After his decision to declare, from May 6, 2021, a state of siege in the provinces of Ituri and North Kivu, ravaged by galloping armed conflicts, the Congolese President, Félix Tshisekedi, published on May 4 2021 an ordinance appointing the military governors in charge of leading these two provinces. They are respectively Lieutenant-General Luboya Nkashama, for Ituri and Lieutenant-General Cosntant Ndima Kongba for North Kivu. They will be assisted respectively by the Divisional Police Commissioner Benjamin Alongaboni and the Divisional Commissioner Ekuka Lipopo, as vice-governors.
This article attempts to briefly establish the concept of military administrator in the light of the elements of international law and history. The note draws up the profiles and the careers of these high-ranking officers of the army and the Congolese National Police (PNC) called to exercise the functions of governor during the period of application of the state of siege to replace the governors Jean Bamanisa Saidi and Carly Nzazu Kasivita. The analysis starts from the questioning of the effectiveness of this measure and its possible political impact in the light of the 2023 elections.
Administrator / military governor of a province, what does this mean in concrete terms?
Strictly speaking, there is no definition of the function of military administrator in Congolese law. Military administration is a polysemantic concept that needs to be circumscribed.
In traditional French and Belgian military jargon, the notion of military administration refers to a certification awarded to an officer who has followed specific technical and administrative training, at the end of which he obtains a military administration certificate (BAM). In Belgium, the Military Administration Certificate, now known as the “ Cours Supérieur d’Administration Militaire” (CSAM), is a continuing education program for officers, intended to provide the armed forces with competent officers, managers and future commanders in the fields of management, leadership, security & defense, budget & finance, public procurement, public management and law on the program [1]. It is therefore a training in public and military administration focused on senior management functions within the defense forces and the security and police services.
In the history of armed conflicts, the notion of military administration refers to the situation of a country defeated militarily, placed under occupation and administered by military governors. In international law of armed conflict, occupation is a situation in which a State finds itself, during or at the end of a conflict, invaded and placed under foreign military domination without being annexed. It is the action for a victorious belligerent state to install an armed force, often an administration, on the territory of a defeated state; the result of this action; the time that this state of affairs lasts.
The definition and legal regime of military occupation, in the law of armed conflict, appears in the Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the laws and customs of war on land[2] , the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War[3] and Additional Protocol I of 1977 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts[4] .
According to article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907, “a territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the enemy army. The occupation extends only to the territories where this authority is established and able to be exercised ”[5] . The definition of occupation is not based on the subjective perception of a situation by the parties concerned, but on a reality that can be grasped objectively: the de facto submission of a territory and its population to the authority of an enemy army.
Thus, legally speaking, the notion of military governor is a function which derives from military occupation, that is to say customary in the context of a situation of armed conflict. He is a minister plenipotentiary of an occupying power responsible for a city or a foreign territory, annexed or at least in a situation of protectorate, and administered by the military authority. The military governor is responsible only to the government for the power which appointed him to this post, and recognizes only the laws of his country.
If this function refers to a situation of armed conflict between two enemy territorial entities, the fact remains that it has been used twice in the recent history of the DRC. Indeed, under the Second Republic, when the AFDL was approaching Kinshasa with great strides, Mobutu had appointed military governors in provinces that had not yet fallen into the hands of the rebellion supported by Rwanda and Uganda. He had already done the same in the former province of Shaba (Katanga), when this region was attacked by rebels from the Congo Liberation Front led by Nathanaël Mbumba.[6] In December 2018, following the bloody interethnic conflict between the Banunu and the Batende, Joseph Kabila appointed Colonel Olivier Gasita, a former rebel of the RCD and the CNDP, as the Acting Administrator of the Territory of Yumbi, in the Province of Maï-Ndombe.
In a situation of growing insecurity in the east of the country, Congolese President Félix Tshisekedi declared on April 30, 2021 a “state of siege” in the provinces of North Kivu and Ituri, in accordance with article 85 of the Constitution.
