On Saturday, February 5, 2022, Kinshasa was shaken by the information of the arrest and hearing by the ANR [1] of the all-powerful Special Advisor to the President in matters of security, François Beya known as “Fantomas”.

In a communication to the RTNC, the spokesperson for the presidency confirmed this Tuesday, February 8, the suspicions of a threat to state security at the basis of the arrest of François Beya, the President’s Special Adviser on matters of security. The Presidency of the Republic has invited the Congolese population to be vigilant.

While François Beya is in detention in the premises of the ANR, President Félix Tshisekedi met on February 7, 2022 in the evening with Jean-Claude Bukasa, Beya’s assistant in charge of external security within the CNS, the National Security Council. According to our sources, there was talk of giving him instructions to ensure his interim and reassure the CNS staff, worried about the situation. His appointment as interim was confirmed on the night of February 8. This appointment is part of the classic provisional administrative procedure. It is the principle of continuity of service. Jean-Claude Bukasa was one of Beya’s assistants (number 2) within the CNS, in charge of external security. Like Eberande Kolongele after the arrest of Vital Kamerhe in 2020, Jean-Claude Bukasa is temporarily – on an interim basis – the function of special adviser to the president on security matters, pending a final appointment to this post. Bukasa can be either permanently maintained in this position or replaced by another person as this position is currently highly coveted by several close collaborators of the President. Details on Bukasa’s profile will probably be given in our next publications.

Besides Bukasa, the following names are the most cited to replace Beya. They are Fortunat Biselele (currently Private Advisor to the President), Samy Badibanga (former Prime Minister and Vice-President of the Senate), Roland Kashwantale (Director General of the General Directorate of Migration (DGM) since February 2020), François Muamba Tshishimbi (Coordinator of the Presidential Council for Strategic Watch), Gilbert Kankonde (Former Minister of the Interior of the Ilunkamba Government) and Roger Kibelisa (Senior Assistant at the CNS in charge of the Interior).

In addition, CNS staff are prohibited from accessing its premises until further notice. Searches are currently being carried out by ANT agents in all of François Beya’s offices, at his various residences and at the homes of some of his collaborators. The following names are cited and could be subject to arrest by the special services because of their supposed involvement in the current case: Djoko Bale Kongolo (Director of Cabinet of François Beya), Guy Vanda (Personal Assistant of Beya), Bosolo, Tshibangu, Tshinay, Ekwaki.

To try to decipher this situation, we resorted to a methodology of questions and answers, following a private exchange with a journalist from a Western media, two days ago.

1. Mr. Wondo, what is your analysis of the arrest of François Beya?

JJW: This question is broad and can be difficult to summarize in a few words.

Broadly speaking, the arrest of François Beya should first be interpreted as part of a clan war that has been waged for several months by close collaborators of Tshisekedi to occupy the very strategic position of special adviser to the president in matters of security; but also to gain the confidence of the President.

In recent months, we have witnessed a sort of skirmish between François Beya and certain close collaborators, including:

– Yane Fumuatu , Senior Assistant to the Special Security Advisor, in charge of political issues (suspended on December 22, 2020 by Beya with a ban on leaving the territory for insubordination, usurpation of quality, influence peddling, indiscipline, etc.).

– Fortunat Biselele known as “Bifort”, private adviser to the Head of State who was the subject of a hearing within the National Security Council (CNS), the coordinating body for all security and information overseen by Beya.

We also witnessed attacks by the media between Major General Franck Ntumba Buamunda [2] , the head of the President’s military office and Beya to gain the exclusive confidence of Félix Tshisekedi. There are also other people who covet this position, arguing that Beya is serving Kabila with the mission of sabotaging Tshisekedi’s presidency. This is particularly the case of Jean-Claude Bukasa, Beya’s assistant.

On the other side, Beya having got wind of this, he had subtly started to trap his potential competitors.

It must also be said that since Tshisekedi came to power, Beya was essential and omnipotent in Tshisekedi’s political and security decision-making, in addition to being omnipresent in all the President’s public appearances, both inside and outside the country. Almost nothing could be done without going through him.

In addition, Beya, known for his closeness and his loyalty to Joseph Kabila, played a very important role in the rapprochement between the two political personalities of the country, in particular in the “deal” which sealed the passage of power between the two leaders.

As a result, several executives of the UDPS, the presidential party, accused him, rightly and wrongly, of riding for Kabila rather than working for the benefit of Tshisekedi. In addition, Beya has aroused the mistrust of those close to the President’s biological family, including Jacques Tshibanda Tshisekedi, one of Félix Tshisekedi’s brothers who works in the office of Roland Kashwantale, the CEO of the DGM. Jacques Tshisekedi probably has an important role in the denunciation of the charges against François Beya.

Finally, the deleterious climate which has recently poisoned relations between Kabila’s camp and that of Tshisekedi is no stranger to what is currently happening.

It cannot be ruled out that the increasingly manifest concern of those close to Kabila of completely losing their political influence is the basis of what is being tried to reproach Beya who, in my opinion, would not have really cut off from the umbilical cord with his former leader.

