A casus belli electoral calendar against Kabila ?
By Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu
In a brilliant analysis, the senior electoral expert and DESC analyst, Alain-Joseph Lomandja, described the electoral calendar published by the CENI as a “State Affair”, because the electoral process stagnates due to deliberately calculated maneuvers instigated by the political family of Joseph Kabila. Mr Lomandja does not limit himself to this observation. In a second very relevant analysis, he deciphers in a scientific and technical way the pitfalls and the political heaviness that will make this calendar, non-consensual, ineffective. He notes a subtle ploy to justify false technical constraints and to misleadingly extend operating times, yet compressive, to delay as much as possible the organization of elections[1]. Boniface Musavuli, the DESC coordinator, presents the same calendar as the catalyst for the fall of Kabila and the implosion of his political family, the Presidential Majority (MP). The jurist-criminologist and Deputy Administrator of DESC, Jean-Bosco Kongolo, discusses the consequences of the visit to Congo-Kinshasa of Nikki Haley, the US ambassador to the United Nations, whose one of the effects is the publishing of that electoral calendar, and calls on the Congolese people to realize that the liberation of Congo will surely not come from outside[2].
According to Musavuli, “Kabila page is being rotated ! The publication of the electoral calendar means that the Congolese can begin to dream of the post-Kabila Congo, which will not become, however, a country of plenty. (…) The regime is creating the chaos, chaos that the same regime and the President of the CENI, then presente to Congo’s international partners as a pretext for the non-holding of elections. These cynical practices have in a certain opinion created the idea that Kabila will never organize elections, and that he must be forced to leave power, including by force of arms. In such an environment, the initiative of a new security chaos could trigger a series of events difficult to master and precipitate the fall of the regime“[3].
Following the same roaming as my colleagues mentioned above, this analysis will attempt to identify other possible consequences of this diversion and cleaving calendar, particularly in the security area. My aim is to show how this electoral calendar may further stifle the disunity of the opposition and at the same time to push the opponents of Kabila to resort to the use of force. This is more than likely a scenario that may become relevant in view of the growing shrinkage of the space of political and democratic expression operated by the regime of Joseph Kabila and the apparent lack of alternative strategies of the opposition. This is what happened twenty years ago in Congo-Kinshasa.
African military sociology has amply demonstrated that the military is most often involved in the political sphere under the “doctrine of necessity”, like the situation has rocked in Zimbabwe, as an ultima ratio when a country is confronted with a political stalemate caused by the regime in place. War is the continuation of politics by other means, one says. That is to say, the war begins where politics stops. And in the coming months, the readership of DESC will probably understand better why I keep pounding on this cardinal strategic principle of Clausewitz in the Congolese situation.
A soporific bluff that divides once more the opposition
With his electoral poker game, by Corneille Naanga interposed, Kabila once again implode an opposition that seemed welded, facade, during the meeting with Nikki Haley. While the naive applauded a union of dupes, the day after the meeting with Haley, the statement of Felix Tshisekedi, the President of the Rassemblement, said a lot about the differences between the three major components of the opposition : Rassemblement, UNC and MLC. While the trio had to send a common message to American diplomacy, Felix Tshisekedi, the day after the meeting told the online newspaper 7sur7.cd that “In front of Nicky Haley the position of Rassemblement remained unchanged “. A slip of the tongue that implied that in the end, in front of President Trump’s envoy, everyone preached for his own chapel. A good illustration of the defect of this Congolese political class, unable to put aside its differences when the supreme interest of the nation is at stake, to privilege personal political interests. Abdou Diouf, the former secretary-general of the OAU (African union) and former president of Senegal was probably not wrong when he qualified Congolese political actors of irresponsible devoid of any sense of the State.
If the CENI, as repeatedly demonstrated by the senior electoral expert Alain-Joseph Lomandja, is the ultimate tool of diversion in the Joseph Kabila strategy of the slip, by the scuttling of the electoral process[4] , the recent electoral calendar is for Kabila the sword of atomization of this opposition which continues to fall apart since the meeting of Goree which gave birth to the Front citoyen. A common front that seemed set to kneel the Kabila regime. Alas, it was necessary to count on the food genius of the Congolese hungry opponents who did not hesitate to jump on the slightest occasion like Pavlov’s rats. A paid formula that Kabila will not fail to use in the coming weeks.
This is the same opposition, while the Congolese people expect a strong statement in the aftermath of the publication of the electoral calendar, which has just spread in the eyes of all its inability to put forward unifying republican values. How can opposition reject the calendar of the only legitimate institution, because integrating its representatives, while two of the three parties composing wants to continue to recognize Kabila as president while without political consensus, on 1 January 2018, Kabila ceases to be president by reprieve.
