Since the launch of the state of siege in the two provinces of North Kivu and Ituri in May 2021, the security situation has further deteriorated to the point that the army and security forces have quickly lost control of the situation. More than six months after the capture of the town of Bunagana by the M23 rebels, supported by the Rwandan army, the Congolese army (FARDC) is struggling to reorganize itself or recover occupied territories. On the contrary, the M23 is expanding its range of action and is at the gates of the city of Goma, capital of North Kivu, after the capture of the city of Kitchanga on January 26, 2023. This city is a strategic axis which connects Goma to the northern part of the province. This is a blow for the populations of Goma and Masisi. Kitchanga, an important center of commercial activity is considered the breadbasket of Goma which risks being suffocated.

How to explain the failure of the Congolese army, FARDC, in the face of this rebellion? This is what we are going to explain in broad outline in this analysis following the interviews we had with several senior officers from the operational staff and certain unit commanders deployed in the combat zones. The article also proposes some possible priority solutions aimed at strengthening the operational capacities of the FARDC. The analysis details certain points raised in the interview I gave to the online diary actualite.cd.[1]

An army without battle order

The FARDC remains an operationally weak and heterogeneous army, with a vague if not almost non-existent order of battle[2], due to unsuccessful reforms, the integration of armed groups and rebel elements disloyal to their hierarchy.

Problem of leadership and multiplicity of chains of command

Several expert analyzes repeatedly mentioned that the FARDC was particularly weak at the command level. These observations were verified in our interviews with the soldiers deployed at the front. Feedback and analysis of recent reverses successively suffered in North Kivu by the FARDC against the M23 since June 2022 mainly attribute the ineffectiveness of the FARDC to their disorganized, dysfunctional and incompetent command. Indeed, on the operational level, several officers complained about an overlapping of structures in the chain of command and the absence of a single command.

Our interlocutors point to overlapping skills between the different levels of command. It is not really known who commands military operations between the different levels of command:

Is it the Deputy Chief of Staff of the FARDC, the President’s Military House from Kinshasa, the advanced staff dependent on Kinshasa, the Military Governor of North Kivu, the Commander of the 3rd Defense Zone, the Commander of the 34th military region (North Kivu), the Commanders of the operational sectors, the Commander of the Republican Guard task force, the Commander of the 3rd Air Group, etc…?

Currently in North Kivu, the Military Governor has no view on all the military operations carried out on the territory where he exercises territorial administrative authority. The commander of the 34th military region, who should legally be responsible for conducting military operations, remains marginalized in certain decision-making. However, the organic law on the organization and functioning of the FARDC gives him the mission of ensuring the conditioning of the units under its responsibility. This is concretely the mission of conditioning the troops deployed in the geographical area for which it is responsible in the event of an alert or armed threat, the operational implementation of these units. This is exactly what happened in 2013, after the fall of Goma, when the late General-Major Lucien Bahuma, then commander of the 8th military Region at the time (North Kivu), was appointed commander of all the operations carried out in this province.[3] By attributing to General Bahuma, both the command of military operations and that of the Military Region (North Kivu), this had clarified the chain of command, while responding to a cardinal operational principle: “field unit – unity of  command  ».^[4] And the results materialized on the ground. According to our military sources, there are currently no less than 24 generals present in North Kivu, several of whom are at the head of the various operational axes.

In addition to these weaknesses, there is the lack of control of the army’s personnel, the absence of organic tables and tables of endowments to allow an overview of the army as well as their equipment. Units in combat show very weak operational capabilities in terms of maneuvers and logistics. They are unable to plan and organize coordinated interforce and combined arms operations between cover units (infantry), main defense units (armoured, mechanized artillery), special units and air support.

In addition to this imbroglio at the level of the direction of military operations, there is the presence of certain military units independent of the local operational command and the military region. According to a general officer: “The generals of the Head of State’s obedience impose their options and establish a climate of fear and denunciation among the other officers capable of proposing effective solutions. Hence the timidity of some commanders to take initiatives for fear of being unfairly accused by these ‘généraux président‘. These officers particularly point to the interference of the Head of the President’s Military Household, Major General Franck Buamunda Ntumba and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff in charge of operations, Major General Chico Tshitambwe. The latter take unilateral and cavalier initiatives, without consulting with the other levels of local command in North Kivu. This sometimes poses problems in the coordination of operations because they do not master all the subtleties of the field. Hence the discouragement of some unit commanders, we are told by a source from the Military Region staff.

Destructured units, understaffed, after several military setbacks

The military setbacks suffered by the FARDC caused the disintegration of the units on the ground. Several soldiers have deserted their already understaffed units because of the figures inflated by their leaders in order to embezzle money, bogus bonuses and allocations of fuel and logistical equipment. Several military leaders, at all levels, take advantage of the additional operational budgets to improve their financial health. This cannibalization of military resources has a negative impact on the effectiveness of military operations. The reconstitution of these units and their reconditioning become in this scenario difficult to carry out.

Demotivated troops without good support

On the ground, there is a lack of motivation of the combat troops. It comes back to us from all the sources questioned that the soldiers deployed at the front are not motivated and are not properly taken care of, especially in the event of injury or death. Their families suffer and are neglected. As a result, they slow down and avoid fighting when they see the fate reserved for their colleagues who are wounded or killed in combat, often buried without dignity. This demotivation is also due to the fact that the unit commanders, who have very little training in group management techniques (group dynamics), do not maintain moral talk to motivate their troops. On the other hand, the soldiers are reluctant to obey the orders of their leaders whom they accuse, rightly or wrongly, of embezzling their bonuses.