As a reminder, the notion of “state of siege” refers to a situation which corresponds to a real fact, of a military nature, which can be declared by a supreme authority of a State in a determined geopolitical space of this State, threatened by the military enemy forces. It is in this capacity that he appointed military governors whose main mission is to ensure the daily administrative management of the two provinces as a “temporary” replacement of the civilian governors for a period of one month.
It is therefore an exceptional and temporary situation of transfer of the prerogatives and competences of the civil authorities to the military authorities, in a context setting up a regulation which will entrust these military and police authorities with the extensive powers of administration of the territory and security of these two provinces facing a very serious security threat. Legally and technically, these military administrators will not have an operational function in the conduct of military and police operations to secure the two provinces concerned. The question to be asked is to know the relevance and the added value that this appointment would bring on the operational military plan.
Lieutenant-General Johnny Luboya Nkashama, a former RCD-Goma rebel sent to Ituri
According to the testimony of Paul Mwilambwe, the policeman involved in the Chebeya affair, who worked alongside General Luboya in the RCD-Goma rebellion : “ Johnny Luboya joined the RCD-Goma rebellion as a civilian. He then followed a basic military training at the Rwandan military academy of Gabiro in Rwanda, particularly in the areas of intelligence. He was then appointed in 2000 as chief of military intelligence staff of RCD-Goma, replacing Séraphin Zirimana.
He had Guy Baongola as assistants and four heads of departments:
- – Cyprien Mananga Intelligence Department (Bandundu or Kongo-Central)
- – Operations Department Paul Mwilambwe that I am (Tanganyika)
- – Head of Investigations Department Fabrice Tumusifu (North Kivu)
- – Department Against intelligence: Rigo Mwamba (Kasaï-Oriental).”
Mwilambwe specifies that ” Johnny Luboya was close to Adolphe Onusumba because they both followed the same military training in Rwanda mentioned above. During the 1 + 4 transition period, Luboya held his first position in 2003 in Lubumbashi as Chief of Staff of the 6th military region (Katanga), before being appointed by Joseph Kabila Deputy Inspector General of FARDC, then Deputy Commander of the Naval Force. He will then be commander of the military region in Mbandaka “.[7] In July 2020, General Luboya will be promoted by President Tshisekedi lieutenant-general and appointed commander of the First Defense Zone which covers Kinshasa and the western provinces of the DRC. [8]
Divisional Commissioner Benjamin Alongaboni Bangadiso: a former MLC deputy governor of Ituri
Benjamin Alongaboni is a Ngombe from the territory of Bolomba in the province of Equateur. He was born in Lisala in 1966. As Luboya is a former ex-FAZ, a graduate of the 17th promotion of EFO (1986). He first worked in the parachute battalion of the DSP as company commander, then in the Civil Guard until 1997.
After the dissolutions of the Zairian national gendarmerie and the civil guard, the new power created the Congolese National Police (PNC) which will reinstate a majority of the gendarmes and civil guards who came to pledge allegiance to the new power, under the leadership of General Benjamin Alongaboni in the hope that he is his new manager. Disappointment! It was then that Benjamin Alongaboni decided to integrate in December 1998 in Gemena the Congo Liberation Army (ALC), the military branch of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC rebellion. There he will exercise as the Provincial Inspector of police work and become aide Jean-Pierre Bemba, then Commander of the 31th Battalion of the ALC, a unit that has repelled the onslaught of Armed Forces of Congo Laurent Kabila, supported by Namibians, Zimbabweans and Interamwe Hutu. He will command the ALC Bravo brigade in CAR to support ex-president Ange-Félix Patassé, between 2001 and 2003.
In 2003, Bemba appointed him responsible for the police services in the territories occupied by the MLC. After the reunification of the army and the police in 2004, Alongaboni was appointed Assistant Divisional Inspector of the PNC in charge of operations and intelligence, notably alongside General John Numbi in 2007. He will occupy this function after the replacement of Numbi by General Bisengimana. But the man will return from favor with Kabila at the end of 2014 and will assume secondary functions including that of provincial inspector of the PNC in Katanga and that of director of police schools until his appointment as deputy administrator of the province of North Kivu. Alongaboni is described as a patriotic officer.
