DR Congo at the Crossroads : The political scenarios around Dec. 19, 2016
By Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu
This analysis aims to briefly describe the different possible polical scenarios by the end of the President Kabila mandate, scheduled for 19 December 2016. We try, with the usual precautions, to discern, cases of political situations to which the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) may confront during the last quarter of the year 2016.
1. The Kabila dialogue : an alibi to slip the electoral calendar
President Kabila is using the alibi dialogue announced since November 2015, but without real significant advance, to lull the Congolese in order to impose a transition, putting everyone before a done deal[1]. In this way he could take pretext of the judgments of the Constitutional Court, an institution in the pay of him and which interpret the Constitution in his favor. Kabila can also rely on the balance of forces currently favorable for him, particularly the Republican Guard and the commando units of rapid reaction forces, to impose himself and stay in power as in Burundi.
2. The Constitutional Court to the rescue of Kabila
Reinforced by the judgment of the Constitutional Court[2] interpreting the Article 70 [3] in favor of President Kabila, the presidential camp can consult again the Constitutional Court to decide on the postponement of the elections indefinitely. This will give a legal basis to the National Electoral Commission (CENI) to postpone the elections in order to allow President Kabila to remain in power. This would lead to a kind of political transition that he would, at any cost, keep under his control. The opposition, or part of it, as in 2003 in Sun City, would deal with the current ruling majority and join a consensus government, with Kabila will eventually use to change the constitutional rules and run other presidential terms later.
This hypothesis is very plausible if Kabila manages to form a new political majority as a result of his dialogue that derives from the resolution 2277 of the United Nations Security Council and that violates the entrenched provisions of the Constitution.
3. Unconstitutional alliance between PD and the opposition near the UNC of Vital Kamerhe
Since the launch of dialogue, co-facilitated by Vital Kamerhe and Thambwe Mwamba, many analysts suspect the national president of the UNC to engage in a game of political alliance with President Kabila in order to reach an agreement of political power-sharing for a transitional period during which he will be the prime minister. Some sources suggest that Kamerhe plays his own partition, as he feels marginalization by the alliance Katumbi – Tshisekedi. He would avenge this affront by rejoining the new presidential majority. Other credible sources actually speak of an arrangement between the two enemy brothers which have the support of some European circles, to counter the US plan favorable to a strict respect for the Constitution with the departure of Joseph Kabila in December 19, 2016. This is what confirmed at least two separate-Western sources, one met Mr. Kamerhe before. These two sources, convergent, confirm the existence of a « secret agreement » between Kabila and Kamerhe for a transition of one or two years up to the next presidential elections. But this agreement include no pledges on the principle of alternation in power. Other information not yet cross-checked by DESC, talk about the support of Kabila to the candidacy of Kamerhe in the next presidential election after the transition.
If this information is confirmed, we believe that the political career of Kamerhe will be heavily compromised. It may even be his “political death”. Deprived of much of his base in the west and in the center of the country, following the departure of Jean-Bertrand Ewanga and Claudel Lubaya, VK risks losing his electoral stronghold of East. Indeed, with the repeated massacres in Beni and Lubero and the continuing insecurity in all the eastern territories, because of the ineffectiveness of the security services and complacency of President Kabila, a Kabila alliance – Kamerhe would be interpreted as an act of high treason by local people who swear by the departure of Kabila on 19 December 2016. This could spell political death knell of the “Native of Walungu”. In any event, the future will tell us more, as Charles Kilosho advance in his opinion on “the Kamerhe soldier” [4].
4. The fall of Kabila after a popular revolt similar to the Burkinabe revolution
Both the previously described scenario seems plausible in the strategic and politician calculations of the presidential circle, as it may be fatal when assessing the relationship of political, social and even security forces. According to our various contacts in the army, the police and security services, the credo is to get the alternation in power – unfavorable to Kabila, that is to say, opposed to any extension of the presidential mandate beyond December 19 2016. This is also the case that any fear : a popular uprising similar to that which prevailed President Blaise Compaore in Burkina Faso.