A cleaving calendar for the opposition : Towards a probable new MP – MLC and UNC or UDPS government ?
By unilaterally imposing a non-consensual calendar, the first thing that can be said about this high-profile political decision is that Kabila has also just buryed the Saint-Sylvestre agreement definitively. The first effect of this new political coup could be the dissolution of the CNSA made in Kabila and the resignation of the Tshibala government, which did not bring him any major political dividend. Recent attempts of parlamentary inquiry against Tshibala would be the premise of this insidious strategy[5].
Kabila’s other half-win is to continue to manage the division in opposition. If the leaders of the main political opposition groups unanimously reject the proposed calendar, differences are clearly displayed on the management of the country, with or without Kabila between 1 January 2018 and the presidential postponed to December 23, 2018.
Congolese opposition or the art of flip flop
To When deciphering the procrastination of the opposition, we realize that it is more than likely to a third round, after the dialogue of the OAU and the agreement of the CENCO, that we are moving, with Kabila as the only master on board, or almost. Thus, in the likely future scenarios, it is not excluded that Kabila eventually offers the prime ministerial and major ministerial positions and directorates of public companies to the MLC and the UNC, as a final reward to the loyal services that they returned to him respectively during the consultations of 2013 and the dialogue of the OAU.
Moreover, a new deal Kabila – UDPS is not permanently buried as many followers of the negotiations of Ibiza and Venice have reinvested the pre-square Felix Tshisekedi. They could push him to accept a power-sharing deal with Kabila for the post-2017 period. This issue would once again divide the UDPS, on the brink of collapse, with several executives under intense pressure from the government. ANR which push them, via in particular false information against its partners of the Rassemblement[6]. The creation by Jean-Marc Kabund, the Secretary General of the UDPS, of the preparatory technical commission of the extraordinary congress of the party already bristles the base of the party which shouts at the coup d’Etat. It is likely to shatter this party in tatters if the convening of the extraordinary Congress of the party is not in the consensus nor in a spirit of reconciliation of the different currents of this party .
The immutable strategy of Kabila since 2006 is still to divide his opposition to continue to reign in single and only master of the Congolese political game since 2001.
The narrowing of the political space often opens the way to the military option
In a country where no new president has come to power by electoral means, the tradition of alternation in power by armed means and by military involvement may confirm the rule. In this worst-case scenario, the UDPS which has been tossed without political spoils between the MP (Ibiza and Venice negotiations) and the Rally which seduces and instrumentalises it just for its high potential of popular mobilization that it is unable to demonstrate since the death of the Lider Maximo, would probably be and once again the big loser or the Congolese political Poulidor of the major stakes of Congo since 1997.
Failure to mobilize his fighters to chase Kabila, it will certainly be by the armed way, ultima ratio , that things are likely to be decanted. On this aspect, it will not be the peripheral rebellions of the East that will make the difference, but those who would be able to neutralize Kabila in Kinshasa will be the first beneficiaries of the coming economic situation. And we describe some scenarios in the next point.
Four main scenarios likely to occur in the coming months
The Tutsi-Rwandan scenario
A replacement or an alternative scenario to Kabila, but in the statu quo, is most plausible if his current Rwandan sponsors feel that the change could come from the west without them being directly or indirectly involved. So the the Rwandan fifth column in the DRC, composed of ex-CNDP regiments and M23 infiltrators in Kinshasa, could overtake everyone and put everyone in front of a done deal.
The events that took place in the Kasai aimed, among other things, to test the ability of Rwandophone units to operate in depth, beyond their traditional military zone of operational comfort. It is up to us from intelligence sources close to high political and security spheres that Kigali and Kampala are increasingly expressing fears that change will take place at the head of the DRC without their direct or at least indirect involvement. Such a change would significantly alter the regional geopolitical dynamics that have been underway since the Rwandan genocide and, by extension, leadership in the Great Lakes. This would concretely result in the end of a period of 20 years of Rwandan domination in the DRC by the Kabila interposed. This end would have a considerable geoeconomic impact because it would mark the end of the Rwandan strategy of capturing Congolese wealth by establishing a “war economy”[7] in its eastern part. For the Japanese professor Masako Yonekawa , the military integration of the CNDP, a pro-Rwandan rebellion within the FARDC, has reinforced the influence of the Rwandan army in eastern DRC, a way to access natural resources and attract financial support from external and multinational actors[7bis].
These are undoubtedly reasons, added to the security motivations, which justify the Rwandan obsessional strategy aiming at maintaining by all the means and possible subterfuges, a double political device, accommodating at the head of the DRC, and security unstable in the DRC. This would allow him to dictate his political agenda in the DRC and earn rents from this war economy. This allows Rwanda not only to increase financial incomes, but also to avoid confronting two fronts likely to implode the Rwandan regime : the socio-political front[8] and the socio-economic front[9].