However, the thesis of a set-up or a plan devised by Beya’s adversaries cannot be ruled out at this stage either, in view of the elements put forward above, even if according to certain piecemeal information that I have collected from high-ranking military sources, there are serious indications of a coup attempt which should take place at the end of the exercise of the rotating mandate of Tshisekedi at the head of the AU.

Caution remains in order at this stage when the information is very little distilled to the public and the rumors go in all directions, even mentioning the influence of Western services given the close ties that Beya maintains with the authorities of the Central African Republic where the regime is supported by the Russians in a context of pandemic psychosis of the Sahelian coup d’etat syndrome.

All this ultimately illustrates the fragile situation in which the Tshisekedi regime is evolving, which seems to be walking on eggshells from the start of its presidential mandate, even if politically, it has always managed to pull out of the game, until now.

2. Is his interrogation necessary?

JJW: As soon as he is accused of grievances related to state security, it seems quite normal that he be arrested and interviewed by the ANR, the National Intelligence Agency. This is a service placed under the authority of the President of the Republic whose mission is to ensure the internal and external security of the State. The procedure seems to me quite legal in view of the competences of the ANR, one of whose missions consists of “the research and observation, in compliance with the law, of offenses against State security”, in accordance with the decree – Law No. 003-2003 of 11 January 2003 establishing and organizing the National Intelligence Agency (ANR).

It all depends on the offenses with which he is accused. His position does not confer him any judicial immunity to my knowledge.

3. Judged close to Kabila, is the theory of the coup justified?

JJW: At this stage, we do not have enough elements to affirm or invalidate anything. But as I mentioned above, this thesis remains plausible in view of the worrying evolution of the political situation. Especially if Beya had information announcing that he was in the process of losing his place, according to several concordant information at our disposal. Which would mean for him (and for the Kabila galaxy in loss of speed and control of state affairs), the total loss of the considerable influence he has on the management of the country of which he was almost the man -orchestra, almost the equivalent of number 2 of the regime.

We can safely suggest that it is possible that he tried to anticipate things. But in this still nebulous affair, we should not exclude either the geostrategic influence of the international powers which have their eye on the DRC. Beya has strong regional and international security networks that can act behind him. I spoke of his links with the CAR controlled by the Russians who are in a dynamic of geostrategic expansionism in Africa and of which the DRC is one of the strategic targets. It is not excluded that the Western services put Beya’s activities under surveillance and informed the Congolese special services of his intentions. A failed retaliatory action attempt by Rwanda, with which Beya would also maintain good relations, cannot be ruled out. Lately, Paul Kagame continues to express his dissatisfaction on the international media with the political and security governance of Tshisekedi. We know that Kagame did not appreciate the fact that Tshisekedi let Museveni bring in the Ugandan army in eastern DRC in a region whose economic resources he also covets and where he has exercised influence for decades. after their two armies fought each other in June 2000 in Kisangani. It was for Kagame, one of Tshisekedi’s supporters in the region, a crossing of a red line by the latter. It is possible that Kagame wanted to use Beya to sanction Tshisekedi. We know that since the entry of Ugandan troops into the DRC, relations between Kagame and Tshisekedi have cooled somewhat.[3]

However, we have been informed of several arrests and/or arrests in security, military and high political circles according to several concordant sources. The names of Modeste Bahati Lukwebo, President of the Senate, and Lieutenant-General Jean-Claude Yav Kabej, the FARDC Chief of General Staff in charge of intelligence and operations, are increasingly cited by our sources as being among the people who would be arrested by the ANR investigation services.

The various theses mentioned here and there remain open at this stage where very few elements of investigation filter through.

4. What scenarios to expect?

JJW: It is premature to predict future scenarios, but this case, given Beya’s political and security weight, will certainly reshuffle the country’s security chessboard. Whatever the outcome of Beya’s arrest, it can be assumed that he will no longer hold his current position. It is a function that requires full mutual trust with the President. However, Beya cannot be heard by the ANR without the approval of the President who, to give the green light to his arrest, has sufficiently taken the measure of his impact. And if ever Beya is kept in his post, he risks spending most of his time settling scores with his opponents. This would weaken the optimal functioning of the security services which would this time return to an open war of “services”.

We should also expect a purge in the army, in the police and in the intelligence services with the risk of pushing some to the last entrenchment and increasing this time the risk of a coup d’etat in a pre-electoral political context already tense by the choice of CENI leaders, if all this is not handled with tact. The attempt at a paranoid security drift and an authoritarian regime is also to be feared and its consequences in terms of human rights violations if all this is not managed with tact.

Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu

Analyst and expert in security, military and geostrategic issues

References

[1] National Intelligence Agency created by Decree-Law No. 003-2003 of January 11, 2003 establishing and organizing the National Intelligence Agency (ANR).

[2] https://afridesk.org/que-cachent-les-entreprises-mediatiques-contre-le-general-franck-ntumba-le-chef-de-la-maison-militaire-du-president-jj-wondo / .

[3] http://voiceofcongo.net/sommet-accord-cadre-daddis-abeba-paul-kagame-a-decline-linvitation-de-kinshasa-le-rwanda-a-t-il-perdu-pied-en -rdc.