Troop relief problem

The officers also complain about the lack of relief from the units deployed in North Kivu. “We cannot fight on the same front for nearly 10 years without being reconditioned or relieved”, a colonel told us.

The EAC Force is just as ineffective as MONUSCO

This is what all the interlocutors tell us who all say that the solution is not to be found in the regional force within which Rwandan officers take part in intelligence activities, even if their officers have been asked to leave the DRC. They continue their missions on the other side of the borders. The Congolese must develop a historical awareness that the EAC states are actively involved in the crisis that is eating away at eastern DRC, having been the basis of the invasion of Zaire in 1996 for geoeconomic reasons. The deployment of the EAC force responds to the unacknowledged objective of keeping the DRC in the geopolitical order of a militarily defeated country. The proof is that today the FARDC are prohibited from entering the territories occupied by the M23 and left under the control of the EAC Force. It is neither more nor less a loss of sovereignty over part of the national territory.

A few priority solutions

The dilapidated state of the FARDC requires real reforms that leave no room for political and nepotistic complacency because it is a question of the sovereignty of a State and human lives are constantly in danger. Hence the urgency of properly reorganizing the armed forces from the base to the top. If the implementation of a reform plan can take years, nothing prevents to start distilling here and there doses of punctual reforms at the level of the military devices deployed in the operational zones.

A certain profane and ignorant opinion, obsessed with partisan and political smacks, wants people to believe that it is impossible to reform an army in time of war. This is pure demagoguery and irrational manipulation. The example of Angola is eloquent enough to contradict these received ideas. Angola is one of the models of African countries which has been able to successfully reform its security services in times of war or in a fragile post-conflict situation by setting up an effective and efficient defense system. Between 1990 and 2002, Angola undertook to reform, modernize and equip its army by developing the military doctrine of “combat performance”.[5] The results were quickly realized on the ground. Today, Angola is becoming an undisputed regional power in Central Africa.

• Define a clear order of battle for effective operational deployment of combat units to enable commanders to manage their troops effectively at the operational and tactical levels.
• Reconstitute some mobile special units to deal with the most urgent.

Although an army reform is spread over a long period, it is already possible to form mobile special units. Between 9 and 15 months, three to six mobile rapid reaction force battalions can easily be formed[6] and equipped according to security needs and threats. We can draw inspiration from the training of the 32nd Brigade of the Rapid Reaction Unit (URR) based in Kindu and the “Train The Trainers” program which made it possible to train some Congolese instructors capable of training these units. Thus, parallel to this training of special units, we can gradually implement the long version of the reform of the army, at the same time as the return to work of military schools, training centers and other specialized training schools of the army and the construction of military barracks.

• The restructuring of the army around a flexible chain of command

Optimize the chain of command and assign the direction and coordination of operations to the Commander of the 34th military region, supported administratively and logistically by the Governor of the Province. The aim is to strengthen the role, the hierarchical authority, the decision-making autonomy and the operational and tactical autonomy of the Commander of the 34th Military Region who must become the real boss of all the units deployed in North Kivu, in close collaboration with the Military Governor. This will increase the effectiveness of the army in accordance with the principle: Unity in the field – unity of command – operational/tactical autonomy.

• Lighten the chain of command by eliminating several unnecessary intermediate or parallel command posts.
• Clarify the roles between the head of the president’s military household, the minister of defence, the chief of the general staff and his deputies and the head of the defense zone.
• Allocate adequate logistical and financial resources to the troops deployed at the front with good and effective care on the ground for soldiers injured in combat and care for the families of soldiers who died in combat.
• Put aside disloyal officers and soldiers and regiments from the CNDP and the 2008 mixage in order to avoid their collusion with local armed groups close to Rwanda and Uganda.
• Carry out the relief, reconditioning and rapid reorganization of units engaged in operations for several years.
• Reorganize information structures by equipping them with adequate communication systems.

Contrary to other received ideas, the balance of forces on the ground in terms of equipment and men is theoretically largely favorable to the FARDC. We must be serious about the leadership of operations by leaving command in the hands of a person who must report directly to the Supreme Commander and the Chief of the General Staff without going through intermediaries. It’s all about strategic vision and political will.

Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu

Analyst and Expert on Security and Defense Issues in Central Africa

References

[1] https://actualite.cd/2023/02/05/rdc-pourquoi-les-fardc-peinent-defaire-le-m23-entretien-avec-jean-jacques-wondo-expert.

[2] An order of battle (ORBAT) is a device or set of information describing the command structure of a military formation and all its subordinate elements. Represented in the form of an organization chart, it defines the command relationship and the structuring of the elements involved. The order of battle defines the hierarchical functioning of the military elements, according to forms which vary according to the doctrines of the armies, and allows the commanders to manage their troops effectively at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

[3] Jean-Jacques Wondo O. Les Forces armées de la RD Congo : Une armée irréformable ?, DESC, 2015. Disponible sur Amazon : https://www.amazon.fr/Forces-Arm%C3%A9es-Congo-irr%C3%A9formable-Prospective/dp/9090287744.

[4] In the book « Les Armées au Congo-Kinshasa. Radioscopie de la Force publique aux FARDC », the Unity of command, a capital concept in the military organization, requires that a single leader has all the powers in the fields and the geographical space of the organization for which he is responsible. This clearly implies that each subordinate receives orders only from the superior (both hierarchical and functional at the same time) and that he is accountable only to the person who has explicitly assigned him the mission.

[5] Michel Luntumbue et Jean-Jacques Wondo, La posture régionale de l’Angola : entre politique d’influence et affirmation de puissance, Note d’analyse, GRIP, 03 Juin 2015.

[6] Few elements within the units should be selected with the aim of quickly subjecting them to training to constitute temporary rapid intervention mobile units.