The fall of Kabila after a popular revolt similar to the Burkinabe uprising remains the potential and dreaded hypothesis of the Kabila strategists. Hence his determination to convene a dialogue on which he will have control from start to finish. But all the maneuvers and the advanced tricks so far to lure a majority of the Congolese opposition and civil society seem ineffective. And each passing day becomes like a bitter pill to swallow for many members of the Presidential Majority, part of which is sure to defect in the coming months.
5. Recourse to the Burkinabe jurisprudence
The fifth scenario would be consecutive to a popular revolt in case of attempt of keeping Kabila in power beyond his term. The Congolese should apply Burkina jurisprudence that excludes all the members of the former Presidential Majority from upcoming election. There would then be a political transition with two possible scenarios :
a)An influential leader from civil society, above political parties, chairs this transition devoted to the organization of elections. Here, Dr. Denis Mukwege is the favorite. It is reported to us, from several converging sources, that the man is actively preparing to assume the mission and that an international lobbying works in this direction. Mukwege is told to be particularly supported by close European Parliament political circles. His weakness is that he is more popular abroad than inside the DRC. But since we know, until proven otherwise, that the political issues in the DRC are durably identified from the outside and when we consider how Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, a “West-made opponent”, swiped the Vice-Presidency chair of the transitional Government of 1 + 4, this apparently weakness of Dr. Mukwege can quickly turn into an asset or a force, based on a SWOT [5] analysis without complacency.
b)A transition ensured by Etienne Tshisekedi, as part of a deal with Moïse Katumbi,and with a strong support of the « Rassemblement » of political and social forces struggling for a new presidency. This scenario that seems to have adhesion of the masses is increasingly considered. Well-fed sources speak of an agreement that would allow Etienne Tshisekedi to chair a transitional period of three years. This is to offer the lider maximo a kind of recognition and consecration to his political struggle for democracy, as he braved one by one the dictatorships of Mobutu and of the Kabila, father and son. Likewise, at the international level, it appears that some American official circles encourage this option, which would meet the aspirations of most Congolese. It seems that this transition should actually take place before the start of Barack Obama to the White House in January 2017.
It seems that this transition should take place before Barack Obama leave the White House in January 2017.
The choice of Tshisekedi would be dictated by the will of the American president to launch a new strong signal to African autocrats who set themselves up as brakes against the consolidation of democracy in Africa. In return for support to Tshisekedi in a symbolic presidency flanked with an expert government, as it was the case in the 1990s in South Africa between Mandela and Thabo Mbeki, the UDPS is committed to support the candidacy of Moïse Katumbi at the next presidential election. The party would provide the chair of prime minister and other key positions of the state… Several information and evidence received by DESC accredit a growing of this strategic political alliance. An alliance in-out as Tshisekedi has indisputable national popularity [6] and control the streets in Kinshasa, seat of the institutions, and Katumbi the till and international lobbies, always king-makers in the DRC, for a long time. However, it must be recognized that such a scenario would suffer from a solid legal base to support it. But it the DRC, the country where politics almost always trump legal !
6. Legalistic compliance with the Constitution and the 2277 resolution of the UN Security Council
This sixth hypothesis was subtly defended for a while by Vital Kamerhe of the UNC and Eve Bazaiba, the secretary general of the MLC. The underlying idea was to deliver an alliance East – West UNC – MLC – Kengo wa Dondo. This scenario could seduce part of the international community, often legalistic. This attempt of alliance seems to be partly the heart of the disagreement observed recently in the opposition. It could always be brandished again in the case of the failure of the current scheme Kabila – Kamerhe. This is a case of political figure that would be based on the interpretation of the Constitution wishing that President Kabila is in a situation of impeachment. Thus, the Senate President Leon Kengo wa Dondo, would ensure the interim functions of president pending the organization of presidential elections in compliance with the constitutional deadline. The strength of this assumption lies both in the fact that when the chances of Kabila to remain in power become thin, a qualified two-thirds majority could quickly emerge in Congress (National Assembly and Senate together) to lift this option. This option also seems to have a second reason which explains the Kamerhe overflowing activism in the dialogue : it is supported, as noted above, by some European decision circles for whom only dialogue could solve the current political crisis in the DRC.
