Awkwardly sanctioned by the United States, François Olenga a general fallen out of favor ?
By Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu
Army General – four stars – François Olenga Tete, Tetela of Katako Kombe of the clan of Patrice Emery Lumumba, born in Maniema, is the highest ranking Congolese military officer with General Didier Etumba, the general chief of staff- of the FARDC. His lumumbist past made him one of the rare Congolese nationalist and patriotic generals currently active in the DRC..
He has held, since September 2014, the function of chief of staff of the President Kabila’s “Maison militaire”, the Head of State’s private military office. It is a strategic function as we know that the functioning of Defense in DRC, a Praetorian regime where, unlike the Constitution which makes Defense a field of collaboration between the President and the Government , the national Defense policy is exclusively managed, without sharing, by the Head of State’s private military office.
Since his surprise sanction by the US Treasury Departement, in June 2017, General Olenga, dispossessed of his prerogatives of ordering the purchase of arms, is gradually moving away from the circle of influence of Joseph Kabila for the benefit of the “kanganese clan” which intends to lock the security and defense device of his regime.
General Olenga played a central role in FARDC victory on the M23
His appointment on 23 November 2012 as Chief of Staff ad interim of the Army, replacing General Gabriel Amisi suspended over high treason suspicions against him, after the fall of Goma face the M23, was interpreted at the time as an attempt to perk up the morale a losing army.
And the results were not long in the field of operations with the good performance of the FARDC, that he motivated financially during the war against the M23 in 2013. This earned him a certain esteem and popularity in a vast majority of the troops he was close to. This would not have pleased some of his Katangese colleagues in Kabila’s military squares, according to a Congolese military intelligence source.
And the results were not long in the field of operations with the good performance of the FARDC, that he morally sought by threatening to publicly shoot the traitors and financially motivated during the war against the M23 in 2013. This earned him a certain esteem and popularity with a large majority of the troops he was close to.
A cumbersome general for the Katangese military circle of Joseph Kabila?
“The all-powerfull General Olenga: Consecration or subtle remoteness?”
This is what I wrote in an article in September 2014 during the restructuring of the FARDC command: “As with General Banze, General Olenga’s move from the army to the Kabila’s private military office can be doubly interpreted. For some, including a European military expert in the DRC: “What is obvious is that Olenga is reinforced in his position as a key man by going to the President’s military Office“. A reading that I did not really share at the time by advancing the following : “In fact, even if on paper General Olenga seems to be the big winner, he loses all the same control and direct contact with the field where he has demonstrated a unanimously acclaimed effectiveness. General Olenga is the architect of FARDC’s victory over the M23. As head of the military Office, he will have under his direct – but not operational – functional authority on the Republican Guard. In a context of a possible retention of Kabila in power by force, it is not excluded that as in 2011, the GR violently represses the protesters of the regime. Thus with increasing Western diplomatic pressure on Kabila, the international community could use the brutal repression of the GR to translate its functional authority, General Olenga, before the criminal courts.[1]“. Some facts seem to corroborate my analysis of the time.
It must first be said that the military success of the FARDC against the M23, that General Olenga copartage with the late general Lucien Bahuma Ambamba and Colonel Mamadou Ndala, mysteriously dead, worried Kabila’s Katangese military entourage. Thus, his appointment as Kabila’s chief of staff while he hoped to occupy the supreme function of Chief of General Staff of the FARDC[2], was a way, for Kabila, to move him away from the troops and bring him back in order to better control him.
The end of the military influence of General Olenga started some time after the appointment of General Gaston Ilunga Kampete as commander of the GR in September 2014. Yet he owes this position thanks to General Olenga who considered him as his favorite. Relations between the two men have been progressively tense since 2015. The two men share differences of view on the role and missions of the GR. While in January 2015, General Olenga was part of the legalistic army officers. They defended the principle of non-intervention of the army in the missions of maintenance and restoration of public order. They were therefore reluctant to involve the GR and the army in the crackdown on protesters[3], unlike Katangan generals Ilunga Kampete, Jean-Claude Yav, Ilunga Sengelwa, Ferdinand Luyolo, Head of National Legion Intervention (LENI) anti-riot unit ( formed by Angolan instructors) and General Amisi Tango Four, supporters of the radical wing and in favor of the violent repression of protesters qualified as insurgents[4].