DESC has recently received several information to this effect. Lobbying actions were even carried out in August and September by Charles Bisengimana in Europe. The latter was even received in private by Belgian leaders Michel, father Louis and son Charles. The objective of this scenario is to thwart upstream the second scenario, that of Angola which seems to have the support of the camp close to Didier Reynders.
One of the concretizations of this scenario would be in the course of its conceptualization from South Africa, according to credible information reached to DESC. It would involve Rwanda, South Africa and some well-known personalities (individuals) from the United States , Great Britain and Belgium. We will come back to this later in an exclusive analysis.
The Angola scenario by Sindika Dokolo interposed or vice versa
More than ever, everything suggests that Angola will play a decisive role in the coming months in the Congolese crisis. Moreover it is already the case since the fall of Mobutu. However, in the past, Angola has consistently refrained from interfering directly in the internal affairs of its northern neighbor. This time, the tutelary military power of median Africa may not be limited to chasing Kabila, but to being the maker of the future Congolese “king”.
This scenario has the advantage of being supported by some European and African chancelleries. And Sindika Dokolo’s watchword, the day after the publication of the electoral calendar, is a serious index that says a lot about the strategy that DESC tries to decipher. This will be divided into two phases : protesting against the Kabila regime by the peaceful way to the end and in case of repression, the intervention of Angolan troops to stop the abuses and push Kabila away like Yahya Jammeh in The Gambia. However, the recent dismissal of Isabel Dos Santos, SindikaDokolo’s wife, by the new president Joao Lourenço, would be a drawback to the effectiveness of the realization of this scenario.
The military-civilian congolese scenario embodied by Colonel Daniel Lusadusu
But a third scenario not to be underestimated is that of the allegiance of the Congolese army to a military personality or with a proven military background. Here is where appears the doctor-colonel Daniel Lusadusu who no longer hides his ambitions to lead a transition to lead the country to free, transparent and peaceful elections. The great asset of Colonel Lusadusu – and this is the argument of his lobbying – is to be the bridge that reconciles the army to the nation. Since his latest media releases, the man spares no effort to convince Americans and Israelis, the major Rwandan supporters of the region. At the same time, he continues to consult privately with senior Congolese military officials, leaders of civil society, political actors and representatives of the citizen movements passing through Belgium to objectively explain the merits of his approach taking into account Congo’s pre-explosive security situation.
For Colonel Lusadusu, embarking on a political transition led by the actors who will have no control over the men in arms and who do not have sufficient strength within the security apparatus presents the great danger of letting out a new a major security crisis in the DRC with incalculable political, economic, social and humanitarian consequences, both internally and regionally and internationally. This risk of possible slippage at the end of Joseph Kabila’s term will mean at the same time the failure of all the efforts undertaken both internally and by the international community for the establishment of democracy and the stabilization of the Congo.
This is how he says he puts forward his dual profile of military and medical, which would best meet the requirements of the current political and security in Congo. According to Colonel Lusadusu that we met on November 7, 2017, returning from a new stay in the United States that led him to the White House where he met the staff of The White House National Security Council (NSC )[10], “The Congolese people want alternation in terms of the rebirth of the Congolese state. But the country’s critical situation requires first and foremost that the country go through a period of transition to allow a good alternation supposed to lead to free elections, transparent and credible, but especially to stabilize the DRC from the security point of view and lay the foundation for good governance. It is also necessary, at the head of the country, to have a man capable of attracting the sympathy of men in arms. This is why a transition led by a man with a military profile would be better ensured than a transition led by a civilian actor who does not have sufficient control over security issues in the DRC and its region“.
Colonel Lusadusu adds : “ the challenge of the stabilization of the DRC goes beyond political and electoral issues and must be the first current concern to which the attention of all should be focused“. Indeed, he insists : “ We will have to hand over and maintain the military in the barracks, thoroughly reform our army so that it becomes truly republican and national, maintain it with dignity, better equip and modernize it according to international standards and especially eradicate the 70 armed groups that have swarmed in the country since the arrival of Joseph Kabila in power. It is also necessary for the DRC to have a president capable of working actively and concomitantly with the security of the DRC, regional stability and international security “.
In a pragmatic way, he says he is the best person in the current Congolese public landscape able to better understand these concerns. He describes his politico-patriotic commitment as salutary for the sole purpose of preventing the various multidimensional crises caused particularly by the illegitimacy of all republican institutions from turning into chaos that no one will be able to control. This is why he sees himself as a bridge that combines, builds confidence and federates the three essential components of Congolese society , namely the civil society, the political world and the armed forces and security of the DRC .