Lieutenant-General Constant Ndima Kongba in North Kivu
Constant Ndima is an Ngbandi and an ex-FAZ who evolved within the DSP, the presidential guard of Mobutu. He then joined Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC at the time of its creation in Orientale Province with the assistance of Ugandan officers.
On the spot, the Congo Liberation Army (ALC) the armed wing of the MLC will not leave good memories with the population. General Ndima’s name was associated with the “effacer le tableau” operation (erase the board). This is a military operation carried out between October 2002 and January 2003 jointly between the MLC and RCD-N forces led by Roger Lumbala aimed at capturing the town of Mambasa in Ituri, until occupying the town of Beni, located about 120 kilometers further south. The operation was named ” Effacer le tableau“, according to the victims.[9] In February 2003, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported to the Security Council that joint MLC / RCD-N operations had been accompanied by serious human rights violations, including arbitrary executions. , rape, torture and enforced disappearances[10] . This crisis has led to the displacement of more than 100,000 people.[11] The region has been stabilized somewhat after the operation Artemis conducted from June 6 to 6 September 2003 in Ituri by the Union European. [12] General Ndima has always refuted these accusations. Indeed, it was Colonel Freddy Ngalimo, along with 27 of his subordinates, who was found guilty of these acts. Freddy Ngalimo was sentenced in February 2003 by the MLC military justice to 43 months’ imprisonment for not having denounced the crimes committed by his subordinates.[13]
Constant Ndima will actively participate in the operations that will allow the MLC to take control of the northern part of Equateur province, where Jean-Pierre Bemba will set up his headquarters.
After the reunification of the army, he became among other commander of the 1st Military Region (Bandundu) until 2014, then deputy commander of the 2nd Defense Zone (Katanga and Kasai) in charge of operations and information , alongside General Jean-Claude Kifwa Kambili (Tango Tango). In 2018, Joseph Kabila appointed him commander of the Third Defense Zone, in the east of the country. In July 2020, the new President Tshisekedi appointed him to the post of Deputy Chief of Staff in charge of the administration and logistics of the FARDC. General Ndima is described as a Republican officer, professional and loyal to the Republic.
The divisional commissioner Jean Romuald Romy Ekuka Lipopo, police vice-governor of North Kivu
Romy Ekuka Lipopo graduated from the 119th Promotion of Belgian Military School (ERM) which he joined in 1978 with the 118th promotion. He also holds a license (master) in criminology from the State University of Liège and a police specialization at the former School of Application of the Royal Belgian Gendarmerie School). On his return to Zaire, he worked in the Zairian Gendarmerie under the FAZ. He then moved to the Civil Guard until the AFDL took power in 1997. He was a major at the time. In 1999 Ekuka named T3 (operations manager) to the 4th Military Region (Katanga).
In 2004, he was admitted to the 3rd cycle of the Royal Higher Institute for Defense (IRSD) in Belgium to follow the staff certificate courses. On his return home, he was assigned to the office of the Chief of the General Staff of the FARDC. On 1st January 2006, he was appointed lieutenant colonel of FARDC. He will then evolve within the PNC as national coordinator of the PNC reform unit (CRP). As such, he steers the reform process of the Congolese Police. A reform that had gone rather well, unlike the bogged down reform of the FARDC. In 2008, he joined the cabinet of PNC Inspector General John Numbi as Deputy Chief of Staff.
On December 28, 2013, with the rank of Senior Senior Commissioner, Ekuka Lipopo Romy was appointed Deputy Provincial Commissioner of the city of Kinshasa in charge of the Judicial Police.[14] In 2015, he was appointed focal point, responsible for monitoring police reform. A post he will keep until the recent appointment as Vice-Governor of the province of North Kivu, in the context of the state of siege. General Ekuka is said to be close to Major General François Kabamba Kasanda [15] , Tshisekedi’s current private military adviser. Ekuka is a police technician and expert who is called upon to assist the military administrator of a province which produces armed groups that it does not consume.
What can these governors do in this part of the territory that they have known in the past?