Relations between General Olenga and General Ilunga Kampete further deteriorated in 2016 when General Olenga wanted to take over the influence of the GR for the benefit of FRR soldiers [5]. As a reminder, when in July 2014, President Kabila was the subject of serious threats of coup d’état by a group of officers of the GR, General Olenga is the one who designated General Ilunga Kampete to calm them [6]. Since then, General Olenga, President Kabila’s special staff commander, personally suspicious of the GR, had tried to dilute the GR-ci’s influence by reinforcing Kabila’s protection by elements of the Kabila Forces de reaction rapide (FRR), by somewhat scaling the premiums of the GR elements to the benefit of FRR soldiers[7].
Since then, General Olenga would be placed under the supervision of the Katangese generals who do not like him very much and who are eager to fill his position. The Katangan general would even be willing to commit a coup against Kabila, if they feel that he is no longer in a position to maintain power.
This is a scenario not to be underestimated, according to convergent information coming from military sources. This pattern would see a number of general and superior officers as well as security officials from Katanga neutralize Kabila or attempt to regain power in the event of his fall. This scenario envisaged by the military entourage of Kabila, develops around General John Numbi. It can involve the following generals : Jean-Claude Yav Kabej, General Olenga’s deputy to the military command of the President in charge of operations and information, Damas Kabulo, the Secretary General of National Defense; Célestin Mbala Munsense, Deputy Chief of Staff for FARDC Administration and Logistics; Dieudonné Banze, former commander of the GR and current chief of staff of the Land forces; Jean-Claude Kifwa, commander of the Second Defense Zone covering the former provinces of the two Kasai and Katanga; Philemon Yav, the commander of the 22nd military region that includes the former province of Katanga, Raus Chalwe, General inspector of the Congolese National Police; Sylvano Kasongo, the provincial chief of police in Kinshasa; Colonels Mpanga Mukutu, Commander of the Security and Honor Regime of the GR, the unit in charge of the close protection of Kabila and Ferdinand Luyolo, chef of the LENI; as well as Kalev Mutond, the General Administrator of the ANR.
General Olenga victim of an unfair US sanction?
This is the conclusion that one could draw from the analysis of the American sanctions imposed against him with regard to his functions.
As Chief of the General Staff of the Head of State, General Olenga has, on paper, a mission to assist President Kabila in the design and development of the defense and security and defense policy, assist in the conduct and coordination of all activities related to the organization, training and equipment of the Armed Forces[8]. He is also the head of the Private military office of the President. As such, he exercises functional authority over the GR, in addition to coordinating all security and intelligence services. These attributes make him theoretically a first rank soldier in the Country, when we know that unlike the Constitution which makes Defense a field of collaboration between the President and the Government, National Defense policy is managed without sharing by the private military office of the President.
But it happens that since he was wrongly sanctioned by the US Treasury Department, which has understood that he is the operational commander of the Republican Guard (GR), General Olenga finds himself dispossessed of his prerogatives of ordering the purchase of arms.
Indeed, the GR does not fall under the functional authority of the FARDC Chief of the General Staff or the responsibility of the Minister of Defense. As explained above, the administrative functional authority of the GR depends on the head of the military office of President Kabila, while the operational command is provided by his corps commander, General Gaston-Hughes Ilunga Kampete [9].
The legal powers of the GR should exonerate General Olenga
The article 153 of Organic Law No. 11/012 on the organization and functioning of the Armed Forces stipulates:
The Republican Guard is a unit of the Armed Forces with missions to:
– guard and protect the President of the Republic and his distinguished guests;
– ensure the security of presidential facilities;
– provide escorts and honors at the level of the Presidency of the Republic.
Article 154: The Republican Guard reports to the President of the Republic for the execution of his missions, and to the Chief of the General Staff with regard to administrative and logistical support.
Article 155: The Republican Guard is commanded by a General Officer bearing the title of Commander of the Republican Guard.
He is assisted by two Deputy Commanders, general or superior officers.
While General Olenga is sanctioned, notably because of the involvement of the GR in the repression of demonstrators, it is noted that this unit reports directly to the President of the Republic for “execution of its missions”. The fonction of General Olenga, in addition as a private advisor, is limited to assisting the Head of State, in the design and development of defense and security policy and assisting him in the conduct and coordination of all activities related to the organization, training and equipment of the Armed Forces [10].