7. The Strategy “Putin – Medvedev”
The seventh hypothesis improbable, but still possible until Kabila will shot in vain all his cards, despite his character of jihadist Kamikaze, he decides to retire officially from power at the end of his current mandate. He supports a dolphin in a strategy Putin – Medvedev. In this scenario, the contenders could be : Augustin Matata ( Prime Minister), Minaku Aubin (President of the National Assembly) already tidy in battle according to several sources, even Leon Kengo Wa Dondo (President of the Senate who maintains good links with Kabila and Kigali), Muzito (Former Prime Minister), on mission of seduction with the diaspora called « combatant »; Moses Ekanga – coordinator of the Chinese contract and Kabila economic strategist, alongside Albert Yuma, PCA of Gécamines, another contender for the interim – and many other personalities who fail to emerge by then. Kabila holds elections that he can control through the manipulation of the CENI in the perspective of maintaining the regime.
Gen Francois Olenga – Head of the Military House of the President, then chief of the ground forces, haranguing the troops during the war against the M23.
8. A military coup… war is the continuation of politics
Another scenario, not least, could be a coup inducted by the continuing of the political crisis as in 1960 and 1965 and after the war of the generals. The coup could benefit from external support, as the DRC traditional partners would be tired of the « whims » of a president clung to power while the country is falling apart.
Generally in Africa, there is a constant despite the change of (para-)military to civilian rule, the army remains the ultimate arbiter of politics : it remains in place, or withdraws when it sees fit [7]. Always keep in mind that changes in regimes in Africa are neither against nor without the army [8].
This scenario, which is not to be excluded, becomes increasingly possible with two variants:
The establishment ofa military interim government of public salvation, as in Niger [9], following the persistence of the political and institutional crisis and severe economic crisis.
A coup during the popular uprising (situation ofBurkina Faso). Then a transitional period where the army would cohabite with opposition +exclusion of the former Presidential majority from the next electoral cycle, at all levels. The establishment of a joint transitional government (army – civils) as in Burkina. Dr. Denis Mukwege or Etienne Tshisekedi would be indicated personalities to chair during this transition.
Speaking of a possible military coup, Captain Ali Kituwe, RSM (Regiment Sergeant Major: Supply Officer in replacement parts of a unit) of the 16th Armoured Regiment / GR was arrested in one of his residences, located at Mbudi district, in the municipality of Mont Ngafula, located in the outskirts of Kinshasa to Bas-Congo. He is currently held at the Ndolo military prison in Kinshasa. In their investigations, the security services also found several hammers and moving parts [10] for the 125mm guns 2A 46M equipping the tanks T-72M-1 fighting service in the Republican Guard. The investigation team also found at the scene of the firing pins and mobile cannons of 73mm 2A48 for armored fighting BMP-1 infantry Russian type also equipping the units of the Republican Guard and the FARDC. Also reported as part of the same case, detention at the Ndolo prison Lieutenant Oscar Sango, head of the depot tank number 3 of the military base of GR Kibomango in Kinshasa next the airport. Also as part of the same investigation, Commander of the 16th armored regiment of the GR, Colonel Steve Mikombe was also arrested on 1th September and questioned by DEMIAP. Colonel Steve Mikombe is the successor of General Ilunga Kampete at the head of the 16thArmoured Regiment / GR. The survey aims to find out if he was aware of the subversive activities of Captain Ali Kituwe. Under house arrest for a time, the joint investigation by the military intelligence / military prosecutor FARDC and Republican Guard concluded his innocence. These and other information at our disposal reinforces the thesis of military action in case of deterioration of the political atmosphere in Kinshasa. Fearing a general mutiny, President Kabila ordered the disarmament of FARDC units in Kinshasa and in major cities of the country for the benefit of a few units expected to be fair to him. However, this presents the risk that
the praetorian army units, very inadequate to protect Kabila and his regime, should not resist a popular revolt extensive and very violent that emerges in the coming days.