The presidential decision to declare a state of siege is generally welcomed by the population with a view to bringing peace to Ituri and North Kivu, while expressing its incomprehension that South Kivu, which is also under threat from local armed groups and foreigners of the same kind as in Ituri and North Kivu, is not affected by this measure. Afridesk and other experts remain very sceptical of the success of the state of siege as nothing is done to restructure the troops deployed in the area.[16]
In fact, on the ground, no troops operating in the provinces placed under siege were detected. Only a commando half-battalion of around 200 men , from Kinshasa, was sent to the Ituri operational sector, before the state of siege came into force.
These are the ex-CNDP Rwandophone regiments, the 2103 rd from Tshikapa as well as the 2101st and 2102nd regiments from Mbuji-Mayi, which were deployed in North Kivu where they operate under the command of Generals Bob Ngoy Kilubi and Bonane suspected of connivance with Rwanda and the ex-rebellions created by this country. However, these units had distinguished themselves negatively in the massacres committed in Kasai between 2016 and 2018, by disproportionately repressing militiamen from Kamwina Nsapu. They were also moved to the center of the country during the war against M23 for their support for this rebel group created by Rwanda and supported by Uganda.[17]
In addition, a few appointments were made in the two provinces. Brigadier General Bertin Mputela Nkolito replaces Major General Peter Kuba Chirimwami as Commander of Operational Sector Sokola 1 Grand-Nord in Beni-Butembo- Lubero.[18] Former MLC, Brigadier General Clement Bitangalo bulime becomes the new commander of the 32 th Military Region, in the province of Ituri.[19] The new commander of the Ituri operational sector is Brigadier General Rigobert Kasongo Maloba.[20] Brigadier General Evariste Mwepu Lumbu is the new commander of the Operation Sukola 2 North Kivu sector against the FDLR. Brigadier General Guylain Mulamba becomes commander of the 34th military region in North Kivu.[21]
It must be said that General Constant Ndima was the commander of the 3rd Defense Zone which covers the two Kivus, Maniema, Ituri, Tshopo, the two Uélé between September 2018 and July 2020. This is the period that covered the launch of large-scale operations in North Kivu which turned into the deterioration of the situation and the increase in massacres in Beni. These operations were illustrated by a great confusion in their operational progress and highlighted the disorganization of a fragmented command and the ineffectiveness of the actions carried out on the ground. It was during this period that special units of the Rwandan army carried out illegal operations, in violation of measures taken by the United Nations Security Council.
General Constant Ndima therefore finds a military ground which he therefore recently commanded. Hence our questioning of knowing what he could do best in a month that he could not do in practically two years with the same troops not relieved, tired in combat, often in connivance with the rebel groups? Especially since it is committed to a purely administrative task of managing the province which does not allow it to act at the level of the conduct of operations.
As for General Luboya, he is also returning to a field where he evolved as a rebel within the RCD-Goma, most of whose officers and units are found in the mixed regiments deployed in Beni and Ituri. Some elements of these regiments and their officers are suspected of colluding with local armed groups.
However, it is appropriate to put things into perspective because the rebellious past of these governors is not enough to point the finger at them. The recent history of the DRC has seen ex-rebel officers like Lucien Bahuma Abamba and Mamadou Ndala of the MLC, and Pacifique Masunzu of the RCD valiantly defend Congolese territory against the rebellions created by Rwanda.
Another question concerns the way in which the functions of these military administrators will be articulated with the operations commanders to avoid repeating the structural and operational dysfunctions consecrating the parallel commands in order to strengthen the operational principle of unity in the field, unity of command. Isn’t a military administration of an army with a fragmented chain of command more dangerous than a legally controlled civilian administration? How would such an exceptional measure be able to resolve the endless structural problems of an army that is badly paid, badly maintained and whose reform is politically sabotaged? Moreover, how would MONUSCO troops, not associated with these new measures, act on the ground with the FARDC , some of whose officials are suspected of being involved in human rights violations? [22]
Also, what about the mineral / natural wealth which is one of the causes of the violence, what will be done with the active military businessmen deployed in large numbers in these two provinces? With what justice because the presidential measure seems to maintain the structural and operational status quo of the units deployed on the ground and their respective commands, but also of the military magistrates often singled out for their partiality and ineffectiveness ?