Indeed, speaking on Radio Okapi after the American sanction, General Olenga, who describes himself as “a nationalist and revolutionary officer”, explained that his institution, the President military office, does not work in collaboration with the Republican Guard. “The Military office maintains rather collaborative relations with the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Interior, the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the National Police. How did the Chief of the General Staff (General Didier Etumba) and the Chief of the Police – at the time the General Charles Bisengimana – are not sanctioned and that the military office that has collaborative relationships with them be sanctioned ?” questioned General François Olenga. He was also surprised that he was accused of having undermined the Congolese democratic process while the management of public demonstrations did not fall within his powers [11].
With regard to Bisengimana, we are of the opinion that the motives behind his setting aside are not internal sanctions, but rather a fine strategy aimed at saving international sanctions. In fact, in 2016, the UN Joint Human Rights Office (UNJHRO) recorded at least 5,190 human rights violations in the DRC, an increase of about 30% more than in 2015. More than 60% of these violations were committed by state agents and especially by the national police, commanded at the time by General Bisengimana. Unfortunately, General Bisengimana, who is very much appreciated by the political circles of the European Union and the United States, was simply spared by these sanctions. The general Charles Bisengimana which also has strong ties with Rwanda which was the armed wing within the RCD-Goma fighters, is as an outsider redoubtable in succession to Joseph Kabila in case of an action involving the army or police where he still keeps strong support.
Conclusion
Considered as a patriot in military circles and in the Congolese political circles, General Olenga would be doubly victim of the hawks of the regime, supporters of dictatorial power praetorian fierce, who covet his place and bad calibration of US sanctions. However, his duties as head of the military office did not give him direct operational command authority over the GR troops used to repress peaceful protesters.
At a time when the Congolese electoral crisis is entering a very critical phase, it is important that the international community increase the pressure on the security apparatus. To do this, it should target more accurately and correctly the real military operational leaders who want to plunge the DRC into chaos, while sparing, even rehabilitating those who do not carry the blood of the Congolese in their hands and do not send the troops to massacre the population by adopting rather a republican posture, as do some rare general officers who refuse to implicate the army in the repression of the civil populations.
DESC, with its proven knowledge of Joseph Kabila’s military apparatus, remains available to provide his expertise so that targeted and well-calibrated sanctions are properly and effectively taken against the general and superior officers who effectively undermine the democratic process that will allow the alternation of power in December 2018 through free, transparent and inclusive elections. This would avoid the counterproductive effects of inappropriate sanctions in a political context where armed men would more than likely end up investing the political area either negatively or positively by adopting a republican patriotic stance.
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu / Exclusivity DESC
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu is an expert and analyst on political and security issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Middle Africa. He is a graduate of the Hautes Etudes de Sécurité et de Defense of the Royal Higher Institute of Defense, a graduate of the Royal Military Academy (Belgium), holding a Master’s Degree in Criminology from the University of Liège and a postgraduate degree in political science of the Free University of Brussels.
Main publications
He is author of two books devoted to the Congolese army: The Armies in Congo-Kinshasa. Radioscopy of the Public Force to the FARDC (2013) and the Armed Forces of DR Congo: An irreformable army? (2014). He is the author of several articles published mainly on DESC, a site focused mainly on issues related to the defense and security of Congo and its region. He has worked for several years as a criminologist in the criminal justice sector in Belgium.
References
[1] Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu, « Comment interpréter le jeu de la chaise musicale à la tête des FARDC ? » in www.afridesk.org, 26/09/2014.
3 Joël Kandolo, « Le Général Olenga, un homme seul et un chef sans troupes ! », DESC, 3 avril 2015. https://afridesk.org/fr/le-general-olenga-un-homme-seul-et-un-chef-sans-troupes-joel-kandolo/.
5 Témoignages de deux officiers supérieurs de la Garde républicaine et d’un officier de la maison militaire.
6 http://afridesk.org/alerte-desc-la-garde-republicaine-a-menace-de-renverser-joseph-kabila/.
7 Témoignages de deux officiers supérieurs de la Garde républicaine et d’un officier de la maison militaire.
8 Article 75 de la loi organique nº 11/012 portant organisation et fonctionnement des Forces armées du 11 août 2011.
9 http://afridesk.org/portrait-qui-est-ilunga-kampete-le-nouveau-commandant-de-la-garde-republicaine/.
10 Article 75 de la loi organique nº 11/012 portant organisation et fonctionnement des Forces armées du 11 août 2011.