9. The distance duel between Kabila and Katumbi turns to the so dreaded armed confrontation
The penultimate scenario would be an armed confrontation between the armed supporters of Katumbi and those of Kabila. This assumption, increasingly likely, would be consecutive to the political deadlock in sight between the presidential camp, which seems to practice the strategy » all except Katumbi « and Katumbi backed Rassemblement refuses any dialogue with Kabila. This is the scenario developed by Thomas Hobbes in his famous work Leviathan « if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end (which is principally their own conservation, and sometimes their delectation only) endeavor to destroy or subdue one another[11]. A beam of convergent information tends increasingly to favor this option because war is a continuation of politics by other means, especially when men on power work hard to neutralize all political voice (classical) of the opponents [12]. This hypothesis is being taken very seriously by some Western diplomatic circles. Moreover, the security services and military intelligence Congolese fear increasingly to face a armed rebellion similar to the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI), the conglomerate rebel against the loyalist Gbagbo army, FANCI, who acted by proxy in favor of Alassane Ouattara, Guillaume Soro via the interface.
10. The strategy of ordered disorder that some call the « chaos »
Political unrest plunge the DRC in an insurmountable political and security instability. The neighboring countries, particularly Rwanda and Uganda, take the opportunity to invade eastern DRC and reoccupy these lands with rich soil and mineral resources, as between 1996 and 2002. Rwanda and Uganda would therefore be tempted to consolidate their hold on these lands, putting the Kinshasa government face with the done deal : namely, the effective loss of control of the eastern territories, occupied. This could lead to a centrifugal drift and a « Somalisation » of the Congo, that is to say the multiplication of vast spaces beyond the government control. This doesn’t mean, however, that these spaces should become new viable State entities, because of lack of popular support.
This is the disintegration of the eastern DRC, followed by a relative or pronounced chaos, that is to say the strategy of orderly disorder [13] in a country adrift, accompanied by looting of its natural resources by Africans themselves and the predatory Multinationals. We refute the thesis of the strategy of planned chaos [14] [15] emotionally developed by certain currents of thought. More on that in a proper analysis. This would result in a scenario of further division of the eastern Congolese space as a stage obliged to regional geopolitical recomposition developed by Africans themselves, that is to say the actors proxies international neoliberal powers. This would eventually lead to an outright atomization of the Great Lakes region in the context of federations and confederations that would put in place a new political space under the complacency of the international community (UN).
This scenario, which could be taken as utopia, is serious, as it is already conceptualized in some expert circles and international think-tanks. It could even happen fairly quickly. Indeed, in case of sudden collapse of Joseph Kabila’s regime, several dignitaries linked to Rwanda and Uganda, fleeing popular anger in Kinshasa, should be tempted to return to their sponsors as in 1998 when LD Kabila ordered the departure of Rwandan and Ugandan forces. With support from Kigali, Kampala and the international mafia involved in the looting of eastern Congo, these officials will not have militarily difficulties to reinvest eastern Congo and try to accelerate the final put out of control of the conquered lands by Kinshasa. It is unlikely that this adventure lead to the creation of a new state on the example of South Sudan. A state is created by adhesion of indigenous masses. But an overwhelming majority of people in eastern Congo are still hostile to the idea of losing their Congolese identity and be put under direct or indirect control of Rwanda. This hostility will not, however, suffice to prevent another Rwanda-Uganda occupation disguised in « rebellion » or secessionist movement.
Conclusion
On this note, worthy of a thriller, we conclude this overview of the scenarios which the Congolese people is likely to face in the coming weeks. As can be seen, the DRC comes at a turning point of its socio-political evolution. From the above, we can summarize with understatement that two major outcomes may occur. It will largely depend on the civic and patriotic responsibility of each Congolese whom have the opportunity to become actor and artisan of his fate as described in the political testament of Patrice Emery Lumumba. The first outcome is the consolidation of the gains of democracy by a pacific alternation in power, to ward off the specter of the 1996 – 2002 ward. The second outcome, a disaster, is the specter of the balkanization that threatens the DRC if sons and daughters miss their appointment with history.
However, from the analysis of all the scenarios described above, it can be argued that the context is very favorable to the political, social and civic forces decided to achieve democratic change. A new « conscious generation » of young people of the Congo and its diaspora is growing up and is engaged in writing the history of the Congo. The unanimous wish of change bubbling bowels around the Congo and throughout the Diaspora, coupled with the clear support of the international community, promotes this great appointment with history. Especially since the Kabila presidency assimilates together a reign of death (the endless massacres and assassinations) and lack of state authority; social exclusion caused by a kleptocratic governance which plunges more than 80% of Congolese in indecent misery, depriving the Congolese any decent dignity. These are some of the elements that militate in favor of the change, which is not supposed to escape the Congolese people by December 20, 2016.
Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu / Exclusive DESC
References
[1] Cf. JB Kongolo, « Dialogue (theater) or national conspiracy against the nation? « – Http://afridesk.org/fr/dialogue-theatre-national-ou-complot-contre-la-nation-jb-kongolo/ .
[2] Required by MPs of the ruling majority to interpret the Constitution, the Constitutional Court stated on May 11, 2016 that Joseph Kabila, incumbent President, will stay in office after 2016 if the presidential election is not organized.
[3] The President remains in office until the effective date of inauguration of newly elected President.
[4] http://afridesk.org/fr/opinion-quest-ce-qui-fait-courir-le-soldat-kamerhe-charles-kilosho/ .
[5] Analysis often used in the management domain that evaluates Forces (Strength), Weaknesses (Weakness), Opportunities (Opportunities) and threats (Threat) or a given situation envisaged or hypothesis.
[6] Cf. our analysis « If Tshisekedi rectified hit this April 24, 2016: http://afridesk.org/fr/opinion-si-etienne-tshisekedi-rectifiait-le-tir-ce-24-avril-2016 -JJ-wondo / .
[7] Ruth First, « New Masks », Le Monde Diplomatique, December 1975.
[8] JJ Wondo, the army will not assist Kabila: http://afridesk.org/fr/larmee-ne-sera-daucun-secours-pour-joseph-kabila-jj- wondo / .
[9] In Niger, as a result of the continuing political and Institutional crisis, during which the commander Salou Djibo took power by arresting President Mamadou Tandja. He suspended the Constitution and installed a Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD). It must be said that politically, the coup is encouraged by a series of decisions taken by President Tandja who wanted to run for an unconstitutional third mandate via referendum. Niger’s Constitutional Court decided that such a referendum was unconstitutional, but President Tandja took the decision to dissolve the National Assembly in May 2009 and a Council of Ministers convened by the President on 5 June 2009, approved a constitutional referendum to be held on August 4 in order to change the Constitution and allow President Tandja to stand for a third time.
[10] With no moving parts and hammers, guns armored vehicles become inoperative and turn into simple rolling toys unable to shoot. Yet the GR intends to use these armored vehicles in case of any urban or street fighting in the cities of Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, Goma, Bukavu and other major urban centers. The account GR take advantage of this enormous firepower to neutralize its potential opponents in case of complaints.
[11] Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p.122-123.
[12] http://afridesk.org/fr/les-indiscretions-de-desc-reunions-securitaires-armement-diplomatie-parrallele/ . Http://afridesk.org/fr/geopolitique-regionale- Katumbi BENEFIT-it-for-support-and-Zambia-Angola-dd-wondo / . http://afridesk.org/fr/le-duel-kabila-katumbi-la-continuation-de-lenjeu-geopolitique -in-africa-dd-wondo / . http://afridesk.org/fr/rupture-en-vue-entre-katumbi-et-kabila-qui-militarise-le-katanga-en-signe-peur- dd-wondo / .
[13] Laurent Gayer, « Neither war nor peace : endless wars (s) or disorders ordered. « News in wars. State of the World 2015, La Découverte, Paris, 2014, pp. 54-67.
[14] It is ordered disorder maintaining the DRC in a permanent political state of instability and widespread insecurity beneficial to the ‘new predators’.
[15] Why I refute the thesis of the chaos? Just because chaos is the status level of a structure where one is not able to make predictions. The chaos destroys the possibility of regulation or self-regulation of the relevant structure. In the chaos, even the person who establishes or causes no longer found and controls nothing. Now if we stick to this explanation, clear, we should not resort too easily to the concept of « chaos » to describe the situation in some countries of the world. This is for us a clumsy use of a term marked by an emotional connotation amplified and exaggerated. Indeed, a chaotic scene implies that neither the founder of chaos no longer control anything, especially in African countries where armed conflict are raging. But the geopolitical situation in Central Africa is more like an orderly disorder; well oriented to specific mercantilist purposes. Moreover, the disorder is to scramble the order, structure and organization of the structure without making it permanently inoperable.