The other skepticism concerns the troops that will be deployed on the ground. While demands for the withdrawal of officers and troops that have plagued the region, the presidential appointments seem to go against popular demands. They give the impression of bringing the situation of eastern DRC under the regime of the old regional geopolitical order that prevailed between 1997 and 2013, dominated mainly by Rwanda[23], and subsidiarily by Uganda and the countries of East Africa. Especially since Kenya, militarily close to Rwanda, becomes a contributing state for the troops of the MONUSCO intervention brigade. Moreover, how will we know that we will not dump foreign troops from neighbouring countries in these operations, whose effectiveness we have not evaluated since their launch in 2019 ?
Conclusion
President Tshisekedi’s decision to place these two provinces under siege is generally welcomed as the Congolese want a lasting peace to be restored in Ituri and North Kivu. But one has the impression that the decision is taken to respond to a political context generated by the popular demonstrations organized in the east of the country against the activism of the armed groups and the inaction of the army and MONUSCO. Hence a kind of haste in taking this decision which does not seem to have sufficiently integrated certain aspects linked, for example, to the collaboration between the new military authorities and their administration in the face of community dynamics. What do we do with DDRC processes[24] in progress ? How are these governors going to collaborate concretely with the army? What structural and logistical changes have been made in the field to optimize the efficiency of operations? With what means beyond slogans? These are the elements that will determine the effectiveness of operations beyond the profiles of the new governors.
We remain very sceptical of the success of operations at this stage. The cart is put before the horse. We always do the same thing: act without thinking or planning upstream operations to estimate their impact. They plunge their heads in the sand. Yet in the field of operations, less than ten days before the end of the initial 30-day period of the state of siege, there is no room for optimism. According to intelligence reports, there is a precarious lull in the two provinces. In Ituri, combatants from the CODECO/URDPC and FR PI armed groups continue to carry out attacks in the territories of Djugu and Irumu. The ADF are still active in Mambasa territory. In North Kivu, the ADF faction of Musa Baluku remains active and continues to massacre the civilian populations in Beni, with the support of certain FARDC officers, according to our military sources.
Hence our questioning, what if the state of siege fails, would the country tend towards its balkanization with the announced arrival of the armies of the countries of the region? What possible political impact of this measure on the electoral process of 2023 in the event of the status quo or deterioration of the security situation until the (pre)-election period? Will the state of siege be extended or reactivated or extended during the (pre) election period of 2023, with its set of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution? Doesn’t the government risk using it to exclude these provinces from the 2023 elections (as in Beni, Butembo and Yumbi in 2018) or to delay the 2023 elections sine die?
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu / Afridesk Exclusive
References
[1] This is a 10-month postgraduate training course, with a multinational and multidisciplinary contribution. The King confers the Superior Military Administrator Certificate (BAM) on officers who have successfully completed the course. The Higher Military Administrator Course is also recognized as a continued university study and is crowned by the Master’s degree in Public and Military Sciences https://www.rma.ac.be/fr/a-propos-de- lerm / organization / coll% C3% A8ge-de-d% C3% A9fense .
[2] Convention (IV) concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre et son Annexe: Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, La Haye, 18 octobre 1907, Deuxième Conférence internationale de la Paix, La Haye 15 juin – 18 octobre 1907, Actes et Documents, La Haye, 1907, Vol. I, pp. 626-637.
[3] Convention (IV) de Genève relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre, 12 août 1949, Actes de la Conférence diplomatique de Genève de 1949, Vol. I, Berne, Département politique fédéral de la Suisse, pp. 294-335.
[4] Protocole additionnel aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949 relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (Protocole I), 8 juin 1977, Les Protocoles additionnels aux Conventions de Genève du 12 août 1949, Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, Genève, 1977, pp. 3-89.
[5] Art. 42. Cette disposition ne contient pas qu’une définition du territoire occupé, mais y ajoute des limitations substantielles quant à la zone dans laquelle la Puissance occupante peut revendiquer des compétences. Voir Howard S. Levie, The Code of International Armed Conflict, Vol. 2, Oceana, Londres / Rome / New York, 1986, p. 714.