The group scenario called “lone wolves“
A final scenario is that of those I call a group of lone wolves, able to surprise everyone at any time and thwart any potential calculations visible. And these groups, very discreet, especially have the advantage of having settled on the ground which they master all the operating parameters of the Kabila system. These are people frustrated and disappointed by Kabila who could therefore ally in a timely manner to give the final blow to a scheme called sham or other opportunist “regime securocrates” that would be ready to make a palace coup. The next few months could give us surprises.
Conclusion
As he came to power without elections, it is certain that it is without elections and through the window, the expression being of the Deputy Administrator of DESC, Jean-Bosco Kongolo, that Kabila will leave power[11]. As Boniface Musavuli says, “ a certain realism recommends seriously to consider the end of the reign of Kabila, his fate being now limited to the debate on the electoral calendar, to shorten or stretch … “[12]. But the big question is, where will the Kabila regime’s fatal blow come from and who will benefit from it to make the transition ? And here is where the Romans/Congolese grabbed !
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu / DESC Rights Exclusivity
References
[1] Alain-Joseph Lomandja, Decrypting the political burdens of a technical electoral calendar, ESCR, November 10, 2017. http://afridesk.org/en/decryption-political-people-of-a-calendar-electoral-technique-aj- lomandja / . http://afridesk.org/en/mission-finished-nikki-haley-va-t-se-pass-after-jb-kongolo/ .
[2] Jean-Bosco Kongolo M., Mission finished for Nikki Haley, what will happen next? DESC, November 12, 2017.
[3] Boniface Musavuli, Electoral Calendar : A bet on the after Kabila. DESC, November 6, 2017. http://afridesk.org/en/calendar-electoral-pari-lapres-kabila-b-musavuli/ .
[4] Alain-Joseph Lomandja, the electoral calendar, a “ state matter In Congo-Kinshasa ?, DESC, November 02, 2017 . http://afridesk.org/fr/calendrier-electoral-affaire-detat-congo-kinshasa-alain-joseph-lomandja/ .
[5] Jean-Bosco Kongolo M, Interpellation of Bruno Tshibala : distraction and trap to cons. DESC, November 15, 2017 – http://afridesk.org/fr/interpellation-de-bruno-tshibala-distraction-piege-a-cons-jb-kongolo-m/ .
[6] This is for example the false rumor circulated by the branch of misinformation of the ANR and which makes believe that Raphael Katebe Katoto , the older brother of Moses Katumbi, would be supported by Westerners to be taxed as prime minister to prepare a return of Katumbi to the Congo and seal his union with Kabila. However sources close to Katebe , the two Soriano brothers are in open conflict since the merger of Katebe to Kabila via the financial interventions of Zoë Kabila and Selemani Mtwale , the two younger brothers of Kabila. Moreover, from Western authorized sources, Katebe no longer has any contact with European chancelleries, even if he tries to exchange with one or other European sulfur political figure known for his support for Kagame and Kabila.
[7] & [7bis] Presentation by Masako Yonekawa ( Rikkyo University – Japan ), Defective and prolonged character of contemporary conflicts and pacification process in the DRC. Conference of the Circle of Congolese Economists , Brussels, 04 November 2017.
[8] Rwanda is constantly at risk of latent ethnic conflict due to the lock-up of its political space and the social inequalities maintained by the power, which favors the Tutsi minority to the detriment of Hutus, the vast majority in the country.
[9] Risk of social explosion by the fear that the eradication in the DRC of the armed groups created by Rwanda could generate a social crisis for tens of thousands of Rwandans and their dependents living from the exploitation of resources of the DRC.
[10] The White House National Security Council (NSC) or the National Security Council of the White House is the main forum used by the President of the United States to discuss issues of national security and foreign policy with senior advisers National Security and Senior Cabinet Officials and is part of the Executive Office of the President. United States. Since its inception under the leadership of Harry S. Truman, the Council has been advising and assisting the President in matters of national security and foreign policy. The Council also serves as the principal organ of the President for the coordination of these policies between various government agencies. The Council has counterparts in the national security councils of many other countries.
[11] Elections after 2018: Nangaa concretizes the slide and offers a free mandate Kabila – JB Kongolo, DESC, October 26, 2017. – http://afridesk.org/fr/elections-apres-2018-nangaa-concretise-glissement-offre-mandat-gratuit-kabila-jb-kongolo/
[12] Boniface Musavuli, Electoral Calendar : A bet on the after Kabila, DESC, November 6, 2017. http://afridesk.org/en/calendar-electoral-pari-lapres-kabila-b-musavuli/ .
