la-garde-republicaine-qui-gagne-qui-perd-entre-tshisekedi-et-kabila-jj-wondo-2/.
[9] Romain G. & Bujakera, S. 2020 (19 juillet). Jeune Afrique. « RDC : sous pression des États-Unis, Félix Tshisekedi procède à un prudent remaniement dans l’armée ». En ligne sur : https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1016772/politique/rdc-sous-pression-des-usa-felix-tshisekedi-procede-a-un-prudent-remaniement-dans-larmee/.
[10] Interview on September 30, 2020 with a senior FARDC officer based in Katanga.
[11] Thomas Fessy , DR Congo: The investigation into the bodies recovered from the Lubumbashi river must be credible
Four bodies were found after the political demonstrations of July 9 , Kinshasa, August 12, 2020.
[13] https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/detail_rdc-des-miliciens-ont-tue-deux-policiers-et-un-soldat-a-lubumbashi-la-situation-est-maintenant-sous -control? id = 10593862 .
[14] https://www.radiookapi.net/2020/08/15/actualite/justice/rdc-plus-de-4-000-cas-de-violations-des-droits-de-lhomme-au-1er .
[15] The Simba Battalion, a battalion made up at the time only of former Air Force soldiers – Numbi was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force before becoming the Chief of the Congolese National Police – united within the PIR to form an Anti-Terrorist Unit. The Cobra Battalion (11th Battalion of the PIR: Rapid Intervention Police) was made up of elements of the official Anti-Terrorist Unit. If officially these units are supposed to be dissolved, military sources say that they remain a kind of strategic reserve of Numbi for the benefit of Kabila and still keep intact their capacity for nuisance in the event of open conflict against Kabila or Numbi. The elements of these two battalions had committed massacres of the followers of Bundu Dia Kongo (in Bas-Congo) between February and March 2008 and were not really really disarmed.
[16] JJ Wondo, Remaniement du commandement des FARDC par Félix Tshisekedi : attentes et désillusions. Desc, 31 juillet 2020. http://afridesk.org/remaniement-du-commandement-des-fardc-par-felix-tshisekedi-attentes-et-desillusions-jj-wondo/.
[17] JJ Wondo, Septembre rouge en RDC : Joseph Kabila dévoile son ADN politique sanguinaire. DESC, 22 septembre 2016 ; En ligne sur : http://afridesk.org/septembre-rouge-en-rdc-joseph-kabila-devoile-son-adn-politique-sanguinaire-jj-wondo/.
[18] Rwanda National Congress.
[19] JJ Wondo, RDC : L’ex-AG de l’ANR Kalev Mutondo a-t-il franchi la ligne rouge ? DESC, 17 février 2020. En ligne sur : http://afridesk.org/rdc-lex-ag-de-lanr-kalev-mutondo-a-t-il-franchi-la-ligne-rouge-jean-jacques-wondo/.
[20] https://afridesk.org/fr/les-massacres-au-kasai-central-desc-interpelle-les-collaborateurs-securitaires-de-kabila/.
[21] https://monusco.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/bcnudh_-_rapport_sur_le_recours_a_la_force_et_annexes_-_mars_2018_0.pdf
[22] https://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2014/11/17/rd-congo-une-operation-policiere-conduit-la-mort-de-51-jeunes-hommes-et-garcons.
[23] https://www.rtbf.be/info/monde/detail_enquetes-au-congo-apres-la-mort-mysterieuse-de-plusieurs-jeunes?id=10024210.
[24] http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171220-meurtre-experts-onu-rdc-role-agents-etat-zaida-catalan-michael-sharp.
[25] https://www.7sur7.cd/2020/01/22/rdc-affaire-200-millions-eu-shadary-menace-de-paralyser-le-pays-si-malheur-arrivait.
[26] Germain Joseph Muanza Kambulu, Les massacres à huis clos dans le grand Kasaï (RDC), L’Harmattan, Paris, 2019, p.124.
[27] AJ Lomandja, Quand les réformes électorales se muent en stratégies de conservation du pouvoir en RDC – AJ Lomandja. DESC, 28 novembre 2020. http://afridesk.org/quand-les-reformes-electorales-se-muent-en-strategies-de-conservation-du-pouvoir-en-rdc-aj-lomandja/.
[28] https://www.dw.com/fr/alain-joseph-lomandja-le-fcc-est-en-train-de-r%C3%A9%C3%A9diter-la-m%C3%AAme-strat%C3%A9gie/av-53916795.
[29] http://afridesk.org/plaidoyer-pour-le-maintien-des-sanctions-ue-visant-des-presumes-auteurs-de-violations-des-droits-de-lhomme-en-rdc-desc/.
[30] Ibid.