[6] JJ Wondo, Quelle armée pour appliquer l’état de siège décrété en Ituri et au Nord-Kivu ? – DESC, 3 mai 2021. https://desc-wondo.org/quelle-armee-pour-appliquer-letat-de-siege-decrete-en-ituri-et-au-nord-kivu-jj-wondo/.
[7] Testimony collected during an exchange with Paul Mwilambwe on May 27, 2021.
[8] https://desc-wondo.org/remaniement-du-commandement-des-fardc-par-felix-tshisekedi-attentes-et-desillusions-jj-wondo/.
[9] Son objectif était présenté par les témoignages des assaillants de tout nettoyer sur leur progression en dispersant la population. Cette expédition a été conduite d’abord par le lieutenant-colonel Freddy Ngalimu, puis par colonel Widdy Ramsès Masamba, alias le « Roi des imbéciles », placés sous le commandement opérationnel direct du général Constant Ndima, basé à l’époque à Isiro. Le propre surnom du général Ndima semblait être “Effacer le tableau” selon plusieurs selon plusieurs témoignages militaires et des victimes. https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MRG_Rep_Twa_FRE.pdf .
[10] Rapport sur la situation des droits de l’homme en République démocratique du Congo présenté au Conseil de sécurité par le Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, 13 février 2003, document ONUS/2003/216.
[11] Le schéma systématique du recours au pillage, au meurtre et au viol était décrit comme une tactique de guerre, les exécutions sommaires visant l’ethnie Nande et les Pygmées, obligés de fuir« afin d’échapper à la persécution que leur valait leur collaboration supposée » avec le RCD-K/ML https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/MRG_Rep_Twa_FRE.pdf.
[12] Dans le cadre de la résolution 1484 du 30 mai 2003 du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU.
[13] https://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/rdc-le-mlc-condamne-27-hommes-accus%C3%A9s-de-violations-des-droits-de.
[14] https://www.leganet.cd/Legislation/JO/2014/JOS.04.03.2014.pdf.
[15] General Kabamba is also a graduate of the ERM in polytechnic and was the head of the deputy military house under Joseph Kabila and at the start of the mandate of Félix Tshisekedi.
[16] https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1166195/politique/etat-de-siege-en-rdc-felix-tshisekedi-fait-il-fausse-route-dans-le-nord-kivu-et-lituri / .
[17] JJ Wondo, L’offensive militaire bâclée, menée par les FARDC à l’est de la RDC, tourne au désastre, https://afridesk.org/loffensive-militaire-baclee-menee-par-les-fardc-a-lest-de-la-rdc-tourne-au-desastre-jj-wondo/
[18] He is assisted by two assistants: Colonel Antoine Yagolo Ngondo in charge of operations and intelligence as well as Colonel Polydor Lumbu Matundu in charge of administration and logistics.
[19] He is assisted by Colonel Damate Dieudonné, as second in charge of operations and intelligence and Colonel Nlandu Matongo, as second in charge of administration and logistics. The Colonel Wamba Djo André was appointed Chief of Staff of the military region.
[20] He is assisted by Brigadier General Abdallah Nyembo in charge of operations and intelligence and Brigadier General Jean Claude Bolanda in charge of administration and logistics.
[21] His deputies are Colonel Jeannot Butengano , in charge of operations and intelligence, and Colonel William Kadima , in charge of administration and logistics.
[22] https://actualite.cd/2021/05/05/etat-de-siege-la-monusco-note-une-decision-souveraine-et-promet-detudier-lordonnance-en .
[23] Indeed, Rwanda has increased its influence in the DRC since the victory of the Congolese AFDL rebellion over loyalist troops of the Zairian armed forces, under Mobutu. Rwanda consolidated its regional supremacy in June 2000 during the Six Day War in Kisangani when its army defeated the Ugandan army. This was accentuated with the military and diplomatic support of the Americans and the British before, during and after the seizure of power by the RPF.
[24] Disarmament-Demobilization-Community reintegration.
